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Researchers studying intelligence ethics have rarely 
had access to the insight of serving intelligence 
practitioners. In this study, a small number of practitioners 
were sampled in an attempt to gain an understanding of the 
techniques they use to make sense of the ethically 
questionable tasks they are required to undertake within the 
legal framework of the institution of intelligence. The 
researcher argued that intelligence practitioners may use 
some of the neutralization techniques found in 
criminological and psychological models in order to remain 
effective in an environment which places their personal 
ethical framework at risk of compromise. In some aspects, 
themes seemed to correspond with the Rational Choice 
Theory of Cornish and Clarke (1986), the Neutralization 
Theory of Sykes and Matza (1957) and the Cognitive 
Dissonance theory of Festinger (1957). Themes were 
categorised under two primary headings: the institutional 
framework and a conceptual and theoretical perspective of 
ethics in relation to intelligence practice. It could be argued 
that intelligence ethics studies may be entrenched in the 
overarching fields of philosophy, criminology and 
psychology as they all offer useful explanations of how 
deviant behaviour is understood and justified by 
individuals. A combination of factors played into how they 
made ethical decisions and how they justified (or did not) 
these decisions. Findings suggested a combination of 





predetermined by the institution) and personal ethical 
frameworks (derived by each individual participant’s family, 
religion etc) were key in creating a working ethical 
framework (intertwining the former and the latter) which 
allowed/justified them in making ethical decisions which 
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 “The spy remains in his curious legal limbo; whether his 
work is honourable or dishonourable, none can tell.” 
 
 -Geoffrey Best: War and Law Since 1945 
 
1.1  Introduction and Positioning of Work 
  
Intelligence ethics. Some refer to the term ‘intelligence 
ethics’ as an oxymoron, the presupposition that there cannot be 
an ethical collection of intelligence (Jones 2010:21; Pfaff 2006: 
69, Andregg 2010: 735 et al). It was Andregg who noted “the 
terms ‘ethics’ and ‘spies’ do not combine easily.” There is, 
however more than one figure of speech which applies to 
intelligence ethics – there is the paradox of intelligence where 
the dilemma of intelligence in open societies is encapsulated in 
how intelligence services must secretly work to provide security 
in democratic societies, often by restricting or violating the rights 
of individuals whilst at the same time also respecting human 
rights and remaining accountable (Born and Wills 2010: 35). 
There may also be an irony of the intelligence domain. The irony 
relates to the fact that the intelligence services try to attract the 
most upright of citizens whose integrity and honesty is 
unquestionable, and then vet them over a period of months to 





induction, they teach them the lore of intelligence practitioners, 
‘tradecraft’, and send them into the field to lie, deceive, 
manipulate and coerce people using a variety of tools in their 
‘tradecraft’ toolkit. An explanation of the title of this study is 
warranted. The term ‘honest thief’ is clearly as much an 
oxymoron as the term ‘intelligence ethics’ is - yet it succinctly 
describes the dilemma of the intelligence practitioner who is 
required to steal and cheat, yet remain an honest man or 
woman.  Intelligence practitioners face complex moral and 
ethical problems which far exceed their having to lie, steal and 
cheat. They have to deal with issues relating to conflicting moral 
and legal duties where decisions have to be made “… in a time-
sensitive, uncertain environment, with varying context” (Bailey 
2012: 68).  
 
1.1.1 Definition of an Intelligence Practitioner 
 
In this work, and often generally in institutional and 
academic circles, the intelligence worker is referred to (often 
interchangeably) as an officer, official, professional or 
practitioner. The word ‘officer’ is more often than not used in the 
context of a military or police officer who is practicing 
intelligence. In the civilian service, the term intelligence 
professional or intelligence practitioner is a more appropriate 
term of reference. There is no correct or incorrect use of the 
words. For the purposes of this study, the word ‘practitioner’ will 
be used consistently.  
The intelligence practitioner is not an agent, despite the 
often confusing mislabelling by the media. He or she is 
  …a manager, a handler, a recruiter… the man whom he 
 locates, hires, trains and directs to collect information and 






In this research, intelligence practitioners were interviewed 
on the dilemmas they face whilst conducting operational activity 
which includes the use of ‘handling’ or managing ‘agents’. 
Although ‘agents’ are also faced with moral dilemmas as they 
engage in espionage or ‘spying’,  they are not the focus of this 
study as it would be an impossible task to survey a population 
whose identity, access and objectives is a secret known only to 
a handful of people. 
1.2 Research Question  
 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the broader 
research agenda by attempting to formulate a conceptual 
framework for thinking about the role ethics plays in the 
collection of clandestine intelligence in a statutory intelligence 
environment in South Africa. The research drew on a sample of 
intelligence practitioners whose daily work required of them to 
collect intelligence in ethically questionable (but legally 
protected) ways. The aim was to attempt to provide more clarity 
on the effect and impact ethics has on these individuals and try 
to determine whether they can engage in morally questionable 
behaviour within their personal ethical framework, or whether the 
institutional framework will give their activity more than just 
legitimacy, but also neutralize any feelings of guilt. The 
researcher considered the possibility that intelligence 
practitioners must adapt their personal ethical frameworks in 
some manner in order to remain effective because intelligence 
work requires a certain level of deceitfulness and sometimes 
dishonesty in order to deliver an intelligence product. The 
overarching research question that prompted this study was 






 What ethical views do a sample of intelligence 
practitioners hold in the collection of clandestine 
intelligence? 
  
 The research posed as its primary objective to design, 
contextualise and elucidate a qualitative survey to assist in 
understanding the views serving intelligence practitioners in the 
statutory intelligence agency in South Africa may hold relative to the 
ethics of clandestine intelligence collection. The survey was presented 
as the principal instrument by means of which the ethics of clandestine 
intelligence collection was analysed. It is contended that the study may 
contribute to the academic discourse on a subject largely unexplored in 
the South African context. The aim of the exploratory study was to 
determine whether a sample of intelligence practitioners adapted their 
personal ethical framework to accommodate ethically challenging 
actions within the institutional framework to make them effective. 
 
1.2.1 Sub Objectives 
 The stated primary objective was concretised in the following 
sub-objectives: 
 Describe the Institutional Framework (IF) in which an 
intelligence practitioner has to function.  
 Describe a possible Personal Ethical Framework (PEF) for an 
intelligence practitioner. 
 Identify and describe how an intelligence practitioner may 
have to adapt his or her PEF to accommodate working within the 







1.2.2 Scope of study 
This exploratory study was conducted on intelligence 
practitioners in the State Security Agency (SSA). It is 
emphasized here that this dissertation was not meant to provide 
an exhaustive or conclusive statement on the subject of 
intelligence ethics. The sample size was small (nine out of a 
population of around 500). The aim of the study was to provoke 
academic debate around the question of how intelligence 
practitioners in a specific environment may deal with the work-
specific ethical dilemmas they encounter.   
This study’s shortcoming may be that the historical context 
of the intelligence practitioners was not considered in depth. 
This shortcoming was not seen as essential to the overall goal 
which was to explore the subject from a criminological-
philosophical and not a socio-political perspective. The study 
also refrained from delving into the legitimacy of the State’s 
collection of intelligence, its choices of targets or its motives. It 
was also conducted in a Western type environment and is thus 
an ethno-centric treatment. The ethics found in other intelligence 
services, such as in Israel or the Russian Federation or China, 
are not considered. 
An extensive body of literature relevant to the focus of this 
study exists, both of a primary and secondary nature. In respect 
of primary sources, the study was informed exclusively by 
publicly available documentation. Secondary sources included 
books, journals, conference papers, publications by research 
institutions and Internet sites.  
 A precondition to authorisation for the study was that the 
thesis should not in any manner compromise secret information or 
insights directly derived from classified information. The research 
necessarily relies on the views of serving intelligence practitioners in 





precondition presented a challenge. It is a basic premise that the 
statutory intelligence agency would want to safeguard information 
regarding its capacity, capabilities and efficiency. Any information 
concerning the morale, efficiency or personal ethical views of serving 
members could be compromising to the Agency and exploited by its 
adversaries. In meeting this challenge, great care was taken to protect 
the identities, specific work areas and geographical locations of the 
members surveyed as the research was conducted at praxis, not 
theoretical level.  
 
1.3 The Structure of the Research  
 
This thesis will begin by introducing the institutional 
framework of intelligence and define key concepts to aid in the 
understanding of the functioning and methodology of the 
profession. Thereafter, the focus will shift to the two main ethics 
theories of utilitarianism and deontology in an effort to position 
the study of intelligence ethics within a particular ethical 
framework. A criminological framework will also be explored as 
intelligence practitioners may be classed as ‘deviants’ as they 
engage in practices which, outside of context, would be 
considered criminal or delinquent. In this chapter, the concepts 
of cognitive dissonance and ethical dissonance are introduced 
as these were considered useful in explaining the ethical conflict 
intelligence practitioners must necessarily feel. The proceeding 
chapter explains the research methodology used and provides 
insight into how the data were collected and analysed. The 
analysis of the data follows with rich quotes from participants 
and the highlighting of possible themes. Building on and 
referring to the literature review, the following chapter takes and 
combines the research findings into a logical argument which 





also explored in this chapter. The final chapter provides a 












 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF INTELLIGENCE 
 
 “The only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others.”    
 
John Stuart Mill (On Liberty: 1859) 
 
The profession of intelligence is practiced within a formal, 
institutional framework. This chapter will attempt to define and 
explain the concept of intelligence. It is important to define 
what intelligence is as a profession and to explore the work 
categories which are relevant to this study, that is, the methods 
of clandestine collection. 
 
 
2.1 Positioning of ethics in intelligence 
 
The concept ‘intelligence ethics,’ with denotations applicable 
to this study, emerged at the turn of the century within the 
criminology discipline. Subsequently, it has gained wide 
application in a variety of other disciplines and fields that include 
law, political studies and philosophy. In the late 1970’s and 





several academic articles (Born & Wills 2010: 40). After the 
September 11 terror attacks in New York and Washington, and 
the war against Iraq which followed, the debate around ethically 
evaluating the practice of intelligence collection and how it might 
be condoned or condemned, gained momentum. A watershed 
year for the subject of intelligence ethics was 2006, with the 
publication of The Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence 
Professional. The first international conference on ethics and 
intelligence was held outside Washington D.C the same year 
and was attended by intelligence practitioners, lawyers, 
academics and participants from nearly a dozen countries 
(Goldman 2010: xi). The Ethics of Spying readers (volumes 1 
and 2) have been useful references for the purposes of 
intelligence ethics discussions. The International Intelligence 
Ethics Association’s launch of the International Journal of 
Intelligence Ethics (http://www.intelligence-ethics.org) has also 
popularized the debate on intelligence ethics. On a theoretical 
level, ample literature has been produced on the inter-related 
themes of international and national security, intelligence ethics, 
international relations and statutory intelligence. Works of note 
include: Buzan (1991), Lowenthal (2003), Herman (2004), Buzan 
& Wæver (2005), Gendron (2005), Gill & Phythian (2006), 
Charters (2006), Drexel Godfrey (2006), Olson (2006), Perry 
(2006), Born & Wills (2010), Erskine (2010) and Bellaby (2012). 
In some of these works, authors have assisted in benchmarking 
normative ethical frameworks in the work of the intelligence 
community (Born & Wills 2010:40). Common themes in literature 
on the ethics of intelligence collection include ethical issues 
arising from the use of informers and agents and the ethical 
implications of intrusions into privacy through the use of 
technical monitoring (Born & Wills 2010: 45). 
Despite the historical interest in and ongoing debates 





often silent about the subject. Rolfe (2015: 1), in an address to 
the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Institute of 
Intelligence Professionals on 15 July 2015, observed: 
 … I can find nothing in the current ‘National 
Security System’ paper (published in May 2011) 
dealing with ethics… the New Zealand Intelligence 
Community website does not mention ethics and none 
of the relevant legislation seems to mention the term. 
 
Notwithstanding the often low-key approach intelligence 
agencies around the world has to have ethics, in the intelligence 
world, moral and ethical dilemmas are commonplace as 
intelligence practitioners and their targets are in a constant battle 
for supremacy. The intelligence practitioner working in a 
democratic society has an obligation to engage the target under 
the laws and conventions which guide the profession. This does 
not detract from the fact that they may still have to lie and 
manipulate to get the job done, actions which must go against 
their personal ethical frameworks. Lying and manipulation treats 
humans as non-autonomous, merely as means to one’s own 
end (Skerker: 2006: 145). It can be argued that the criminal (or 
foreign spy), is a liar and manipulator himself1 so exempts 
himself from the reciprocal web of deontological obligations and 
so frees others from an obligation to respect his rights. Yet this 
does not mean intelligence practitioners should not treat him or 
her with respect (even though they may not deserve it.) The 
proposition, as philosopher David Hume notes (quoted in 
Skerter 2006:145) is that those who do not obey the rules of war 
(barbarians) should not be dealt with barbarously but deserve 
“the chivalric restraint owed other soldiers”. Andregg indicates 
the importance of practicing intelligence ethically in a legal 
framework. “Without some law and some ethics we all may 
become barbarians” (Andregg 2010: 742). 
                                                          
1






2.1.1  Intelligence studies: the secret domain 
 
In addressing these questions, it came as a surprise that 
academic discourse on the question of ethics in intelligence 
collection is restricted to overseas studies and even then, due to 
the secretive functioning of intelligence agencies, qualitative 
information from current serving operatives is hard to find. As 
Duvenhage (2010: 70) rightly observes in his study of 
counterespionage, 
…documentation made publicly available by 
governments mostly refers to general espionage trends, 
while refraining from identifying and describing in detail 
the activities of espionage adversaries. 
Compensation for these limitations of source material, he 
goes on to say, can be partially achieved through inferences. In 
the case of this exploratory study, while inferences are useful, 
qualitative data would be better. The opinions of current serving 
intelligence practitioners are given scant attention and in the 
South African context, no attention at all. As will subsequently be 
elaborated upon, the ethical perceptions of the individuals 
themselves, as moral actors, is important to understand as these 
may have consequences to the intelligence agency they serve 
and, more generally, to the intelligence profession as a whole.  
Warner (2007: 17) notes that intelligence studies are two 
fields: one conducted on the “outside” with no official access to 
records and one on the “inside” where “ …a few scholars have 
intermittently enjoyed sanction (if not always complete) access 
to the extant documentation”. 
Warner notes that over the last 60 years, the governments’ 
of some nations have encouraged the academic understanding 
of their intelligence services and this has laid a foundation for 





scholars who have opened up the field to scrutiny. ‘Intelligence 
ethics’ now has its own association (the International Intelligence 
Ethics Association), a journal, The International Journal of 
Intelligence Ethics and an emergent cohort of experts in the 
field, such as Herman, Goldman, Erskine and Bellaby. 
Various studies have sought to unravel the mystery of 
clandestine intelligence collection in democracies and 
understand how the human beings responsible for collecting 
information in deceitful and manipulative ways respond to the 
ethical dilemmas which present themselves (Herman (1998, 
2004), Pekel (2006), Andregg (2010), Bellaby (2012, 2014), et al 
). Andregg (2010) notes that intelligence services do not appear 
to place a high premium on ethical training and books on 
tradecraft hardly even mention ethics. “Training courses may 
have one module on intelligence ethics which intelligence 
practitioners probably tolerate” (Andregg 2010: 737). Pierce 
(2007: 7) suggests that 
Before codes of ‘ethics’ must come very deep 
thinking among practitioners about an ‘ethos’ which is 
more about who they are at core than what they do, 
and what their professional identity should be. 
 
In the context of these shortcomings, it was felt research 
was necessary to understand how ethics and intelligence 
intersect in a specific statutory environment in South Africa. The 
new democracies (of which South Africa can be considered 
one), are often reluctant to talk about intelligence and this limits 
scholars access to information. Although this is challenging, it 
provides a good opportunity for scholars and academics to 
explore new fields and create ‘intelligence literature’ on topics 
which a few years ago, were considered taboo. The research 
focus in new democracies is generally restricted to how states 
can achieve control and transparency (Bruneau & Matei: 2010: 





moral dilemmas intelligence practitioners face during the course 
of their work. 
 
 
2.2 Defining Intelligence 
 
2.2.1 The concept Intelligence 
 
 
 The concept of Intelligence can be defined as 
 …mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, 
analysis, dissemination and action- intended to 
enhance security and/or maintain power relative to 
competitors by forewarning of threat and opportunities 
(Gill 2009: 214). 
  
Forcese (2015: 181) provides the following definition: 
“Spying” is a colloquial, rather than legal, term. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “to spy” as, among 
other things, “[t]o watch (a person, etc.) in a secret or 
stealthy manner; to keep under observation with hostile 
intent; to act as a spy upon” and “[t]o make stealthy 
observations in (a country or place) from hostile 
motives.” 
Information is gathered principally in two complementary 
ways; through scanning freely available public domain 
information, and through “more aggressive techniques 
penetrating the secrecy and privacy of others” (Gill & Phythian, 
2006: 31). The methods of intelligence collection are described 
as ‘tradecraft’ (Wirtz 2010: 59). These techniques are carried out 
by intelligence practitioners and involve avoiding detection and 
surveillance, secret communications and recruiting and handling 
clandestine agents. Sources and methods of information 





agency as compromise would give opponents or targets an 
appreciation of capabilities and interests (Wirtz 2010: 59). 
Forcese (2011: 181) provides the following (US Department of 
Defense) definition of intelligence: 
“Intelligence” is the “product resulting from the 
collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis 
and interpretation of available information concerning 
foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or 
elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.” 
 
2.2.2  The concept Clandestine 
 
Clandestine refers to the modus operandi employed in 
procuring information. Carl (1996: 98) defines clandestine as 
“secret or hidden; conducted with secrecy by design.” The 
acquiring of secret information requires intelligence practitioners 
to conduct clandestine activities because open access to certain 
types of information is denied. Clandestine collection activities 
are characterised by the best efforts of the intelligence 
practitioner to conceal the activity of collection, circumvent 
protective measures and remain anonymous (Crane 2003: 5). 
Carl (1996: 98) defines clandestine collection as “the acquisition 
of intelligence information in ways designed to assure the 
secrecy of the operation.” Dulles (2006: 51) noted clandestine 
intelligence collection is “a matter of circumventing obstacles in 
order to reach an objective.” He goes on to clarify what 
clandestine collection uses: agents, sources, informants who 
work in secret, otherwise the opponent would try to stop the 
effort. Dulles also mentions the importance of access in 
clandestine collection:  
Someone, or some device, has to get close 
enough to a thing, a place or a person to observe or 
discover the desired facts without arousing the 







…suggests information that the custodian (‘owner’) 
regards to be of such a sensitive nature that the 
unsanctioned disclosure thereof would be detrimental 
to the custodian’s interest (Duvenhage 2010: 88).  
 
Security measures such as classification and the physical 
protection of documents would, in the statutory milieu, mitigate 
against unsanctioned disclosure. Secondly, Duvenhage goes on 
to define ‘clandestine’ also as the modus operandi employed in 
procuring information since open access is denied to the agency 
seeking the information and clandestine methods of acquisition 
are necessarily employed. Lowenthal (2003: 8) describes 
clandestine intelligence, as opposed to overt or open source 
intelligence which is freely available through journals, on-line 
sources or libraries, as  
…intelligence which is acquired secretly through 
deception, secret monitoring, recruitment and handling 
of agents and other intrusive methods which impact on 
a person’s privacy.  
 
2.2.3  Overt collection insufficient 
 
Although much information is gathered through open (non-
intrusive means), if there was not an element of clandestine 
collection activity, the researcher suggests that the intelligence 
agency would be little more than a news gathering agency or an 
information think tank which had no more access to information 
than the average, internet-savvy person on the street. The fact 
that a small percentage of information is covertly acquired is 
essentially what sets the intelligence agency apart from similar 





There is an acknowledgement that countries have no choice 
but to engage in intelligence collection of a covert nature. Olsen 
(2006: 43) suggests there is no alternative: 
 
Should we abstain from lying, cheating, deceiving 
and manipulating and do without the intelligence they 
produce? 
 
No country can rely on overt intelligence alone and hope 
that their enemies will not take advantage of them. It just would 
not be safe. A statutory intelligence agency must satisfy the 
government’s need for intelligence, while competing with a wide 
variety of local and international mass media networks and even 
social media networks which can trap a government in an 
“information glut” (Meyer 1987: 28). Intelligence organisations 
collect information through various means, including SIGINT 
(from intercepts in communications) and HUMINT, which is 
information collected by people (Bruneau & Boraz 2007: 8) 
Secrecy is an inherent requirement to the intelligence 
profession. Statutory intelligence services exist to collect 
information, convert it into intelligence products and provide it to 
clients (Bruneau & Boraz 2007: 7).  
 
2.2.4  The aim of intelligence 
 
The aim of intelligence is to inform the state on threats, risks 
and opportunities with a bearing on national security and 
strategy. Ideally, the client uses the intelligence products to 
make decisions in the national interest. Born & Wills (2010: 45) 
assert collection of information is the foundation of intelligence 
which feeds the rest of the intelligence cycle. Information 





core business upon which the entire structure rests. Intelligence 
activity is frowned upon in most countries and world leaders 
have to justify to their citizens this ‘necessary evil’. Eisenhower 
called intelligence a ‘fundamentally repugnant philosophy’, but 
also urged Americans to understand and support this ‘distasteful 
but vital necessity’ (Olson 2006: 39). In the US, the threat to 
security that the Germans and Japanese posed during the 
Second World War changed the attitudes of citizens and 
politicians alike. Before the war, diplomacy was characterized by 
gentleman-like principles which saw national security as a mind-
set of the conservative few (Olson 2006:39).  
 
2.2.5  Arrigo’s insiders and outsiders 
 
 Arrigo (2006: 301) undertook research into the 
involvement of ‘outsiders’ – civilians who may even be 
unsympathetic to intelligence – to “negotiate practicable ethical 
standards for intelligence operations” and found that outsiders 
cannot impose moral constraints on operations. She cites a 
number of reasons for this, the most valid to this study being that 
outsiders cannot monitor intelligence operations. There should, 
however, be a contribution to the understanding of intelligence 
ethics from outsiders. ‘Insiders’ are members of the intelligence 
community. From Arrigo’s (2006: 310) study it is likely that some 
of the points of agreement and disagreement of the ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’ will apply to the South African situation. Both 
groups agreed that intelligence activities need to be 
conceptualized in a way which unites them with fundamental 
belief systems giving intelligence professionals the freedom to 
make moral decisions. Outsiders believed insiders did not seek 
guidance on the consequences of operations because of 
secrecy and the need to know principle. Insiders believed in the 





intelligence practitioners for unintended consequences of their 
operational actions, while insiders only took moral responsibility 
for intended consequences (Arrigo 2006: 310). 
Although the differing perspectives of insiders and outsiders 
is outside the scope of this study, it is important to note the types 
of concerns outsiders have when it comes to morally acceptable 
actions in the operational environment as this may have an 
effect on the perceptions ‘insiders’ may have.  
  
2.3 Methodology of collection 
 
Information is collected in various ways, both openly and 
covertly, and converted into intelligence. The next section will 
briefly outline two ways intelligence is covertly collected, 
namely, through agents and communication intercepts.  
 
 
2.3.1 Agent operations  
 
History has shown that human beings are still the most 
effective vehicle for obtaining intelligence. An agent may be 
deemed an ‘asset’ as she adds some type of value to the 
intelligence requirements of the intelligence agency. Forcese 
(2011: 181) suggests 
[h]uman intelligence may be provided by “assets” – 
that is, willing accomplices of the security service 
prepared to share information. 
 
It was concluded during the 9/11 Commission and the 
Silberman-Rob Commission which investigated the intelligence 





presence (or not) of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
that these failures were directly related to the US not having 
human agents on the ground (Hitz 2010: 257). Gill (2003: 11) 
notes: 
Certainly there were failures in gathering prior to 
911, for example, the failure of FBI and CIA (Baer 
2002) to develop human sources at home and abroad. 
 
Follis (2007: 641) highlights the importance of human 
sources of intelligence:  
Human intelligence collection reached its highpoint 
before the advent of satellite photography: in the fifties 
at least 75% of raw intelligence came from agents 
gathering information across the globe.  
 
This trend reversed in the seventies and more reliance was 
placed on technical collection methods. The neglect of human 
agents made the American intelligence community realise that it 
did not know what its enemies were ‘thinking’ after a litany of 
intelligence failures, not least of which was the 9/11 terrorist 
attack on New York (Follis 2007: 640).  
The use of ancient traditional tradecraft methods such as 
spotting, assessing, developing and recruiting agents by 
intelligence practitioners remains key to the success of an 
intelligence agency. These methods have been used since 
Biblical times where tribes have wanted to know what their 
enemies were planning; through the medieval times and during 
the renaissance, where ‘ambassadors’ acquired secrets from 
their rivals which kept them in power (Hitz 2010: 258). Herman 
(1999: 255) suggests that “pragmatists may have no objection to 
covert methods per se but worry about the effects.” He asserts 
that “it might be held that intelligence's activities undo the good 
done by the knowledge they produce.” Up until the era of 





because that was the only means available. There is a return to 
classical intelligence gathering using tried and tested means, the 
exploitation of the weaknesses of human beings to lever 
information. Often referred to as the seven deadly sins or 
secrets of espionage, intelligence practitioners exploit 
vulnerabilities and approach potential services to betray their 
comrades, organisations, or country (Hitz 2010: 262). Briefly, 
these approaches may be on ideological grounds, for monetary 
payment, a desire for revenge, entrapment through a sexual 
ploy, blackmail and intimidation and finally a potential agent may 
spy because of common ethnic, cultural or religious ties with the 
approaching country. Herman (1999: 257) notes that 
…some spies have patriotic or ideological motives, 
although avarice and other human weaknesses loom 
equally large; in 1995 the CIA was restricted over 
recruiting 'unsavoury' agents. 
 
All of these approaches have a certain level of deceitfulness 
and involve betraying the trust of others. Hitz (2010: 274) 
contends that 
more than or in addition to money, sex, ideology, revenge or 
ethnic solidarity, a potential spy must be comfortable in the 
duplicitous role-playing and manipulation of people that 
spying often demands. 
Carl (1996: 14) lists in excess of fifteen different types of 
agents including a deep-cover agent, disinformation agent, end-
of-the-line agent, hard-target agent and stay-behind agent. 
Duvenhage (2010: 103) also names many types of human 
intelligence sources, all or any of whom would form part of an 
agent operation:  
 Human intelligence (HUMINT) sources include, but 
are not limited to: peripheral agents, agents-in-place, 
access agents, ‘moles’, defectors, double agents, 
multi-turned agents (for instance triple agents), agent 





agents, penetration agents, infiltration agents, false flag 
agents, witting agents and ‘sleepers’. 
 
For the purposes of this study, a more general definition was 
sought, which assists in understanding the role an agent would 
play in an operational environment. Carl’s definition of a 
collection agent, best defines the word ‘agent’ in the context of 
this study as, “tradecraft jargon for an agent whose mission it is 
to collect information” (Carl 1996: 14). The various sub-
categories of agents employed in operations are not necessary 
to define in this study. Essentially, one of the prerequisites of a 
successful human source operation is the ability of an 
intelligence practitioner to exploit human relations. Bellaby 
(2014: 100) confirms this and notes that an experienced 
intelligence practitioner can get people to do and believe almost 
anything through the use of deception and manipulation.  
Although the subjects of this study are not ‘agents’ 
themselves, but managers of these agents, it was considered 
necessary to include these definitions of agents as their 
‘unethical’ activities are directed by intelligence practitioners and 
they themselves are often treated ‘unethically’ by practitioners. 
 
2.3.2 Interception of communications 
 
The interception of communication as a method of 
clandestine intelligence collection has been given much publicity 
since Edward Snowden exposed the bulk interception of data by 
the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States of 
America (US) and its allies. Carl (1996: 110) defines 
communication interception as “information that has been taken 





intended recipients”. Forcese (2011: 183) suggests that 
electronic surveillance  
…may include, for example, bugging – the 
placement of a listening or tracking device on or 
around the person in places where the person might 
reasonably not expect to be observed – or a wiretap – 
the intercept of communications over phone or 




In South Africa, communication interception is regulated by 
the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision 
of Communication-Related Information Act, no 70 of 2002 
(referred to the RICA Act from here onwards). This Act regulates 
the interception of certain communications and the regulation of 
the process whereby interception can take place (Netshitenzhe 
2004: 2). This is in keeping with international law and the 
sovereignty of nations where  
…a state is… generally free to prescribe the forms 
of surveillance and investigation it wishes in relation to 
people, places and things on its sovereign territory 
(Forceses (2011: 185). 
 
The RICA Act authorizes law enforcement agencies to 
intercept communication after a judge is satisfied that the 
identity of the ‘target’ is known; the grounds on which the 
application is made are clear; full particulars of the facts and 
circumstances are detailed; and whether other investigative 
procedures have been applied and failed (Netshitenzhe 2004: 
5). There has to be reasonable grounds for the judge to approve 
the application, so the gathering of information is necessary 
concerning an actual or potential threat to the public health or 
safety or national security. It can be said that covert electronic 





entrenched in international human rights law and also in South 
Africa’s Constitution and Bill of Rights. However, these rights  
…are not absolute – indeed, the protection they 
offer is muted, making them a limited constraint on 
state electronic surveillance so long as certain basic 
protections are observed (Forcese 2011: 193).  
Gill (2003: 5) asserts that a democratic state should conduct 
surveillance in a way which befits its status and  
…procedures should be designed in order that, 
even in the short term, the invasion of privacy is 
proportionate to the alleged threat but also to prevent it 
being directed at the wrong person or conducted in 
such a way as to amount to intimidation. 
Although the interception of communications is a technical 
method of collection where automated systems and complicated 
algorithms are used, the actual listening and interpretation of the 
collected data is eventually done by a human being, an 
intelligence practitioner. For the purposes of this study, the 
intelligence practitioner who may be involved at this level of the 
process may be part of the exploratory sample. 
 
 
2.4 (Unethical) Tools of clandestine collection 
 
The collection of information from human beings is a social 
and human process which takes place in the context of personal 
relationships. Rolfe expresses the opinion that a century ago, 
the intelligence profession had no rules, except, 'don't get 
caught'. Otherwise, lying, forgery, murder, or breaking and 
entering were part of the daily life (Rolfe 2015: 2).  
‘Don’t get caught’ is not an ethical solution, no 
matter how pragmatic it might be. All the cases I have 
considered have people at their heart. And if people 





ideas of ethics, ethical systems and ethical safeguards 
(Rolfe 2015: 4). 
 
The intelligence profession has been refined and 
professionalised over the last century, although some of the 
tools of the trade have not changed much at all. These are the 
tools which are available for the intelligence practitioner to use to 
illicit information from the human source. This is pertinent to the 
human source who is in possession of information but who is 
perhaps not willing to disclose it to an intelligence agency for 
one reason or the other. These methods (or ‘tradecraft’) are 
what may cause ethical unease in some intelligence 
practitioners. 
 
2.4.1  Manipulation as a tool of collection 
 
 Interestingly, some of these techniques are precisely the 
same as what the persuasive selling industry may use to sell 
their goods: persuasion, manipulation and coercion (Beitz 2006, 
Sunstein 2015).  
Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp define 
psychological manipulation as “any intentional act that 
successfully influences a person to belief or behavior 
by causing changes in mental processes other than 
those involved in understanding.” Joseph Raz suggests 
that “Manipulation, unlike coercion, does not interfere 
with a person’s options. Instead it perverts the way that 
person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts 
goals” (Sunstein: 2015: 10). 
Manipulation and coercion are practices which intelligence 
practitioners may use to elicit information from an unsuspecting 
target or target associate.  
Manipulation is a form of power that employs 
deception of those over whom power is exercised. It is 





resistance of others. Manipulation occurs when 
someone exercises power over other people, inducing 
them to behave as the exerciser of power wishes, 
without their awareness that power has been exercised 
(Beitz 2006: 213). 
 
Sunstein (2015: 10) suggests manipulation counteracts or 
undermines people’s ability to engage in rational deliberation. It 
requires skill and cunning to control the course of action of 
another person. Most people have probably engaged (at one 
time or another) in some form of manipulation, even if it is to 
gain the co-operation of their children. Manipulation, according 
to Beitz (2006: 213) is different from coercion in that the latter 
involves the inducement of someone to act against their will, 
whilst the former is an attempt to co-opt the person being 
manipulated. Manipulation, according to Beitz (2006: 214) is evil 
because the manipulator is enlisting the services of the person 
being manipulated to serve their goals and interests. This is an 
invasion of the person’s autonomy, and because it is done 
secretly, the manipulated person is largely defenceless against 
this attack. A person being coerced would be aware of the 
coercion, but not someone being manipulated. Sunstein (2015: 
3) notes that there is a concern about coercion (meaning the 
literal use of force) in both public and private law. In the United 
States, 
 
…the Due Process Clause is designed to impose 
procedural safeguards in the event of actual or 
threatened coercion on the part of government, and if 
private actors plan to resort to force, both criminal law 
and the law of tort will stand in their way. There are 
also legal constraints on lying and deception. 
An example of manipulation may be where the wife of a drug 
dealer provides information to whom she thinks is a charming 
associate of her husband, but is in fact an intelligence 





Misrepresentation is another form of deception. In the 
business intelligence environment, which Trevino and Weaver 
(2006: 349) are discussing, but equally true in the general 
intelligence milieu, misrepresentation involves misrepresenting 
one’s intent rather than one’s identity.  
Where the intelligence agency possesses knowledge which 
is potentially embarrassing or damaging to the agent, he can be 
blackmailed into working as a spy in exchange for protection 
from exposure (Perry 2006: 228). A rarely used tactic of creating 
an embarrassing or damaging situation for an innocent potential 
agent can also be used. Coercive recruitment should only be 
used as a last resort as this method converts a human being into 
a submissive tool with little or no self-worth. This element of 
control is essential in agent recruitment and William Hood in his 
book Mole (quoted in Perry (2006: 230) notes 
No espionage service can tolerate the merest whiff 
of independence or reserve on the part of an agent… 
With a new agent, the case officer’s first task is to 
manoeuvre him into a position where there is nothing 
that he can hold back – not the slightest scrap of 
information nor the most intimate detail of his personal 
life. Until this level of control has been achieved, the 
spy cannot be said to have been fully recruited. 
 
This is why it can be argued that agent recruitment should 
always be a last resort when all other methods of gaining 
information have been exhausted (Perry 2006: 240). People 
should not, without good cause, be manipulated into agreement.  
It is often thought that when people are being 
manipulated, they are treated as “puppets on a string.” 
Almost no one wants to be someone else’s puppet (at 
least without consent), and in some respects, it is 
especially bad to be a puppet of government. Many of 
the worst governments in history have attempted to 






Recruiting agents openly in a non-deceptive way should 
then be the next option, where the agent is both aware for whom 
he is working, and the motives of the recruiter. Where the agent 
is recruited through a false flag or other deceptive methods, or 
worse, through coercive means such as blackmail, should be a 
rare exception, only where the end result justifies such extreme 
methods. Perry argues that such extreme measures should only 
be used in the context of targeting a tyrannical regime which is 
threatening war (Perry 2006: 241). He concedes though that in a 
coercive recruitment, the agent – a human being with emotions, 
hopes and dreams - suffers real harm in the process.  
 
2.4.2  Deception as a tool of collection 
 
Deception is an essential tool for the intelligence practitioner 
to use where disclosing their true identity, or that of their 
principal, will result in, at best, not getting the information they 
need, and at worst, their injury or death. Deception does not 
come naturally to most human beings and has always been 
considered stressful – it is more difficult to lie than to tell the 
truth – however this cannot be accepted as a given. Bloom 
(2013: 170) points out that Judeo-Christian prescripts condemn 
deception as sin, but some variants of Islam (taqqiya and 
kitman) condone deception. Deception – telling an untruth – 
cannot be universally considered unethical from a religious point 
of view (Bloom 2013: 171). Whatever religion or society believes 
about deception has little bearing on the harm done to the 
deceiver and the deceived in the process. The deceived is 
harmed because his or her decision-making process is altered 
or hijacked (Bellaby 2014:100). Deceiving people comes at a 
price as it comes into conflict with their vital interests, that of 
autonomy, which is the individual’s ability to act as an end in 





control of external influences (Bellaby 2014: 105). Sunstein 
(2015: 7) concurs and suggests  
…a central problem with manipulation is that it can 
violate people’s autonomy (by making them 
instruments of another’s will) and offend their dignity 
(by failing to treat them with respect). The manipulator 
is leading the chooser to make a choice without 
sufficiently assessing, on the chooser’s own terms, its 
costs and its benefits. 
 
Recruitment of agents for gathering information is often 
done through deception (where the real recipient of the 
information is different to what is presented to the agent – as in 
a false flag approach (Perry 2006: 227). This misrepresentation, 
essentially a con game as Perry calls it, is aimed at getting an 
agent to co-operate where he would not normally because of his 
values, loyalties or conscience. Trevino and Weaver (2006: 347) 
define deception as  
 …falsely representing one’s identity with the intent 
of gathering information that the other party would not 
willingly share if one’s true identity were known. 
  
From a moral perspective, the agent is willingly supplying 
information, but this is deceptive because if he knew where the 
information was going, he would likely not provide it (Perry 2006: 
228). 
 
2.5. The purpose and paradox of intelligence 
 
Intelligence, as a function of the State, has as its raison 
d’être the use of special and secret methods to reduce uncertainty 
and maintain survival (Gill 2010: 49). Born and Wills (2010: 35) 
observe that the enduring dilemma of intelligence in open 





secretly work to provide security in democratic societies, often by 
restricting or violating the rights of individuals whilst at the same 
time also respecting human rights and remaining accountable. 
Born and Wills (2010: 35) call this the paradox of intelligence work 
where ethical dilemmas must often be resolved by the intelligence 
practitioners themselves in an environment where there are time 
pressures and demands for secrecy. The intelligence practitioners 
have to make ethical choices every day which may have far 
reaching consequences for the rights of individuals and for 
national security. Right2know, in its activist handbook entitled Big 
Brother Exposed (2015: 56) acknowledges intelligence agencies 
have a role to play where there are real threats to peoples’ safety, 
such as ‘gangsterism’, organised crime, xenophobic attacks and 
political assassinations. 
There are a multitude of non-state intelligence actors from 
corporates to private security companies and consultancies which 
also gather intelligence. As the state employs intelligence 
methods to reduce uncertainty and maintain survival, corporate 
intelligence aims at survival in the marketplace and profitability 
(Gill 2010: 50). Meyer (1987: 8) states: 
Throughout the world of commerce and industry, 
‘intelligence’ is on its way to becoming a key 
management tool for corporate chief executives and 
their policy making lieutenants. 
 
Competitive Business Intelligence is a regulated industry 
and entails the use of legitimate methods and open sources. 
From a statutory viewpoint, classical intelligence gathering is 
restricted to the South African Police Service (SAPS) Crime 
Intelligence section, the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) and the SSA. Intelligence gathering using clandestine 
methods by any other entity, even (or especially) any other 







 This chapter introduces the reader to the concept of 
intelligence as an area of research focus. The aim was to direct 
the attention of the reader to the functioning of an intelligence 
service and how its practitioners, by virtue of the nature of the 
work, are expected to engage in deceptive practices such as 
manipulation and coercion. This chapter sought to explain how 
the human beings responsible for collecting information in 
deceitful and manipulative ways respond to the ethical dilemmas 
which present themselves. The aim of this chapter was to create 
the foundation upon which the research question can be 
addressed as the research question relies on the views of 
intelligence practitioners who work within the environment of 
intelligence. As practitioners try to balance the task of protecting 
the citizenry from harm whilst simultaneously engaging in 
sometimes morally questionable behaviour, the question of 
intelligence ethics will be pertinent. With this introductory 
framework in mind, attention now turns to the subject of ethics 








 A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: 
ETHICS IN RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE PRACTICE 
 
 “We do not act rightly because we have virtue and 
excellence, but we rather have those because we have 
acted rightly.” 





This chapter begins by presenting two traditional ethics 
models of utilitarianism and deontology in an attempt to frame 
the thinking of intelligence practitioners on ethical decision 
making. It is acknowledged that other ethics models may also 
be applied to the practice of intelligence and the utilitarianist 
and deontological models are not the only models which could 
be applied. When these models seem to be inadequate, a 
personal ethical framework is described to better understand 
their thinking. This leads to the conclusion that there is no fit-to-
purpose model which will explain the ethical decision making of 
intelligence practitioners, and answers are sought in two 
criminological theories, the rational choice theory and the 
neutralization theory. These models highlight the argument that 
neutralizations allow and give expression to deviant actions. 
Exploration into psychological theories which better explain 
neutralizations was then sought and the cognitive dissonance 





framework for explaining how intelligence practitioners function 
in an environment with an ethical deficit. This chapter has five 
sections: 
3.1  Two philosophers’ views of intelligence 
3.2 Traditional ethics theories (Utilitarianist and 
 Deontological) 
3.3 Personal Ethical Framework 
3.4 Criminological theories (Rational Choice and 
Neutralization theories) 
3.5 Psychological explanations (Cognitive Dissonance 
model and Ethical Dissonance model.) 
 
 
3.1 Two Philosophers’ Views of Intelligence 
 
The two philosophers Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and 
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) had diametrically opposed views 
of the intelligence profession. Kant defined espionage as 
‘intrinsically despicable’ as it ‘exploits only the dishonesty of 
others’ (Herman 2004:180). Kant went further and claimed the 
employment of spies was a diabolical act and that the state 
should be prohibited from using them.  
Among these forbidden means are to be reckoned 
the appointment of subjects to act as spies… in a word, 
it is forbidden to use such malignant and perfidious 
means as we would destroy the confidence which 
would be required to establish a lasting peace 
thereafter (quoted in Olson 2006: 25)  
 
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, a realist, likened 
intelligence agents to spiders’ webs and rays of light (Erskine 
2004: 195). Hobbes asserted intelligence gathering was beyond 





practice but focuses on the obligation of the state to ‘get 
intelligence of enemy plans’ and secure the safety of citizens 
(Erskine 2004: 199). The way intelligence was collected was of 
far less consequence than the product it produced. Hobbes 
suggested that the state had a clear responsibility to engage in 
intelligence gathering, and likened intelligence networks to 
spider’s webs spreading in all directions. A state that neglected 
this responsibility was ‘morally reprehensible’ (Erskine 2004: 
195). The metaphor was meant to convey the idea that without a 
web extending beyond the spider’s ‘little cavity’, the spider would 
have no forewarning of danger from the world outside or indeed 
be able to exploit any opportunity, much like a sovereign without 
an intelligence capacity. To Hobbes, the state may have a 
scarcity of goods (in the modern sense, perhaps resources,) 
which may make it vulnerable to attack. In Leviathan  Hobbes 
observes 
…others may probably be expected to come 
prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and 
deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also 
of his life or liberty. And the Invader is again in like 
danger of another (Hobbes [1651] 1968: MacPherson: 
184). 
 
Many studies into intelligence ethics use the realist 
framework of Hobbes to describe intelligence gathering within 
the context of a nation state’s responsibility to protect and 
defend its citizens. The realist approach to international politics 
is often - and wrongly, as Erskine  (2010: 125) explains – used to 
describe the antithesis of an ethical approach. From a realist 
perspective, citizens give up some of their natural freedoms and, 
in return, expect protection. Actions that contribute to the good 
of the political community are considered justified in a realist 
framework (Jones 2010: 24). Realists believe that acting in the 
national interest is a worthy moral principle and so using 





end, is ethically acceptable and even ethically necessary (Jones 
2010: 24). Hobbes would argue that there are no limits to what 
methods could be used to maintain national security, so ethical 
standards can easily be lowered to accommodate the perceived 
national interest (Jones 2010: 25). Hobbes saw defense of the 
national interest as a moral duty and this informed his position 
on intelligence (Erskine 2010: 125). Shpiro (2010: 59) cites the 
Israeli thinking on intelligence ethics which is distinctly realist. 
Ethics are seen as a set of ‘recommendations’ which guide the 
intelligence practitioners and serve as behavioural guidelines 
based on certain beliefs. Herman is a key illuminator of 
intelligence ethics in a broader sense, arguing that the use of 
intelligence should be guided by ethics in the same way as the 
military has to justify the use of armed force (Scott & Jackson 
2004: 15).  
Nevertheless, intelligence rests on a basic ethical principle 
of telling the truth (Drexel Godfrey 2006: 2). Indeed, Drexel 
Godfrey reminds us of the CIA’s motto ‘And the Truth Shall 
Make You Free’. The ultimate aim of intelligence is to give to the 
policymakers the most truthful picture of a given situation, 
however the methods by which the truth is obtained, poses 
ethical dilemmas (Drexel Godfrey 2006: 3). Shpiro (2010: 61) 
explains the Israeli intelligence practitioner’s ethic is ‘tell the truth 
within the organisation but lie to the rest of the world’. 
 
 
3.2 Traditional Ethics Theories 
 
In a general sense, a normative ethical framework aims to 
identify the basic principles, criteria or standards which we 





to act morally in a given situation (Frankena 1973: 61). There 
are more specific normative theories to address issues such as 
moral value and moral obligation, but for the purposes of this 
study, moral values – what is morally good or bad, is relevant as 
this is possibly the cornerstone of any personal ethical 
framework. Ethics has two meanings. It can be, as the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Fowler et al.1964: 415) 
defines it, “the science of morals…moral principles or rules of 
conduct.” In this sense, it is defined as a value-neutral 
discussion of the boundaries of a normative framework. It can 
also be applied as an aspect of morality which encompasses the 
notion of right and wrong, guilt and shame – thus a value 
judgement on the rightness or wrongness of certain actions as 
determined within a normative framework (Born & Wills 2010: 
37). Ethics concerns itself with understanding the words ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, tries to determine the criterion for right action, and 
asks what the nature and source of moral obligation is (Joad 
1947: 8). Ethics relates to human conduct, as Lewis (1991: 3) 
explains, and most definitions of ethics emphasise right or 
wrong, good or bad, proper or improper conduct and are 
judgemental on human behaviour. To do the right or moral thing 
and to balance one’s own interests with the interests of those 
affected by your actions, is to act ethically. Born and Wills (2010: 
37) suggest the term ethics can refer to a “value-neutral 
discussion of the contours of a normative framework” or it can 
judge actions in a normative framework on the basis of their 
being right or wrong.  
Gray and Schein (2012: 412) suggest that the traditional 
thinking on how people make moral decisions needs to be 
reviewed when normative theories are developed. They assert 
that in the past, the line between moral psychology and moral 






Psychology examined is questions, developing 
descriptive theories about how people make moral 
decisions. In contrast, philosophy examined ought 
questions, developing normative theories about how 
people should make moral decisions. Recently, this 
sharp line between is and ought has been blurred as 
normative theories are advanced to describe how 
people make moral judgments (emphasis added). 
 
 
Gray and Schein (2012) and Conway & Gawronski (2013) 
argue that ethics cannot be compartmentalized into utilitarian 
and deontological arguments as in the past. This raises the 
important question of the ‘scientific validity’ of ethics. It should be 
acknowledged that the study of ethics is not a perfect science. 
Although the word ‘ethics’ is understood generally to mean ‘do 
what is right’, from an academic point of view, the phenomenon 
of ethics is harder to define. Many theories and models exist in 
the social sciences which attempt to understand the various 
facets and application of ethics. For example, Hulnick & 
Mattausch (2004: 47) define ethics as behaviour relating to 
professional standards of conduct. Aristotle was the first to admit 
that ethics is not an exact science (Joad 1947: 87). Theoretical 
science defines and explains the laws of chemistry and 
geometry, but the motives which cause people to act, and the 
consequences of their acts is far harder to define and explain, if 
they can be explained at all. Despite these limitations, no 
literature study on ethics would be complete unless two of the 
most important ethics theories, utilitarianism and deontology, are 
discussed. 
 
Normative theory guides individuals in the making of 
decisions and judgements about actions in particular situations 
(Frankena 1973: 12). A normative theory should provide clarity 
on what individuals should do or how they should act in certain 
situations and determine how others in the group or even in 





and explain this phenomenon for centuries. Dominant models 
which have emerged are utilitarianism, developed by Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832) and modified by John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873) who emphasized the superiority of non-physical 
happiness; and deontology, described by Kant who established 
strict standards to determine the moral acceptance of an action 
(Olson 2006: 24-27). 
 
3.2.1  Utilitarianism 
 
Teleological theory’s basic premise is that a good act is one 
which produces a balance of good over evil, and an act is wrong 
if it does not. Jeremy Bentham is regarded as the ‘father of 
utilitarianism’ and suggested one could evaluate the general 
effects of an act in terms of the pleasure or pain it produced 
(Olson 2006: 27). Bentham noted 
Take an account of the number of persons whose 
interest appear to be concerned, and repeat the above 
process with respect to each. Sum up the numbers… . 
Take the balance; which, if it be on the side of 
pleasure, will give the general good tendency of the 
act, with respect to the total number of community of 
individuals concerned…. (IV, 6, Bentham’s italics). 
 
The utilitarian system is defended in Mill’s work Utilitarianism 
and Other Writings, as a theory which  
[h]olds that actions are right in proportion as they 
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness (Mill, Warnock 
[1861]1962: 257). 
 
Utilitarianism holds that our actions and rules should be 
determined by which of them produces the greatest balance of 
good over evil (Frankena 1973: 34). Utilitarianism argues that 





aggregate happiness (Allhoff 2006: 128). A wrong action is 
therefore one which produces the opposite of happiness. Overall 
harm realized is measured against the overall benefit resulting 
from the activity (Charters 2006: 367). If the harm suffered is 
greater than the benefit, then the action is unethical.  
 Individual motivations are irrelevant in determining 
 whether an action is ethical. It is the end result that 
 determines if an action is ethical (Charters 2006: 
 367).  
 
Where the community as a whole benefits, any actions 
which lead to those benefits, are deemed ethical in utilitarianism. 
One cannot only measure harm/benefit accruing to individuals – 
all stakeholders need to be considered (Charters 2006: 367). 
The utilitarian focuses on the propensity for harm of any action. 
Gray and Schein (2012: 406) suggest that judgments of 
immorality are generally—and inextricably—tied to perceived 
suffering, although the prohibition of harm is not a precondition 
to determining whether an action is ethical or not, as long as 
there is sufficient justification for a greater good being achieved 
(Charters 2006: 367). The central issue revolves around the 
ultimate standard of right, wrong and obligation which is 
expressed in the principle of utility –the moral end of all that we 
do should be sought in the greatest balance of good over evil, 
although how good and evil are defined, measured and 
balanced is one of the difficulties of utilitarianism (Frankena 
1973: 35). Any definition will be subjective, because ‘good’ for 
one will not necessarily be ‘good’ for another. An obvious 
example is in war. A victory is good for the victors, but it is hell 
for those defeated. Hobbes’s view of ‘good’ is “whatever 
conduces to the individual’s favour” and “that which we desire is 
good; that for which we feel aversion, evil” (Joad 1947: 354f).  
Rule-utilitarianism emphasizes the importance of rules in 





the best consequences for a particular action (Frankena 1973: 
39). In practical terms, the law becomes a plumb-line against 
which decisions are made, and not a determination as to what 
would result in a greater good. Laws are often crafted for the 
general good of citizens, even though laws may not always 
seem just or fair. If there are exceptions which make obeying the 
law difficult, these exceptions should be dealt with legally (by 
enacting a new law), which should then be obeyed. Rule-
utilitarianism assumes the position that the right action is in line 




3.2.2  Consequentialism 
 
Consequentialism, a form of utilitarianism, holds that the 
morality of an action is contingent on the action’s outcome or 
result in a cost versus benefit calculation, in determining the 
utilitarian goal, that is, the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people. Erskine (2004: 201) quotes Herman as making a 
distinction between intelligence collection and intelligence as 
knowledge. Activities and knowledge have to be balanced in an 
‘ethical balance sheet’. The consequentialist position suggests a 
credit balance of intelligence results over collection (Erskine 
2004: 201). The moral justification of the means of collection is 
balanced by the positive impact of the knowledge acquired. The 
consequentialist approach argues that actions should be judged 
by the value of their consequences (Jones 2010: 25). This 
approach will not justify ‘anything goes’ as the means must 
always be outweighed by the ends. The common example used 
is the torture of a prisoner to extract information which will 





‘ticking bomb’ argument) (Born & Wills 2010: 46). Act-
consequentialism can justify harsh and extreme collection 
methods to the extent that it maximizes a good end (Jones 
2010: 26). Michael Herman’s position (in Erskine 2010: 127) can 
be paraphrased as follows: intelligence collection is the method 
by which intelligence knowledge is acquired. These two 
separate entities then have to be integrated into an ‘ethical 
balance sheet’ where the credits are the information (or 
knowledge) gained and the (less acceptable) methods used in 
collecting the intelligence are morally justified by the positive 
impact of the information acquired.  
Act-consequentialism essentially justifies the use of any 
intelligence gathering action – no matter how undesirable – as 
long as it maximizes a good outcome, that is the benefit of 
knowledge. If the end result is beneficial, then morally 
questionable means can be ethically pardoned (Jones 2010: 
26). The cost-benefit determination is extremely hard to quantify. 
Jones asks who determines the moral weight of the actions 
employed in collection? Who determines the benefits? How 
general should the benefits be? To one person, a community, a 
political party, to all the citizens of the country? Erskine (2010) 
concedes there is difficulty in using a consequentialist approach 
to legitimize intelligence collection, because defining both that 
which is good and that which is detrimental, and thereafter 
assigning relative moral weight to each point along the spectrum 
is an unmanageable undertaking (Erskine 2010: 129). One 
needs to address the unforeseen and unintended consequences 
of the outcomes of actions (Erskine 2010: 130). The causal links 
need to be taken into consideration when assessing the 
consequences of an action and the consequentialist approach 







3.2.3 Deontological theory 
 
Deontological theories – ‘deon’ meaning duty - reject 
utilitarianism in particular and in general, all consequentialist 
theories. In this theory, the focus is on the action and whether it 
is right or wrong, good or bad. An individual has an obligation 
(duty) to fulfil a promised course of action, no matter what the 
circumstances. An action is made moral by a person motivated 
by a good intention to do the right thing, regardless of cost and 
without any ulterior motive (Olson 2006: 24). There are a variety 
of deontological accounts (see Alexander and Moore 2008 for 
an overview). What most accounts share in common are the 
focus on moral rights and duties over consequences (Gray and 
Schein 2013: 413). The focus of the deontological approach is 
on evaluating the rightness or wrongness of an action, not on 
the consequences of the action (Erskine 2010: 131). Deontology 
is characterized by moral absolutes (O’Boyle & Dawson 1992; 
Ferrell et al 1989). Some acts are wrong in themselves, 
regardless of their consequences (Erskine 2004: 204). Act-
deontologists agree that judgements of obligation are based on 
specific situations and that general obligations must be rejected 
as being useless (Frankena 1973: 16). At the extreme pole of 
act-deontology are those who propose that each situation should 
be judged separately what is the right or obligatory thing to do. 
The individual, before embarking on a course of action, should 
ask him or herself whether the action is right or wrong and 
whether any reasonable man or woman in a similar situation, 
would act in the same way. In this way, deontological evaluation 
…is based on an inherent good or bad in all 
actions separate and apart from the consequences of 






Act-deontologists have no standard for determining right 
from wrong, rather it guides the individual into forming a 
judgement about what is to be done (by intuition or decision), 
after weighing up the facts and determining what is right 
(Frankena 1973: 23). There are no criteria, only general 
guidelines. 
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s categorical 
imperative deserves mention here. The categorical imperative is 
a command which is not subject to a purpose, for example not 
“do this to achieve that” but just “do this” (Norman 1998: 75) and 
 
[t]here is, therefore, only a single categorical 
imperative and it is this: act only in accordance with 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law (Kant [1785] 2013: 492). 
 
Kant’s ([1785] 1993: 421f) four formulations can be 
paraphrased as follows: 
Act on a maxim that could become a universal law and treat 
humanity not only as a means, but also as an end.  
These formulations are important for the purposes of this 
study. Kant saw people as an end to themselves, they are “free, 
rational and autonomous agents… they are persons, not things.” 
People should not be treated as a means to my own ends as 
they have their own ends and have value and dignity (Kant 
[1785] 1993: 429f). Kant declares 
[t]here is nothing more sacred in the wide world 
than the rights of others. They are inviolable. Woe to 
him who trespasses upon the right of another and 
tramples it underfoot! His right should be his security; it 






Kant captures the idea that there are ways of treating people 
that will always be wrong and Macdonald & Beck-Dudley (1994: 
617) assert that today’s criminal justice system reflects Kant’s 
absolutist demand: murder is considered universally forbidden. 
 The application of Kantian ethics to intelligence methods 
highlights the complexity of the subject. The approach does 
force intelligence practitioners to consider how individuals are 
treated (Charters 2006: 368). There is no reference to the 
validity of the knowledge gained through the action and any 
unacceptable method of collecting that knowledge. The 
deontological position on morally questionable actions would be 
absolute. Lying is always lying (no matter what the justification) 
and stealing cannot be morally justified under any 
circumstances, no matter how noble the outcome. No ‘bad’ 
action could elicit enough credits on an ethical balance sheet to 
justify the end, no matter how honourable (Erskine 2004: 204). 
In fact, the approach is absolute in its judgements and principle 
will always outweigh calculation. The Categorical imperative is 
important to the intelligence profession because categorical 
rules may conflict – such as – (1) the intelligence practitioner 
shall always protect the nation’s security and (2) an intelligence 
practitioner shall never steal (Hudson 2010: 1420). It may be 
impossible for the intelligence practitioner to honour both of 
these categorical imperatives. W.D Ross offered a possible 
solution to this conundrum by proposing there is a distinction 
between ‘prime facie’ duties’ and ‘actual duties’ (Hudson 2010: 
1420). Before an action commences, the actor has to weigh up 
the prima facie duties to protect the nation and to not steal and 
then the actual duty becomes the prevailing duty. Hudson, in his 
attempt to propose a deontological construction of ethics in the 
intelligence community, emphasizes that relative weight be 
given to each rule across the intelligence community in a 





hypothetical (Hudson 2010: 1420). His aim was to create 
deontological ethical rules which aimed to achieve a “desired 
ethical condition within an ethical framework” so that intelligence 
practitioners  
…are capable of reasonable ethical discernment in 
the inevitable situations where rules are absent or 
conflicting (Hudson 2010: 1420).   
The principle guiding the action, in Kantian philosophy must 
be universal. It can be argued that it is impossible to universalize 
a maxim of deception, “because if everyone deceives, both truth 
and deception lose meaning” (Jones 2010: 23). This would 
suggest all the clandestine collection methods would be ruled 
out from a deontological approach. Kant, however, seems to 
offer an argument for the too rigid application of this maxim. He 
believed that one duty may have a stronger ground of obligation 
than another, when there is a conflict (Kant [1797] 1996: 224). 
This may imply that Kant leaves the moral agent to decide 
herself which duty is more important. Kant argues we can only 
treat humanity as an end and never as a means only (Allhoff 
2006: 128). Harm, however, when factored in before an action is 
taken, can be justified. An action which has caused significant 
harm may still be deemed ethical, if the risk of harm was freely 
assumed (Charter 2006: 368). This assumption is highlighted in 
Skerter (2005: 155) where 
…actions in violation of a natural order may be 
acceptable in non-consensual, nontherapeutic 
instances (still in natural law terms) if performed by 
public authorities for the sake of the common good. 
 
Gray & Schein (2012: 413) assert that harm should be an 
important measure of whether an action is moral or not: 
 
Even young children, who seem like perfect 
deontologists because of their reliance on explicit rules 





principle as immoral if it causes harm—even if it is 
endorsed by God (Nucci and Turiel 1993). 
 
Even where suffering (the potential of harm) is only 
perceived, this should be adequate grounds for judging an act 
as immoral. Others argue differently about whether Kant’s rules 
can be applied too generally to ones’ actual life. White (2009: 
305) argues that Kant’s maxims only provide guidelines for right 
action and duties should not be applied too rigidly to real-life 
scenarios. White suggests that Kant “trusted in our judgement” 
and even acknowledged the fallibility of human nature (2009: 
305). In Kant’s words, 
… the perfect fit of the will to moral law is holiness, 
which is perfection of which no rational being in the 




3.2.4 Limitations of Utilitarianism and Deontology 
 
 Utilitarianism has some appeal for intelligence practitioners, 
as it may be used to justify ‘unethical’ behaviour. There is no 
measure of the motive for an action, provided there is an 
increase in the sum of happiness, so even a wrong act can be 
justified. The limitations of utilitarianism, in the context of 
intelligence, are, according to Charters (2006: 367), harms and 
benefits cannot be forecast as a consequence of any action and 
“intelligence, by its nature, is a self- interested activity”. By self-
interested, Charters pronounces that if the intelligence action 
benefits (the intelligence agency) then it is likely at the expense 
of another (target). Although Charters applies the utilitarian 
principle to business intelligence, the same principles may be 





It was always thought that ethical theory could be divided 
into deontology and teleology, and the theories are essential to 
understand individual judgements (Murphy & Laczniak (1981) 
and Hunt & Vitell (1986)). New research suggests there may be 
other alternatives to the utilitarianism/deontology framework 
which bridge the utilitarianism/deontology divide (Gray & Schein 
2012). Some researchers (Baack et al 2000: 39) lament the fact 
that these philosophical models may explain how ethics affect 
decisions, 
…yet there is no descriptive framework to explain 
how specific individuals make ethical decisions in 
specific situations. 
 
Researchers have argued that the two theories of 
deontology and utilitarianism propose competing positions on 
moral decision-making (Gray & Schein 2012: 412). They 
suggest this is evidenced by the use of 
 
…(so-called) trolley problems—moral dilemmas 
where an unpalatable act (e.g., murder) is pitted 
against desirable consequences (e.g., saving lives). 
Because deontology emphasizes acts over 
consequences, and utilitarianism emphasizes 
consequences over acts, these two normative theories 
aptly describe the two conflicting intuitions in these 
moral dilemmas. The question, however, is whether 
these competing normative theories describe moral 
cognition beyond the bounds of trolley problems. 
 
Trolley problems (Foot, 1967) provides a useful scenario for 
determining utilitarianist or deontological perspectives and this 
can be expanded to include similar dilemmas. Foot’s classical 
theory proposes that a runaway trolley can be stopped from 
killing five people if participants intervene by flipping a switch 







Participants are asked to indicate whether killing 
one individual to save the lives of five is acceptable or 
unacceptable. The former response is interpreted as a 
utilitarian judgment, whereas the latter response 
reflects a deontological judgment (Conway & 
Gawronski 2013: 216) 
 
 
Both utilitarianism and deontology revolve around the 
concept of harm and ‘harm’ is a key attribute in this study as 
intelligence practitioners are seen to inflict harm (in the form of 
invasion of privacy, deception, deceit) against ‘victims’. Conway 
and Gawronski (2013: 216) offer a succinct view of how the 
theories of utilitarianism and deontology are viewed as being 
mutually exclusive where 
[p]articipants must categorize a harmful action as 
either acceptable or unacceptable, thereby endorsing 
either the deontological or utilitarian principle. To 
behave in line with the deontological principle is to 
simultaneously behave in opposition to the utilitarian 
principle, and vice versa. Thus, the traditional approach 
confounds selecting one option with rejecting the other. 
 
Researchers, particularly in the field of psychology, have tried 
to find an alternative theory which does not force a utilitarian or 
deontological approach. When studying ethical dilemmas, 
researchers are faced with their own dilemma in that participants 
must categorize a harmful action as acceptable or unacceptable, 
thereby endorsing either the deontological or utilitarian principle. 
Ladkin (2006: 87) proposes Heidegger’s notion of ‘dwelling’ might 
be used to resolve ethical conflicts where a re-conceptualization 
of ethical action is sought. Gray and Schein (2012: 406) suggest 
that judgments of immorality are inseparably linked to perceived 
suffering, the fundamental link between blame and pain. They use 
a cognitive template (the moral dyad) to argue that  
 [p]eople do not separate acts from consequences  





 consequences from the agents who perform them  
 (as utilitarianism advocates). 
 
Studies, based on extensive research, suggest that ‘victims’ 
are a matter of perception and ‘immorality’ is automatically 
linked to perceptions of victimhood (Gray & Schein 2012: 411).  
In one paradigm, participants are asked whether a 
variety of ostensibly harmless transgressions (e.g., 
burning a flag) were a) immoral and b) harmed a 
victim. As predicted, the more acts are rated as 
immoral, the more they are seen as involving a victim 
(DeScioli et al. 2012; Gray et al. 2012a). 
 
Gray & Schein (2012: 413) propose that researchers may be 
mistaking philosophical theory for psychological reality. They 
suggest that the trolley problem paradigm forces conflict 
between the two normative theories of utilitarianism and 
deontology and presents a slanted explanation of moral 
cognition. These limitations to the utility of ethics theories are 
especially pertinent in trying to find a framework for intelligence 
practitioners’ functional behaviour.  
White (2009: 303) argues that Kant’s categorical imperative 
was never meant to be applied to every moral dilemma faced in 
life, but is rather a rough guide for moral intention and action. In 
this sense, it is the moral compass which guides individuals in 
the real world. White understands Kant’s application of 
deontology requires context, found in judgement. 
 
3.2.5  Modern application of utilitarianism  
   
 
Jeremy Bentham originally intended utilitarianism as a tool of 





century criminal penalties (Macdonald & Beck-Dudley 1994: 
618). Laws had to be measured by their ‘utility’ in respect of 
contributing to the good of the people. The principle of utility is 
still relevant today. ‘Spying’, in this case by the US’ National 
Security Agency (NSA) is justified by the application of J.S. Mill’s 
ethical principle of utility. In Hladik’s (2014: 30) critique of Alan 
Rusbridger’s observation that the mass collection of meta data 
by the NSA could be justified within Mill’s utilitarian framework, 
Hladik argues that its appeal to utility is unfounded. Hladik is 
critical of the NSA’s argument that the positive consequences of 
their surveillance practices outweigh the negative ones, so they 
are justified. The intelligence programs of the NSA are claimed 
to produce happiness in the form of security because they 
protect citizens from harmful attacks, while they produce 
unhappiness insofar as they rob them of personal privacy and 
freedoms.  
 The NSA argues the determinations are made in the dictates of 
security, however Hladik (2014: 35) notes 
  …although they judge the positive 
consequences to outweigh the negative ones, they 
cannot legitimately make this claim within the utilitarian 
framework to which they appeal since Mill argues that 
only an agent intimately familiar with the pleasures and 
pains involved can determine the dictates of utility.  
 
With this in mind, Hladik notes that the benefits of spying do 
not outweigh the drawbacks and the rights of citizens are 
arbitrarily infringed, a clear violation of the utilitarian calculus. 
There is no possible way the spying agency has made legitimate 
determinations about the utility of the actions so cannot claim 
the benefits outweigh the pain suffered by ordinary citizens. 
This modern application of the utilitarian model to real world 
politics is useful in showing the complexities of the argument are 










This dissertation aims to find a philosophical model which best 
describes how intelligence practitioners may deal with the ethical 
challenges they encounter in their daily work. The classical 
philosophical theories highlight what ethical dilemmas may 
confront human activity and may provide a framework for 
understanding how individuals should act in various 
circumstances but they fall short in explaining the unique 
environment of the intelligence practitioner. As each individual 
has his or her own personal ethical framework, one which is not 
necessary framed by one of the philosophical models, it was 
deemed necessary to include a section on the personal ethical 
framework. 
 
3.3 Personal Ethical Framework 
 
A personal ethical ideology impacts on decisions individuals 
make to participate in any human activity and this will include 
activity relating to the work of intelligence practitioners. This 
study assumes that intelligence practitioners are at first, human 
beings with personal ethical frameworks which may direct their 
behaviour. This personal ethical framework, in the view of Born 
& Willis (2010: 36), should be firm as it is the only safeguard 
against wrongdoing in intelligence work. Intelligence collection 
involves various activities where clandestine collection is but 
one. A blanket pronouncement on the moral acceptability (or 





various approaches that have been applied to collection 
methods disagree on the moral weights that should be applied to 
the range of collection activities. Erskine asserts the realist, 
consequentialist and deontological approaches 
…provide radically different ways of thinking about 
the ethical boundaries within which moral agents 
engaged in intelligence collection might deliberate, act, 
and, indeed, be judged. 
 
Erskine also asks if any of them can be applied to the 
activity of intelligence collection without condemning the very 
substance of effective intelligence collection.  
3.3.1  The moral compass 
 
 
Moore and Gino (2013: 6-7) use the metaphor of the moral 
compass to describe the “inner voice that motivates us toward 
ethically sound action” and which determines our internal 
standards of behaviour implying “both that our moral center is 
stable (a compass always points North) and its orientation 
clear.” It is therefore an inner voice which guides an individual 
into right or wrong action in various circumstances. A person 
who engages in unethical behaviour is said to have “lost” their 
moral compass and this could be as a result of social or 
environmental circumstances. The magnets within our moral 
compass can be strengthened if we surround ourselves with 
people or symbols we admire (positive role models) or even “… 
priming the idea of God increases prosocial behavior (Shariff & 
Norenzayan 2007)” (Moore and Gino 2013: 47).  
 Moore and Gino (2013: 56) believe the locus of control of 
our moral compass is often in the hands’ of others, and this 
results “in behavior that is inconsistent with our best selves” 





There has been much research on what motivates or inhibits 
ethical behaviour and how individuals respond to ethical 
dilemmas (cf Kohlberg 1983, 1984; Rest 1990). Henle et al. 
(2005: 219) acknowledge that a personal ethical ideology has a 
profound impact on decisions individuals make to participate in 
‘socially disapproved behaviour’. Other authors stress the 
important role and influence of personal values (England 1967; 
Christiansen et al. 1987; Freeman and Gilbert 1988). Frizsche 
(1995: 909) suggested specific values should be identified which 
could be linked to ethical behaviour. These studies show the 
importance of personal values in individual’s ethical decision-
making. Crossan et al (2013) have presented a decision making 
model which “integrates virtues, values, character strengths and 
ethical decision making (EDM).” Other studies propose that 
personal religiousness is a source of ethical norms and a 
contributor to ethical decision making (Clark & Dawson 1996: 
359). Researchers appear to agree that individuals possess a 
type of personal ethical framework, from which decisions are 
made. Ayal and Gino (2011: 3) quote research which suggests 
most individuals strive to be moral. 
In the same vein, people typically value 
honesty, believe strongly in their own morality, and 
strive to maintain a moral self-image (Greenwald 
1980; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong 1990). For 
instance, approximately 84% of individuals self-
report that they are moral and honest (Aquino & 
Reed 2002). 
 
The central core of personality contains one’s self-concept 
and this drives the individual: 
These central core characteristics may dictate the 
nature of other items which are closer to the surface 
(e.g., a religious person may dress in a manner which 
he or she feels is consistent with that religious ethic). 






Baack et al (2000: 40) see the importance of the Social 
Penetration Theory (Altman and Taylor 1973; Baack, 1991) to 
explain and examine the nature and structure of an individual’s 
ethical and moral framework and to portray the degeneration of 
a personal ethical code. Moore and Gino’s (2013: 3) review  
…portrays a moral pendulum which allows people 
to swing back and forth between the guilt associated 
with unethical temptation and a sense of decency 
elicited by justifications. 
 
3.3.2  A sense of morals 
 
All humans possess a moral sense and have a moral 
experience which helps them understand the difference between 
‘I ought to do this’ and ‘I would like to do this’, or ‘it would be 
expedient for me to do this’ (Joad 1947: 170). Frankena (1973: 
63) suggests that morality has more to do with traits of character 
rather than rules or principles. Stephen (1882: 155) reinforces 
ideas held by Plato and Aristotle that morality is more about 
virtues than obligations: “The moral law…has to be expressed in 
the form, ‘be this,’ not in the form ‘do this’.” This view advocates 
an inherent ethic, one which is in your DNA, not one imposed as 
a duty. Kant made the point that principles without traits are 
impotent and traits without principles are blind (Frankena 1973: 
65). Clearly, both may be equally valid to direct an action in the 
morally correct way, where principles of prima facie duty are not 
always clear at the moment of decision, and we have to rely on 
our ‘moral compass’. Moore and Gino 2013: 18 note that  
Social networks play a role in normalizing unethical 
behavior and can be a source of moral compass 
deviations as well. Socialization to unethical practices 
may become “contagious” through the network of 
formal and informal relationships that organizations 
foster (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998; Labianca, 






3.3.3  Organisations are amoral 
 
Human beings often function within an organisation (or an 
institutional framework.) Intelligence practitioners are employed 
in an intelligence agency. Organisations have their own ethical 
identity, but more often than not, the organisation itself is neither 
‘good’ nor ‘bad’. Moore and Gino: (2013: 16) assert that  
…some commentators have described 
organizations as inherently amoral—that is, incapable 
of attending to the moral implications of their actions 
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich 
2001; Clinard & Quinney 1973, p. 212; Gross 1978, 
1980). Gross even claimed that “all organizations are 
inherently criminogenic” (Gross 1978, p. 56) 
 
Certain professions are seen to have a reputation for 
deviance and research was needed to determine if this 
perception conforms to reality. A study by Rusch (2015: 6) 
suggested that the banking profession is characterized by sub-
standard morals. Rusch studied the ways bankers respond to 
various moral dilemmas as opposed to ‘normal’ people, based 
on the assumption that bankers have ‘less than standard morals’ 
and are seen to “have a low standing in public opinion” (Rusch 
2015: 6). The results of the study, which compared “the 
responses of professional bankers to the two standard trolley 
dilemmas ‘bystander’ and ‘footbridge’ to those of ordinary 
people” were interesting. There were 
 … no indications that individual bankers’ 
evaluations of the moral acceptableness of the 
behavioural options in these dilemmas deviate from 






The intelligence profession is not the same as the banking 
profession. 
The famous spy writer John le Carre (The Spy Who Came in from 
the Cold: 1963) wrote 
…what do you think spies are: priests, saints and 
martyrs? They’re a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors 
too, yes; pansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play 
cowboys and Indians to brighten their rotten lives. Do you 
think they sit like monks in London balancing the rights and 
wrongs? I’d have killed Mundt if I could, I hate his guts; but 
not now. It so happens that they need him. They need him so 
that the great moronic mass that you admire can sleep 
soundly in their beds at night. They need him for the safety of 
ordinary, crummy people like you and me. 
 
Le Carre’s character raises an important point – intelligence 
practitioners - as bereft of ethics as they may be perceived to be - are 
needed for the security of ordinary people. To paraphrase Henry 
Kissinger’s famous remark: “Espionage should not be confused with 
missionary work” (Johnson 2006: 271). A former director of the CIA, 
Allen Dulles said there are few archbishops in espionage and Richard 
Helms, another CIA director said “We’re not in the Boy Scouts” (Olson 
2006: 40). It is a dirty business conducted by men and women of 
integrity. The argument is that if the client (the intelligence agency) 
wants to know what is happening in the target areas, they would have 
to “hold their noses and pay” agents to provide the necessary 
information on drug smuggling, people smuggling, organised crime 
groups and terrorist cells (Johnson 2006: 271). The people who control 
and handle these agents are the intelligence practitioners who are the 
subject of this study. 
 
3.3.4  Contradictory moral standards 
 
Although intelligence agencies are not deliberately 





investigative arms may be required to function immorally. The 
functions which practitioners perform are defined not only by the 
organisation, but by Acts of Parliament. The SSA prescribes to 
the members which goals need to be reached. Moore and Gino 
(2013: 16) suggest that  
Organizational socialization sets up role 
expectations for individuals, communicates which 
organizational goals are important, and establishes 
appropriate ways to achieve them. Socialization 
processes per se are agnostic about questions of 
morality.  
 
The SSA is not in a position to attend “to the moral 
implications of [intelligence practitioners’] actions” but would 
expect professional performance in line with the laws of the 
country and consistent with the traditions of intelligence. 
Because of the silence of the institution on work-related ethics, 
the personal ethical framework of an intelligence practitioner 
may be a conflicted one. Hulnick & Mattausch (2006: 44) view 
secret intelligence operations as a ‘sphere of moral tension and 
even moral tragedy.’ They propose the justifications for breaking 
deontological imperatives by intelligence practitioners do not 
relieve them from guilt. In their view, intelligence practitioners 
are human beings who have to accept moral responsibility for 
their own actions. Immoral actions, however justified from an 
ethical point of view, elicit feelings of guilt and may create a 
moral deficit in the individual (Jones 2010: 28). Yet their 
professional ethics allow them to consciously break societal 
rules (without becoming bad people) and so are expected to 
operate in two worlds with contradictory moral standards (Jones 
2010: 29). How much leeway should an intelligence practitioner 
be given to achieve her assigned goals? Can she mislead, lie 
and deceive an agent in the belief that the “proper course of 






Phythian (2012: 13) refers to Kent Pekel’s research based 
on structured interviews with fifty CIA professionals. The serving 
officers saw intelligence as being ethically neutral and like 
journalism and the military, people were allowed to act in ways 
which would be wrong, were it not for the role (Pekel 1998: 3). 
Pekel’s research noted that intelligence practitioners believed in 
the moral purpose of the Agency (CIA) mission and this 
legitimized their actions which would be unethical if carried out 
by an ordinary citizen Phythian (2012: 13). Phythian refers to the 
term “social construction of threats” where policy makers 
develop this moral dimension to intelligence work which then 
legitimizes targeting and methods. Political culture and direction, 
in his opinion, is therefore linked to intelligence ethics. This 
leads to accountability and the price that citizens are willing to 
pay for the protection of the national interest. 
In intelligence, accountability is a key expectation. 
To be accountable (to the people or to a 
legislature) is to be under an obligation to respond to 
requests for explanation and information about one’s 
official actions (Beitz 2006: 217).  
 
Accountability is a safeguard against the abuse of power 
and in the case of intelligence practitioners, accountability is 
particularly important because of the magnitude of the power 
given to them. Being accountable should deter intelligence 
practitioners from using the powers of their office outside the 
limits of their authority (Beitz 2006: 217). Perry asserts that 
research shows that the public allows intelligence practitioners 
to make ethical trade-offs (if they serve a legitimate, 
democratically elected Government, as part of a social 
contract) but these officers should never consider themselves 





In the literature, it is interesting to evaluate the analysis of 
responses to intelligence scenario moral dilemmas which 
Olson (2006: 47) presents. In his study, one of the participants, 
Louise Corbin, a former CIA officer, had noted a change in how 
she viewed unethical intelligence activity, such as blackmail 
operations. She stated that blackmail is repugnant but 
confessed 
I cannot help feeling that my reactions are different 
today from what they would have been if I were still 
working at the Agency (Olson 2006: 47).  
She conceded it is easy to be mission-focused without 
critically looking at the ethical issues involved. She suggests that 
she did not lack a moral compass when she worked at the 
Agency, but now that she was outside of the intelligence world, 
she first judges cases in an ethical context, and then only for 
intelligence value.  
 
3.3.5  Moral drift of intelligence practitioners 
 
An intelligence practitioner striving to achieve strategic goals 
may have his or her moral conscience blunted and develop an 
‘at all cost’ type tunnel vision in reaching that goal. Moore and 
Gino (2013: 21) suggest that  
…by mobilizing and focusing our behavior toward 
specific ends, goals lead us to neglect other (often 
desirable) behavior (Shah et al., 2002).  
  
How are these conflicts between ‘overall happiness’ and the 
rights of citizens enshrined in the Constitution resolved by an 
intelligence practitioner at the level of his personal ethical 
framework?  





…a present but misdirected moral compass could 
seduce us with the belief that we are behaving ethically 
when we are not, while allowing us to maintain a 
positive moral self-image (Moore and Gino 2013: 7) 
 
Individuals’ morality is not cast in stone, but adaptable, or 
malleable (Moore and Gino 2013: 8; Ayal & Gino 2011; Monin & 
Jordan 2009). If an individual’s ethical framework is malleable, it 
can be moulded by various factors and influences and this can 
cause the moral compass to drift. One of the influences is the 
groups we associate with through social categorization, (Turner 
1999; Turner et al. 1987) and this could take place on the basis 
of similarities, which include assignment to the same group or 
work unit (Guzzo & Dickson 1996) (Moore and Gino 2013: 12). 
Rai & Fiske 2011, quoted by Moore and Gino 2013: 12, indicate 
that  
…the groups we create through social 
categorization influence the types of relationships we 
form, and also how we evaluate the moral content of 
our actions. 
 
Based on this argument, intelligence practitioners may be 
influenced within their work environment (social group) to accept 
certain unethical activity as a norm and this may cause a drift in 
their moral compass. This phenomenon, which Welsh et al 
(2015: 3) calls the slippery slope of unethical behaviour, is likely 
to take place gradually, where the 
… temptation to commit small indiscretions (Mazar, 
Amir, & Ariely, 2008) over time may gradually lead 
people to commit acts that are considerably less ethical 
than they may have originally considered permissible. 
 
 
The clash of personal and professional ethics is not new. 





conflict is evident. In González-Prende’s study (2011: 1) the 
conflicting values in the social worker profession are explained: 
Often, in the course of practice, workers encounter 
situations that bring them face to face with a conflict 
between their personal values and the values of the 
profession.  
 
 Shu et al (2011: 3) contend that 
[t]he vast majority of us hold very positive images 
of ourselves as good and moral individuals (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002) who resist shining a critical moral light on 
our own behavior. Most of us care that we are 




   
 
In this study, intelligence practitioners may be required (if 
not ‘forced to’) undertake unethical activities in the course of 
their work roles. Socialization may take place through being part 
of the organization and culture and receiving training on how to 
engage in these activities. Where the organization is perceived 
to be, at best amoral, or at worst, unethical, socialization into 
immoral activity may occur. It is clear there are influences on an 
individual’s moral compass which affect the way they behave 
which may cause conflict in the way they see themselves. 
Where there is conflict, certain adaptations need to be made in 
order to consider themselves to be ‘moral’ again. 
The concept of personal ethics was explored and how a 
personal ethical framework can be influenced by various 
environmental factors was given attention. The starting point for 





clear understanding of how ethics and the field of intelligence 
converge at application level. The personal ethical framework of 
an intelligence practitioner may be more prone to influence by 
external factors, or more adept at adapting. Born and Wills 
(2010: 37) quote Shpiro’s definition of intelligence ethics as “a 
set of behavioural guidelines based on certain 
beliefs…regarding the role of intelligence in society.” This 
section explored the various theories which are applicable to the 
study of intelligence ethics generally and as applied to the 
personal ethical framework of an individual intelligence 
practitioner. 
 It was considered necessary to look at other models which 
may have utility in explaining how intelligence practitioners deal 
with moral dilemmas within their work function. Answers were 
sought in criminological models. 
 
 
3.4. Criminological Models 
 
“Ingenuity was apparently given man in order that he may 
supply himself in crises with shapes and sounds from 
which to guard himself from truth.”  
   William Faulkner, Light in August 
 
Having determined that the intelligence practitioner must 
have a personal ethical framework in which he or she functions 
and where the objectives of the institutional framework demand 
activity which may conflict with the personal ethical framework, it 
is now proposed that some type of rationalization must take 





previous section, attention was given to the various theories 
which try to explain ethics. The utilitarian and deontological 
approaches are limited in their explanations of how individuals 
deal with ethical conflicts. The literature which describes a 
personal ethical framework suggests that individuals may have 
‘moral compasses’ which are influenced by external factors, 
including a work environment which is seen as ‘amoral’. The 
ethics models do not provide clarity on the focus of study and 
other models were sought to explain the environment. This 
section will introduce two criminological theories, the rational 
choice perspective and the neutralization theory in an attempt to 
understand how intelligence practitioners may rationalize and 
neutralize their ‘deviant’ behaviour. The use of criminological 
models is considered appropriate as these models describe 
deviant behaviour and how criminals rationalize their deviance 
and there is a convergence of views between the philosophical 
models and rationality. Although intelligence practitioners are not 
criminals, they may use the same justifications to normalize their 
behaviour and restore the internal conflict which deviance may 
cause. For the purposes of comparison and application of these 
theories, the researcher makes certain assumptions. Firstly, the 
person being targeted by a clandestine intelligence collection 
action (the target) is deemed ‘a victim’, although in most cases 
the target is in fact the perpetrator and society is the victim. 
Secondly, the intelligence practitioner is deemed the victimiser 
because he or she is conducting actions which would be 
considered criminal were they not legally sanctioned. The 
rational choice and process theories may both support the 
justifications intelligence practitioners make in their decision 







3.4.1 Utilitarianism and Rational Choice 
 
There is a definite link between utilitarianism, traditional 
teleology and the concept of rational choice. Macdonald & Beck-
Dudley 1994: 621) draw a clear distinction between the utilitarian 
concept of rationality as efficiency in allocating resources to 
maximally satisfy preferences, and the traditional teleological 
idea of the ‘rational man’ standard, where reasonable people 
avoid deviant behaviour and develop natural virtues. The 
normative problem of rationality is about what choices people 
should have and the rational choice theory prescribes the best 
ways to achieve these desires (Read 2004: 1). Bentham’s 
definition of utility found in rational choice theory has been 
revived by David Kahneman (1997) and measures experienced 
utility. Read notes that the experienced utility theory asserts that 
there is a ‘measurable good’ that is separable from the choices 
people make (Read 2004: 4). Kahneman makes a distinction 
between experienced utility and decision utility, the utility 
reflected in choices.  
With this introduction in mind, the rational choice perspective 




3.4.2 Rational Choice Perspective 
 
The rational choice model was developed by Derek Cornish 
and Ronald Clarke in the 1980’s and presented the offender as 
a reasoning person who 
[…used] cues present in potential crime settings to 





particular crimes and, if so, how to commit them 
(Cornish & Clarke 2017: 32). 
 
The rational choice theory may be useful in the study of 
intelligence practitioners’ actions because these individuals are 
consciously making decisions based on information at their 
disposal and the model is valuable in explaining this (Tunnel 
1992: 3). Akers (1990: 654) asserts that  
…human actions are based on "rational" decisions-
that is, they are informed by the probable 
consequences of that action. 
 
In this sense, the individual makes decisions in the context 
of a utilitarian framework, where the reward/cost balance or 
expected utility function is considered. The rational choice theory 
suggests that an individual will take an action, “criminal or lawful, 
which maximize payoff and minimize costs” (Akers 1990: 654). 
Gül (2009: 38) sees the core assumption of the rational choice 
perspective (Cornish & Clark 1986) that a criminal is goal-driven 
and acts according to a choice made on the basis of cost versus 
benefit.  Rational choice theory could apply to other individuals 
besides criminals and be a normal decision- making process for 
all individuals. The theory “posits that people make cost-benefit 
calculations to make decisions that guide their behaviour” 
(Cordy 2007: 41) and that it “implicitly assumes that human 
motivation stems from market-based cost-benefit analysis to 
maximize utility”. 
The criminal calculates the perceived reward against the 
costs and risks of alternative actions in the same way an 
intelligence practitioner may weigh up the benefit of a potential 
action (information gathered) against potential harm 
(compromise of agent, invasion of privacy, disregard of target’s 
right of association, movement etc). The rational choice model 





contemplation and decision making in the individual (Van der 
Hoven 2000: 193). The view that individuals make moral choices 
within the context of particular circumstances is found between 
the extremes of free will on the one pole and determinism on the 
other. Rational choice is essentially a social learning theory 
which includes a full range of behaviour encouragers and 
inhibitors including cost/benefit (Akers 1990: 655). An individual 
is not passive and unreasoning but is constantly being 
influenced by environmental factors and consequences. Akers 
(1990: 666) concedes that 
social learning is a behavioural approach to 
socialization which includes individuals' responses to 
rewards and punishments in the current situation, the 
learned patterns of responses they bring to that 
situation, and the anticipated consequences of actions 
taken now and in the future in the initiation, 
continuation, and cessation of those actions.  
 




Some of the basic premises of the rational choice 
perspective can be applied to the intelligence collection 
phenomenon where “sanctioned misdeeds” occur because the 
intelligence practitioner makes a rational decision to proceed 
with a deviant course of action. He or she is driven by a motive 
(in the case of criminals, the motive is financial gain; in the case 
of intelligence practitioners it is the collection of information to 
preserve state security). The three mental processes which 
Fattah (1993: 243) maintains occur before the offence are 
neutralisation, redefinition and desensitisation. Neutralisation 
enables the perpetrator to overcome moral and cultural 
obstacles before proceeding with a criminal action and this 





Hoven 2000: 195). Secondly, redefinition attempts to redefine, 
rationalise and justify the action and strip it of its immoral 
character. Desensitisation is an attempt on the part of the 
victimiser to desensitise him or herself from the pain and 
suffering of the victim so no guilt is felt and this is achieved 
through various techniques such as denial of harm caused to the 
victim, devaluing and depersonalising the victim (Van der Hoven 
2000: 195). Guilt is dissipated through desensitisation so no 
post-victimisation cognitive dissonance is experienced. One of 
the shortcomings of the rational choice theory is its failure to 
explain irrational offences, but this is irrelevant to this study. 
The techniques of neutralisation, redefinition and 
desensitisation may equally apply to intelligence practitioners 
who are called upon to conduct a clandestine intelligence 
activity. The intelligence practitioner may have to overcome 
moral and cultural obstacles (in terms of his or her personal 
ethical framework) before an action can be initiated. Redefinition 
of terms such as ‘stealing’ and ‘lying’ may be necessary to 
rationalize an action and strip it of its immoral character (Van der 
Hoven 2000: 195). Third, eliminating guilt through 
desensitization may be necessary for the intelligence practitioner 
to function efficiently. This may be achieved through 
depersonalizing a target person (giving him or her a number or 
code name) and by denying harm is caused to that person. 
Neutralization techniques will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section.  
 
3.4.2.2 Learnt behaviour in rational choice 
 
Akers (1990: 670) sees rational choice as a component of 
social learning where behaviour is learned by conditioning and 





reinforced by past and present reward and punishment stimuli. 
This is consistent with Moore and Gino’s (2013: 16) view that  
[…o]rganizational socialization sets up role 
expectations for individuals, communicates which 
organizational goals are important, and establishes 
appropriate ways to achieve them. 
  
In the context of intelligence practitioners, it can be argued 
that social learning takes place in the secret intelligence 
environment and the punishment reward stimuli may be seen as 
intelligence failure versus intelligence success. Essentially, 
intelligence practitioners are taught the skills of tradecraft to 
deceitfully acquire information through formal training but also 
through socialization within the culture of the organisation. If 
they use these skills optimally, they should be rewarded with 
good results and this reinforces peers (and the organization) to 
encourage further use of the same techniques. There is reason 
to include a moral cost dimension into the equation and some 
social learning models include “conscience, religious beliefs and 
commitment, and other moral attitudes and commitment” (Akers 
1990: 671). 
Bruhn (2009: 205) proposes that some organisations have a 
grey area ethic where the boundary between right and wrong is 
blurred. Bruhn quotes Nel as calling the area where the border 
between right and wrong is blurred, ‘the twilight zone’ (Bruhn 
2009: 206). Ethical grey areas are commonly found around 
boundaries which may be 
…physical, social, psychological, emotional, and they 
can be policies, procedures, rules, or formal or informal 
agreements. 
 
Bruhn (2009: 206) observes that every organisation has an 
embedded morality which establishes the boundaries of ethical 





conundrum to overcome, because practitioners are required to 
be ethically sound within the organisation but perform unethical 
activity as part of their work. There are no written or unwritten 
policies in the SSA which guide intelligence practitioners to deal 
with ethical and moral dilemmas they encounter in the work 
place. Bruhn suggests that managers are responsible for 
resolving grey areas in organisations and because there is often 
no written policy to guide them, they experience ‘moral stress’ 
(Bruhn 2009: 207). Studies show that managers rely on prior 
ethical socialisation to resolve ethical dilemmas. The 
organisation should be clear about what is ethical and unethical 
in intelligence activity and have specific guidelines and 
boundaries instead of leaving intelligence practitioners to decide 
for themselves and having to deal with the guilt or conflict which 
follows. Bruhn (2007: 212) concludes that grey areas should be 
anticipated and planned for, and policies developed to deal with 
the issues. 
 
3.4.2.3 Critique of rational choice theory 
 
There have been varied criticisms of the rational choice 
theory (Opp 1997; Jones 2001; Paternoster & Bachman 2001; 
Malesevic 2002) where the question of what constitutes a 
rational choice is mostly argued. Cordy (2007: 48) is critical of 
the reductionist nature of the rational-choice model. He argues 
that the theory presupposes all individuals are rational, utility-
seeking actors who are trying to maximise profit or gain. He 
asserts 
[…w]hen all actions are reduced to the 
maximization of profit, we learn little about where 







For the purposes of this study, it is useful to acknowledge 
this point, because intelligence practitioners may be rational, but 
their motivation to commit a ‘deviant’ act may not be self-gain or 
pleasure, it is to serve a greater cause. Other motivations may 
be ‘axiological’, which are 
… social actions that are rooted in values instead 
of ends, and situated rationality occurs when actors 
have ‘good reasons’ for pursuing an action. The 
reasons for their actions are often driven by strong 
belief systems as well as the actor’s internal motives 
(Cordy 2007: 48). 
 
These types of motivations are more relevant to what drives 
a rational thinking intelligence practitioner into action. The 
appeal to action may be loyalty and duty to country, the 
preservation of a secure environment or a desire to ‘make a 
difference.’ So a rational choice may also be toward a positive 
end, with a pure motive driving it. Even if a decision made to 
participate in a morally questionable activity is rational, there 
may still be conflict if the action is incongruent with the 
practitioner’s personal ethical framework. It is therefore 
important to highlight the techniques individuals use to justify or 
rationalize behaviour which may cause them discomfort. 
 
 
3.4.3 Neutralization Theory 
 
There is no perfect fit of any criminological theoretical 
framework for understanding the justifications intelligence 
practitioners use to perform their work, but there are useful 
framings which may explain how they deal with ‘unethical’ 
behaviour. Social control theory is a branch of social process 





offenders through social interactions or processes. Social 
Control theories introduced the self-report tradition where the 
self-report survey (asking juveniles about their behaviour) 
became the dominant form of gathering criminological data 
(Williams & McShane 1999: 190). This theory relies on social 
factors to explain the controls which are needed to prevent 
harmful activity. The reason for choosing social control theory as 
a possible framework for explaining intelligence behaviour is 
based on the assumption that socialization teaches us how to 
function in society. It was Hobbes who conceded that humans 
are basically evil and need socialization to help control them 
from acting out their desires. The Neutralization theory of 
Graham Sykes and David Matza (1957) holds promise in 
understanding how intelligence practitioners may justify 
unethical activity and embrace it as a norm of the intelligence 
subculture. 
 
3.4.3.1 Sykes and Matza’s Neutralisation theory 
 
Sykes and Matza (1957) proposed that delinquents can be 
freed from commitment to societal values through a process of 
neutralisation (Williams & McShane 1999: 193). The techniques 
of neutralisation create a state of limbo or drift in the individual 
who is then freed to commit a deviant act. Sykes and Matza 
emphasise the fact that deviants’ (who possess conventional 
values) rationalize their delinquent behaviour to make it 
acceptable to themselves and society (Bersoff 1999: 29).  
These rationalizations, known as techniques of 
neutralization, precede deviant behaviour, 
making delinquency possible by neutralizing potential 
disapproval from both internal and external sources. 
 
Thus, social controls that serve to inhibit deviant 





free to engage in delinquent behavior without serious 
self-esteem damage (Sykes & Matza, 1957). 
 
The neutralization theory has been adapted for use outside 
of the purely criminological framework in various studies. Sykes 
and Matza applied the neutralization theory to lower class youth, 
but conceded the theory was applicable throughout society. A 
case in point is Ertz et al’s 2016: 6) use of Sykes and Matza’s 
theory to identify how consumers justify the existence of 
controversial consumption systems such as commercial peer-to-
peer mutualisation systems (Uber and AirBnB). Christensen 
(2010: 554) indicates the idea of neutralizations has also been 
extended to a number of behaviours, including corporate crime 
(Leeper Piquero et al. 2005), the sex trade (Thompson et al. 
2003), shoplifters (Cromwell and Thurman 2003), the holocaust 
(Alvarez 1997), pedophiles (De Young 1988; Durkin and Bryant 
1999), hit men (Levi 1981), rapists (Scully and Marolla 1984), 
beauty pageant mothers (Heltsley and Calhoun 2003), and the 
perpetrators of a variety of other non-conforming behaviours 
(Copelton 2007; Eliason and Dodder 1999; Evans and Porche 
2005; Gailey and Prohaska 2006; Gauthier 2001; Green, South, 
and Smith 2006; Peretti-Watel 2003; Pershing 2003; Pogrebin et 
al. 2006; Vitell and Grove 1987). The theory has been widely 
adapted and used to explain behaviour (Divard 2013), especially 
to better understand consumer decision-making (Chatzidakis, 
Hibbert and Smith 2006, 2007; Brunner 2014; Chatzidakis, 
Kastanakis and Stathopoulou 2016). Ertz et al (2016: 7) noted 
this theory helps explain how individuals choose a certain 
behaviour which contradicts personal beliefs and values. In Ertz 
et al’s study, consumers applied neutralization techniques to 
diminish the sense of guilt or cognitive dissonance which was 
experienced. Bersoff (1999: 29) concurs that neutralization 
techniques are not the sole preserve of delinquent groups. He 
disagrees with the contention that neutralization, as originally 





…that a redefinition or distorted construal of an 
unethical action as being morally acceptable often 
precedes and fosters decisions to act in an unethical 
manner among people generally. 
 
In this sense, all individuals, not just deviants, use 
neutralizing techniques every day to redefine and justify 
unethical behaviour. 
Chi-Mei (2008: 252) studied 30 subjects in Hong Kong to 
determine neutralization techniques and found that 
neutralizations played an important role in the decisions of the 
subjects to offend. An important finding was that “the subjects in 
this study used different justification techniques before, during, 
and after their punitive offences”. Henry (1976) suggested that 
offenders perform neutralizations while contemplating their 
crimes, verbalizations after contemplation and before 
commission, and rationalizations following commission.  
Bersoff (1999: 29) notes that neutralizations 
…allow people to act contrary to the dictates of 
their values or attitudes without experiencing cognitive 
dissonance or any of the other discomforts which have 
been associated with perceived inconsistencies 
between one’s attitudes and behaviour. 
 
 
3.4.3.2 Techniques of neutralisation 
 
With this in mind, the researcher asks if it may be possible to 
apply the techniques of neutralization to explain how intelligence 
practitioners justify unethical or immoral acts within the 
framework of their society or culture, the intelligence realm. Four 
of the techniques of neutralisation are explained (Williams & 






 Denial of Responsibility. Acts are the product of forces beyond 
the control of the delinquent. The delinquent has no 
control over the situations he or she finds him or 
herself in and is therefore not responsible for his 
actions “I didn’t mean it”. 
 Denial of injury. No harm is caused. “I didn’t really hurt 
anybody.” 
 Condemnation of the Condemners. Those who disapprove of 
the act have wrong motives or ulterior agendas. Those 
committing deviant acts may also point out that those 
accusing them also engage in unethical behaviour. 
“Everyone’s picking on me.” 
 Appeal to Higher Loyalties. Some rules of society are 
abrogated for the good of other individuals or groups. 
They argue their violation of norms is to a higher order 
or achieve a greater value. “I didn’t do it for myself.” 
 
Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory has merit in 
explaining how individuals rationalize their deviant behaviour. 
Sykes and Matza acknowledged that there is an inherent flaw in 
neutralizations in that the use of valid justifications can be 
distorted into a context which is unacceptable to society. Bersoff 
(1999: 37) notes that there is a concession in that 
…the less moral ambiguity there is surrounding a 
situation, the less latitude an agent has in negotiating 
reality in such a way as to provide justification for an 
unethical action. 
 
In the case of this study, the view South African society has 
of clandestine intelligence methods is not known so intelligence 
practitioners may rely on their own perceptions of what society 
believes about their actions. In this way, their own perception 
may create a new reality which provides for their justifications. 
The fact that there is moral ambiguity around the intelligence 
profession could mean the practitioner may have little latitude in 





It is likely some of the neutralizations offered by intelligence 
practitioners prior to their actions and rationalizations afterwards 
could be interpreted in other ways. The aim of this study is to 
create a platform of possible explanations and not a rigid, 
deterministic viewpoint. 
 
3.4.3.3 Limitations of neutralisation theory 
 
Christensen (2010: 566) notes techniques of neutralization 
and rationalization may not serve the functions being attributed 
to them. The argument is made that there is a lack of empirical 
proof that techniques of neutralization neutralize guilt: 
 
  
There is no measurement of the individual’s 
feelings of guilt before and after the neutralization was 
uttered.  
 
Christensen (2010:566) notes that Copelton 2007; Eliason 
and Dodder 1999; Peretti-Watel 2003; Thurman 1984 see a link 
between neutralization techniques and the reduction of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger [1957] 1962) arising from violating the 
norms and values one is committed to. Cognitive dissonance will 
be discussed in the next section. 
Rationalizing behaviour, considered after an action, may 
also involve dissociation which involves altering a reality. Van 
Rees (2009: 4) suggests that dissociation means separation, as 
in regarding two things as separate from one another. 
Dissociation involves the resolving of a conflict or paradox by 
creating a new reality, one which is more acceptable. 
Philosophical pairs of appearance/reality is the basis of 
dissociation (spirit/letter, means/end and relative/absolute) (Van 





intelligence realm before, cited by Trahair (2004). The unethical 
practice of using women as honey traps (an operation to recruit 
targets through the use of illicit sex and threats of exposure) was 
used by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) (the 
Soviet intelligence agency), particularly during the cold war 
(Trahair 2004: 127). The practice involved the recruitment of 
women prostitutes (known as ‘swallows’) to trap foreigners into 
co-operating with the intelligence agency. Trahair noted  
…although some KGB officers felt guilty about 
forcing women into the role of a swallow, they did not 
feel guilty as professional espionage agents. They 
simply split or dissociated their selves (sic) from their 
role. 
 
Trahair observed that the KGB officers rationalized the 
honey trap by believing the swallows were serving their country 
(Trahair 2004: 128). This rationalising of an uncomfortable 
reality can also be seen as creating consonance out of 
dissonance (see below). The separation of an individual from his 
role, function or from an action may be an important rationalising 
mechanism used by intelligence practitioners. It implies a 
separation of two ethical frameworks, a personal one (where 
guilt would be felt) and a separate, working framework, where 




Control theories focus on the restraint of individuals to 
prevent them from pursuing their own interests rather than the 
interests of society. Social institutions are important to educate 
people in order to remain law abiding (Joubert 2000: 226). The 
training institutions in the intelligence environment and the social 





assist in socializing the intelligence practitioner into accepting 
unethical and immoral behaviour. Part of this process may 
require the intelligence practitioner to find neutralizations before 
and rationalizations after they have committed this behaviour. A 
theory which advocates dealing with the discomfort or 
dissonance caused by conflict in the personal ethical framework 
is the theory of cognitive dissonance. This theory may have an 
answer for the discomfort intelligence practitioners may 
experience as their personal ethical framework is tested by their 
engaging in repugnant behaviour. A model of ethical dissonance 
is also examined as it may support the idea of a rationalizing 
framework. Although the following two studies relate more to the 
field of psychology, it is important to note the underlying 
processes of neutralization and rationalization that are relevant 
to this study.  
 
 
3.5 Theory of Cognitive Dissonance  
 
The intelligence practitioner working in an environment 
which requires exposure to ethical dilemmas on a daily basis 
may bring about what social psychologists describe as cognitive 
dissonance. The theory was first published in 1957 by Leon 
Festinger and postulated that pairs of cognitions, or elements of 
knowledge, which are relevant to each other may be dissonant if 
the obverse or opposite of one cognition follows from another 
(Harmon-Jones & Mills 1999: 3). The individual who is 
experiencing this dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable 
and attempts are made to reduce this dissonance. Cooper 





A state of cognitive dissonance occurs when 
people believe that two of their psychological 
representations are inconsistent with each other. 
 
Shu (2011: 12) quotes (Festinger & Carlsmith 1959): 
Cognitive dissonance exists when there is a 
discrepancy between one’s actual behavior and one’s 





People generally see themselves as moral, decent, and 
ethical (Aquino & Reed 2002) and this cognition, when in conflict 
with a cognition arising from an unethical behaviour, causes 
dissonance (Gouws, Louw, Meyer & Plug (1979: 154)). 
The theory has its limitations as Bersoff (1999: 29) observes 
that dissonance occurs after a person has committed to 
behaviour. 
 Because of its post hoc etiology, cognitive 
dissonance is not useful in accounting for how people 
initially decide to perform actions contrary to their own 
values. 
 
Since Festinger first postulated his theory, there have been 
a number of revisions applied with limiting conditions. Cooper 
(2007: 73) highlights the conditions under which inconsistent 
behaviour produces dissonance. Dissonance is caused when 
decision freedom is high; when people are committed to their 
behaviour; when this behaviour leads to aversive consequences 
which consequences were foreseeable. Harmon-Jones et al: 
(1996: 1) confirm that over the past three decades, various 
revisions of Festinger’s (1957) cognitive theory have been 





… inconsistency is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to cause dissonance-related attitude change and that the 
production of aversive consequences is necessary and 
sufficient (e.g., Collins, 1969; Collins & Hoyt, 1972; 
Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Cooper & Worchel, 1970; Scher 
& Cooper, 1989). 
 
The possibility that consequences alone can cause 
dissonance-related attitude change and not only inconsistency is 
of value to this study because intelligence practitioners may 
rationally consider the consequences of their actions. When an 
individual engages in an undesirable (or unethical) activity to 
achieve an outcome, dissonance is experienced and this causes 
discomfort. The individual tries to neutralize it by creating the 
opposite cognition, consonance. One of the ways of reducing 
dissonance and increasing consonance is by exaggerating the 
desirability of the outcome (Harmon-Jones & Mills 1999: 7). 
Intelligence practitioners may use this mechanism to reduce the 
dissonance caused by conflict between their personal ethical 
framework and the obligation towards achieving a goal 
(outcome) – security, however there is no empirical evidence at 
this stage to confirm it. An adverse consequence which results 
from an individual acting without a choice or where the 
consequence was unforeseeable, will reduce dissonance 
(Cooper 2007: 76). The dissonant state will have to be reduced 
by an attitude change. One of the revisions of Festinger’s 
original conceptualization of the cognitive dissonance theory 
was the self-consistency interpretation of dissonance. The self-
consistency referred to how situations which cause dissonance 
do so because they create inconsistency between the self-
concept and behaviour (Harmon-Jones & Mills 1999: 13). This 
revision to the theory highlighted the possibility that individuals 
may experience dissonance when they behave in a way which is 
inconsistent with their self-concept as a moral person. This 





immoral or unethical and which jeopardizes his positive self-
concept (Harmon-Jones & Mills 1999: 14). Moore and Gino 
(2013: 26) see self-verification as a facilitator of moral 
justification. According to the self-verification theory (Swann, 
1983, 1990), “people are motivated to verify, validate, and 
sustain their existing view of themselves.” They are also then 
encouraged to associate with others who see them as they see 
themselves, as this confirms their self-concept (Swann, Pelham, 
& Krull 1989). Self-verification of one’s own morality will result in 
one viewing oneself as moral, regardless of the actual ethical 
content of actions (Moore and Gino 2013: 27). They concede 
that this 
… tendency can lead individuals to create and 
maintain cultures that may perpetuate morally 
questionable behaviours, as individuals will seek to 
remain in the company of those who confirm their 
positive self-regard, regardless of their actions. 
 
This suggests that intelligence practitioners may be able to 
maintain a positive self-regard within the intelligence culture, 
where they are surrounded by like-thinking individuals. Festinger 
hypothesized in 1954 that individuals tended to make their 
cognition and their behaviour consonant.  
Cooper and Fazio (1984) proposed, in an 
influential review of the dissonance literature, that 
"dissonance has precious little to do with the 
inconsistency among cognitions per se, but rather with 
the production of a consequence that is unwanted" 
(Harmon Jones et al 1996: 7)  
 
The unwanted consequences refer to an event which blocks 
self-interest or an unwanted event. The intelligence practitioner 
may experience dissonance as she tries to reconcile her activity 
to her personal ethical framework. There may be a conflict 
between how she views her moral code and what she is 





adverse consequences). Cooper (2007: 92) draws on research 
conducted by Claude Steele to suggest that when an individual’s 
self-system is threatened, they need to affirm its integrity. These 
threats may occur when individuals see themselves as being 
unworthy or dishonest. Ayal and Gino (2011: 3) draw on 
research done by social identity theorists such as Schlenker 
(1982) and Tajfel (1982), who have argued that… 
…people want to feel good about themselves and 
strive to maintain a positive self-image, which 
presumably includes viewing themselves as moral. But 
sometimes this requires a little immorality combined 
with self-deception. 
 
3.5.2 Cognitions which facilitate unethical 
behaviour 
 
Various studies have been conducted where researchers 
have attempted to measure peoples’ ethical responses. 
Bersoff’s (1999: 30) experiment with 120 participants who were 
overpaid to participate in a study, aimed to test the hypothesis 
that 
… unethical behaviour is promoted when people 
are able to develop and maintain a biased 
characterization of an unethical action as being morally 
acceptable. 
 
It can be argued that intelligence practitioners, possessing 
integrity and a strong personal ethical framework (based on their 
fulfilling the requirements of security vetting), must have some 
adaptive means to function in an environment where unethical 
conduct is necessary. Research will have to substantiate the 
hypothesis that the participation of practitioners in unethical 
functions may have an influence on how they view themselves, 





sometimes freely decide to behave in an unethical way which 
compromises their self-image, where they view themselves as 
being ethical and honest and this results in dissonance, anxiety 
and stress. Bersoff (1999: 28) cites various studies which 
substantiate the idea that defensive processes must necessarily 
be brought to bear in order to rationalize unethical behaviour. 
 
If an insult or potential insult to one’s self-image 
cannot be avoided, then a whole series of ego-defensive 
processes are brought to bear. These include various 
forms of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990), self-
handicapping (Jones & Berglas 1978), and verbal 
strategies such as accounts (Scott & Lyman 1968). The 
ultimate goal of these defensive processes is to sustain 
a phenomenal experience of the self as being moral, 
competent, good, stable and capable of choice and 
control (Steele, 1988). 
 
Bersoff’s (1999: 38) findings helped in the understanding of 
the cognitions which facilitate unethical behaviour. His study 
showed that in acts of social deviance, 
… people commonly distort the moral implications 
of their desired behavioural response and end up 
acting contrary to these motivations. 
 
Behaviour which involves dishonesty creates a threat to the 
individual’s self-worth and they would do anything to correct this 
situation and reaffirm the self-system. The researcher suggests 
that in the case of an intelligence practitioner, she may have to 
lie, steal or deceive (threatening her self-system) but then 
remind herself that she is working in the best interests of the 
citizens of South Africa – and this reaffirms the global integrity of 
the self. In so doing the threat is neutralized. The reminder can 
be seen as an attitude change, which is one of the techniques of 
reducing dissonance. When dissonance is high because of 
discrepancies between various pairs of cognitive elements, the 





the discomfort. Festinger (1957) suggested that changing your 
opinion about the element causing dissonance is an important 
strategy to restore consonance. The discrepancy between a 
decision made and the consequence can be minimized by 
justifications. Harmon Jones et al (1996: 1) note that in the 
reduced compliance paradigm,   
…participants are induced to act contrary to a 
previously held attitude, and if they are provided 
minimal external justification (few consonant 
cognitions) for doing so, they will experience 
dissonance and reduce it, usually by changing their 
attitudes to be more consistent with their behaviours. 
 
 
3.5.3 Reducing cognitive behaviour 
 
Shu (2011: 12) refers to studies by Bandura and others to 
explain how individuals reduce cognitive dissonance in cases of 
dishonest behavior (Bandura 1990; Bandura, Barbaranelli, 
Caprara, & Pastorelli 1996; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer 2008).  
People whose actions are at odds with their moral 
standards will modify their beliefs about their bad 
actions through moral disengagement in order to 
alleviate cognitive dissonance. Moral disengagement 
repackages detrimental conduct in a way that is 
personally acceptable by relabelling the questionable 
behavior as morally permissible (Bandura et al. 1996). 
 
Welsh et al (2015: 8) reinforce this point: 
 
Moral disengagement involves a dissonance-
reducing process through which an individual is “freed 
from the self-sanctions and the accompanying guilt that 
would ensue when behavior violates internal 






Moore and Gino (2013: 33) are of the view that moral 
disengagement refers to the means we use to neutralize the  
“self-sanctions that typically compel us to behave morally” 
(Bandura 1990, 1999). When these means are depleted, people 
may become susceptible to moral self-deception (Welsh et al 
2015: 8). It is a process which occurs in small increments over 
time, due to the self-deception that occurs along the way (Welsh 
et al 2015: 9). Moore and Gino (2013: 33) posit that moral 
disengagement disturbs the needle of the moral compass, 
moving it towards morally justified behaviour through its 
processes. Cooper (2007: 85) suggests that individuals change 
their attitudes to reduce dissonance to try and make the 
consequences of their behaviour more acceptable. People 
search their autobiographical memories for evidence they can 
use to support their new position following an attitude change, 
but this has constraints as reality can get in the way as there is 
prior knowledge of their true attitudes. Shu (2011: 15) introduces 
the term Motivated Forgetting:  
Individuals are curators of their own collections of 
memories; they act as “revisionist historians” when 
recalling the past (Ross, McFarland, Conway, & Zanna 
1983). People recall features selectively in ways that 
support their actions. They engage in “choice 
supportive memory distortion” for past choices by 
selectively over-attributing positive features to options 
chosen while simultaneously over-attributing negative 
features to options overlooked (Mather & Johnson 
2000; Mather, Shafir, & Johnson 2000).  
 
Shu (2011: 15) suggests that individuals can regain a 
positive self-image after acting unethically by revising their 
memory and “only recall rules that favour their self-image” and 
so forget the rules created to change their behaviour. Individuals 
may change their attitude in a way that makes it more closely 





(Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Martinie et al (2013: 1) note that 
individuals may also 
…agree to undertake a second, related behavior 
(act rationalization, Beauvois, Joule, & Brunetti 1993). 
They can modify their usual behavior (Dickerson, 
Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller 1992), play down the 
importance accorded to the cognitions involved in the 
state of dissonance (trivialization, Joule & Martinie, 
2008; Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm 1995) or feel less 
responsible for their behavior (denial of responsibility, 
Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé 2006). 
 
Dissonance may be reduced by believing the harm caused 
to a person through deceit is justified by a positive outcome. 
 
3.5.4 Dissonance and culture 
 
 Culture includes a social group’s values, ideals and 
symbols, shared rules and norms which are passed on from 
generation to generation (Cooper 2007: 137). These rules 
determine how an individual will think and act in a certain 
environment. Hoshino-Browne et al’s (2005: 295) cross-cultural 
study showed that 
…the characteristics of independent Western 
self-concepts that are likely to contribute to effective 
self-affirmation tend to reinforce people’s beliefs in 
their individual uniqueness or distinctiveness from 
other people. In contrast, the self-affirming 
characteristics of interdependent East Asian self-
concepts tend to reinforce a strong sense of 
connectedness or belongingness with important in-
group members. 
 
Cooper (2007) asserts that some cultures (North American 
and Western Europe) tend to be more agentic, that is, people 





Asia and India, cultures are more holistic, where people view 
their behaviour as being embedded in their relationships with 
significant other people (Cooper 2007: 137). This is similar to the 
African term of ubuntu which means ‘I am what I am because of 
who we all are’ (https://www.ubuntu.com). In a study conducted 
by Hoshino-Browne et al (2005: 294) where the effects of self-
affirmation on dissonance arousal were examined cross 
culturally, the researchers found that  
 
…both Easterners and Westerners can 
experience dissonance, but culture shapes the 
situations in which dissonance is aroused and 
reduced. 
 
Hoshino-Browne et al propose that dissonance emerges in 
culture-specific ways because culture plays a role in how and 
when such rationalization occurs. In terms of dissonance, 
studies have shown that Western cultures eschew virtues like 
say what we believe, believe what we say and take responsibility 
for our actions, whereas holistic cultures - where people view 
themselves in relation to others - are more complicated. (Cooper 
2007: 138). The suggestion is therefore made that dissonance 
reduction may only be a phenomenon of agentic cultures (i.e., 
people who prefer consistency among their behaviours and 
experience discomfort when there is inconsistency). The study 
by Markus and Kitayama (1991) attempted to answer the 
question of whether dissonance is culture-specific or not. The 
results were inconclusive and this question remains a matter of 
ongoing debate (Cooper 2007: 140). For the purposes of this 
study, it can be said with reasonable surety that lying, deceiving 
and coercing are actions which would be considered unethical in 
all cultures, so the question of cultural responses to dissonance 








Despite the inherent difficulties in measuring the attributes of 
cognitive dissonance and some of the criticisms which have 
been levelled at the theory, there does appear to be a place for 
the application of the theory to this study. Martinie et al’s (2013: 
7) conclusion serves to underpin what this researcher suggests 
intelligence practitioners’ experience in the course of their work:  
It is now well documented that individuals can 
reduce their dissonance by adapting their behavior or 
their thoughts. They do this primarily in order to avoid 
psychological discomfort and the associated negative 
affect created by inconsistencies between two 
cognitions. 
 
Cognitive dissonance is generally resolved overtly, but there 
is another type of dissonance which may be experienced at a 
more hidden level. This is ethical dissonance. 
 
 
3.6 Ethical Dissonance 
 
 
Ayal and Gino (2011: 4) suggest the phenomenon of ‘ethical 
dissonance’ could be similar to ‘cognitive dissonance’ but where 
the focus is on the discomfort caused by ethical, not cognitive 
conflict. 
Ethical dissonance is the tension that arises from 
the inconsistency between one’s actual cheating 
behavior and one’s ethical values or attitudes. We 
argue that the discomfort produced by ethical 
dissonance, similar to the consequences of cognitive 






Barkan and Ayal (2015: 9) see ethical dissonance as serving 
as a moral gatekeeper to remind people to maintain a set ethical 
standard, using the discomfort or tension the dissonance 
arouses. Ayal and Gino (2011: 4) make the important distinction 
between cognitive dissonance and ethical dissonance. In the 
case of the first, the action causing dissonance is more public, 
where attitude cannot be denied and so the tension they 
experience has to be reconciled by adjusting their attitude to 
match prior behaviour. In the case of ethical dissonance,  
…the unethical behavior, such as a minor 
instance of cheating, is hidden from other people. 
Thus, the adjustments and corrections people 
make to cope with ethical dissonance do not 
necessarily require them to relax their 
contradictory internal code. 
 
 
3.6.1 Ethical dissonance and self-image 
 
Barkan and Ayal (2015: 4) posit that ethical dissonance can 
be aroused when there is the breach of absolute criteria of right 
and wrong (e.g. the Ten Commandments; Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics). Ethical dissonance becomes a threat to 
the self by 
…including also the violation of social norms and 
failed self-integrity… people cannot solve this 
dissonance with a change of attitude, as explicit 
cutback of moral standards will further threat the self-
image. 
 
Moore and Gino (2013: 3) suggest that justifications resolve 
ethical dissonance by restoring the self-image, but they also 





their own morality. Shu et al (2011: 14) conducted research 
which showed that people “explicitly violate ethical standards 
while maintaining a positive view of [their] own ethicality.” Welsh 
et al (2015: 6) quote studies which show that  
 
…individuals not only desire to maximize the 
benefits obtainable in a given situation but also want to 
view themselves in a positive manner that corresponds 




3.6.2 Ethical dissonance and the environment 
 
Shu (2011: 6) suggests that environmental factors play a 
major role in determining ethical behaviour and cites the famous 
Milgram (1974) experiment and Stanford Prison Experiment 
(Zimbardo 1969). The results suggest that when individuals are 
placed in a situation where authority demands obedience, 
ethical transformation takes place and harm can be inflicted on 
innocent persons. Moore and Gino (2013: 38) assert 
 
…[o]bedience to authority appears to be a deep-
seated psychological response that only a minority of 
individuals naturally resist (Milgram, 1974). 
 
Other environmental or situational factors which may 
influence negative ethical conduct are, according to Shu (2011: 
7), “job context, incentive structures, and organizational culture” 
(Ferrel Gresham, & Fraedrich 1989; Treviño, 1986). These 
studies in organizational behaviour are important to note 
because intelligence practitioners are part of an organizational 
culture where the nature of the job requires a certain amount of 
moral dishonesty. In this sense, decision making is not only 
made in the context of the personal ethical framework but is also 





decision. Moore and Gino (2013: 39) assert that organisations 
may be structured in ways which minimize moral accountability 
for actions:  
 
First, bureaucracy and the anonymity it provides 
exacerbate the diffusion of responsibility—the 
minimization of moral agency that occurs when one is 
a member of a group. Second, hierarchy exacerbates 
obedience to authority and the displacement of moral 
agency onto organizational superiors. 
 
Within a bureaucratic environment where secrecy is of a 
high order, this phenomenon may be even more prevalent. 
Moore and Gino (2013: 39) suggest that employees of 
bureaucracies may possess a personal sense of anonymity, 
where  
…an individual is “protected, in so far as the office 
sets the limits of his responsibility, from both the 
bludgeons of critics and the sharp thrust of his own 
conscience” (Hughes, 1937, p. 406) 
 
Anonymity therefore affords individuals the benefit of “not 
feeling like themselves” and unobserved actions are often 
consistent with no consequences. Moore and Gino (2013: 49) 
concede that an individual’s sense of anonymity is “undermined 
when they believe they are being monitored.”  
 
 
3.6.3 Ethical dissonance and ambiguity 
 
An important factor which Ayal and Gino: (2011: 7) highlight 
is that ambiguity blurs the criteria for judging what is right and 
what is wrong and allows individuals to reinterpret behavior 





Barkan and Ayal (2015: 6) assert that people have the ability 
to pre-empt ethical dissonance by using justifications which 
redefine unethical behavior as a ‘non’ -violation. Their view is 
that 
[A]mbiguity and grey areas allow people to blur the 
difference between right and wrong, and diminish the 
threat to the moral-self. 
 
If there is no ambiguity and an action is clearly wrong, 
rational mechanisms (Ayal and Gino 2011: 7ff) can be used to 
reduce dissonance, such as moral cleansing (Tetlock, Kristel, 
Elson, Green, and Lerner 2000). Moral cleansing is a process 
whereby individuals can purge negative feelings after an 
unethical act and allows them to distance themselves from the 
act and start afresh. One of the methods of moral cleansing is 
‘emotional accounting’ where an individual may try to counter 
unethical behavior after the fact by acting in ethical ways to add 
‘credits’ to the moral ledger to counter the debits in the utilitarian 
tradition.  
 
3.6.4 From wrong behaviour into right 
 
Barkan and Ayal (2015: 6) introduce the concept of self-
serving altruism. Anticipated dissonance can be neutralized by 
harnessing altruism to turn wrong behaviour into right.  
Unlike a lie that benefits only the liar, if a lie 
benefits another person as well, it can be justified, and 
redefined as altruistic. 
 Ayal and Gino (2011: 13) quote research by Latane (1981) 
on diffusion of responsibility behaviour and Loewenstein, 
Thompson, & Bazerman’s (1989) research on how individuals 
involved in deviant behavior attempt to neutralize the 





instance, diffusion of responsibility relates to how individuals in 
groups may diffuse responsibility amongst other members in the 
group, thereby reducing their own responsibility (Latane 1981). 
Ayal and Gino (2011: 13) make the important point that 
…[s]everal studies have demonstrated that people 
care not only about their own benefits, but also about 
their utility to others (i.e., social utility; Loewenstein et 
al., 1989). 
This may serve as a relevant motivating factor in justifying 
the work of intelligence practitioners. Members within the group 
compare themselves to others in the group to “maintain or 
enhance positive social identity and self-esteem” (Ayal and Gino 
2011:17). If ‘deviance’ is allowed within the group, it may be 
seen as a norm, but if the same activity is undertaken outside of 
the group, it will be seen as ‘deviant’ by the in-group. The in-
group members may still display signs of moral hypocrisy – 
where an individual can believe one thing, whilst acting contrary 
to it (Ayal and Gino 2011; Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, 
Kampf, & Wilson 1997). Barkan and Ayal (2015: 7) describe 
moral hypocrisy as a “cynical post-violation justification [which] 
allows people to hold two distinct belief systems”. In so doing, 
individuals distort their understanding of their actions (Moore 
and Gino 2012: 23) and reframe immoral actions as defensible 
(Barkan and Ayal 2015: 9). 
 
 
3.6.5 Sanitizing unethical practices  
 
 Organisations often use euphemistic language and rename 
“practices or products to make them seem more innocuous and 
hence more legitimate than they actually are” Moore and Gino 
(2013: 27). They quote empirical studies “which confirm that 





practices, facilitating our participation in them.” So, language is 
an important facilitator of how a decision should be understood 
and allows an individual to choose appropriately. In this sense, 
the moral justification and the use of euphemistic labels allows 
one to maintain the self-image of a moral person and dispel 






For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that any 
conflict in an individual’s personal ethical framework leads to 
discomfort which demands a return to comfort through some 
sort of rationalization process which is supported by various 
studies. It is likely that these processes take place over time in 
what Welsh et al (2015: 4) describe as a slippery slope into 
unethical behaviour.  
Dissonance may be aroused when people compare the 
consequences of their behaviour to a moral standard and 
become uncomfortable when the results are disappointing. The 
restoration of the self-image to one that is seen as moral 
becomes a necessary endeavour and various techniques were 
highlighted in this study. The intelligence practitioner who 
engages in clandestine action may feel cognitive and/or ethical 
dissonance in the course of the work and try to rationalize their 
behaviour by changing an attitude or redefining what ‘normal’ is 
in an intelligence culture which has ambiguous values and a 








The research objective of this paper is to delve into the 
responses of a particular group of people (intelligence 
practitioners) in a particular environment (intelligence sector) 
who engage in specific actions (clandestine intelligence 
collection) with a view to understanding the ethical dilemmas 
they face in so doing. Chapter 2 described the environment in 
which these practitioners exist and some of the actions which 
they engage in which define the work of intelligence collection. 
These actions may be seen as deviant by society and ethically 
questionable so the application of ethical theories to these 
activities was essential. This section highlighted the various 
ethical models which philosophers over the centuries have 
suggested may explain responses to ethical dilemmas. These 
fell into the broad categories of utilitarianism and deontology.  
New research suggests there may be other alternatives to the 
utilitarianism/deontology framework which bridge the historical 
divide that pitted the one philosophy against the other and this 
was explored in the chapter. Utilitarianism and deontology may 
explain how ethics affect decisions, but fail to provide answers 
as to how specific individuals make ethical decisions in specific 
situations. The shortcomings of these models led to an 
inadequate framework for understanding intelligence ethics and 
innovative theories in the criminological and psychological fields 
were applied.   The various types of neutralizations and 
rationalizations which intelligence practitioners may use to 
enable them to function in an ethically-challenging environment 
were explored.  
Having thus explained the institutional framework in which 
practitioners work and the nature of the work itself in Chapter 2 
and the application of a selection of philosophical, criminological 
and psychological models to the types of dilemmas faced by 





and the next chapter will describe and explain the methodology 















This chapter will describe and explain the research methodology 
used to gather data to explore possible answers to the research 
question. The aim of the research, the participants, the data collection 
and analysis process and the ethical considerations which relate to the 
study are also described. It will conclude with the limitations to 
qualitative research, and an assessment of the study’s reliability and 
validity. 
At the onset, it should be appreciated that the study of the 
phenomenon of intelligence is unique because of the secretive 
environment. A study which seeks to assess the ethics of serving 
intelligence practitioners in a statutory environment is a daunting task 
but it is a challenge which has been experienced by other researchers 
before. Born & Wills (2010: 36) concede that the study of intelligence 
ethics is hindered by the secrecy which surrounds the profession: 
 A further barrier to the study of ethics is the lack of 
information about ethical standards in intelligence available in 
the public domain. Official codes of conduct for intelligence 
officials are seldom made public. 
 
The secrecy makes it difficult to evaluate the conduct of 
intelligence agencies against any specific guidelines. Gill (2010: 





to make because of the “secrecy, uncertainty and complexity 
that characterize the field of intelligence.” Bruneau and Boraz 
(2007: 1) concede there has hardly been any consensus on 
how to research and study the intelligence community, and 
often what is passed off as data or analysis can be wrong. They 
go on to note that there is no public control or competing 
positions to correct the errors as there would be in academia. 
Erskine (2004: 210) agrees that further investigation into ethics 
and intelligence is needed as the practice of intelligence in the 
21st century becomes more challenging. The need for rigorous 
research and data collection in the organisation of intelligence 
cannot be overstated. Scott and Jackson (2004: 16) also lament 
the fact that ethics is an under-explored area in intelligence 
studies. Ethical issues must affect intelligence practitioners, 
who are moral agents who use their thinking capacity to 
consider various courses of action and the consequences 
thereof, and act on these (Erskine 2004: 197). Born & Wills 
(2010: 40) concur that until post the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
US, there was little academic interest in ethical issues in the 
area of intelligence, but this has changed in the past decade. 
For the purposes of this study, intelligence gathering or collection 
will be considered an activity which involves performing actions, in 
order to allow ethical evaluation (Erskine 2004: 196). 
Fundamentally, only if one looks at the intelligence practitioners’ 
actions, would one be able to assess his or her ethical imperatives. 
This study is not concerned with the general acceptance or 
rejection of the ethics of intelligence as a profession or an 
institution. It is people who are involved in obtaining intelligence, 
“purposive actors and active participants in the practices of 
intelligence” (Erskine 2004: 198) that are under the microscope in 
this study. Although the organisation is also a moral agent which 
may eschew ethical guidelines through codes of conduct and 
standard operating procedures, the aim of this study is to assess 





also on clandestine collection as there are other forms of 
intelligence collection (such as overt collection) where the method 
does not subject the intelligence practitioner to moral or ethical 
considerations although there could still be unintended harm or 
effects (collateral damage) (Erskine 2004: 210). There are also 
other aspects to the intelligence cycle (analysis, dissemination) 
where ethical issues may not play a dominant role or where 
other types of ethics may come into play. 
Erskine contends that intelligence, in general terms, is 
practiced within an ethical realist framework. Intelligence 
practitioners in democratic societies, like South Africa, act 
within strict codes of conduct which 
…establishes strict criteria for appropriate 
action, rather than offering carte blanche approval of 
any policy or practice (Erskine 2010: 136). 
Academic research has a central role to play in 
highlighting ethical dilemmas that intelligence professionals 
face and contribute to the debate on how they should be 
resolved (Born & Wills 2010: 35). The study of ethics is now 
seen as being highly relevant in supporting efforts to improve 
accountability, image, professionalism and control of 
intelligence services (Born & Wills 2010: 34). This study will 
primarily be a theory of intelligence, using social sciences to 
explain a uniquely intelligence phenomenon (Gill 2010: 43). 
The methodology used will be discussed below.  
 
4.2 Research methodology 
 
In this research, a qualitative methodology was used because 
qualitative approaches share a similar goal in that they seek to arrive at 
an understanding of a particular phenomenon from the perspective of 






Miles and Huberman (1994: 1) describe qualitative data as 
‘sexy’ because they are 
…a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and 
explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts. 
 
 
4.2.1 The goal of qualitative research 
 
The attraction of qualitative data is that they may help 
generate or revise conceptual frameworks and get beyond initial 
conceptions (Miles and Huberman 1994: 1). Qualitative research 
employs methods of data-collection and analysis which explore 
social relations and describe reality as experienced by the 
respondents (Sarantakos 1998: 6). A feature which this 
researcher considered important in this study is the fact that  
…qualitative approaches share a broad 
philosophy, such as person-centeredness, and a 
certain open-ended starting point (Holloway & 
Todres, 2003). 
 
Quantitative research seeks to explain social phenomenon, 
while qualitative research has as its goal the understanding of 
social phenomenon (Bailey 1987, Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 
Miles and Huberman 1994, Sarantakos 1998). The qualitative 
methodology provides insight into the thought processes of the 
respondents and provides a way of voicing these thoughts and 
experiences. This approach allowed for exploration into a field 
with the researcher having limited preconceptions about the 






…study things in their natural settings, attempting 
to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln 
1994: 2). 
  
The aim of qualitative research is to take a snapshot of 
reality, capture reality as it is and is seen by the respondents. 
The focus is on people’s ‘lived experience’ and this serves well 
the purpose of “locating the meanings people place on events, 
processes and structures of their lives” (Miles and Huberman 
1994: 10). An attraction of qualitative research is that it is 
factist. Vaismoradi et al (2013: 400) describe the perspective. 
  
A factist perspective assumes data to be more or 
less accurate and truthful indexes of the reality out 
there (Sandelowski, 2010). In other words, the 
researcher wants to find out about the actual 
behaviour, attitudes, or real motives of the people 




4.2.2 The methodology of qualitative research 
  
Qualitative research’s purpose is to study a small number 
of respondents and interpret their view of reality and so capture 
the meaning of social actions, as subjectively experienced by 
the respondents. These meanings are captured in the form of 
words, gathered through observation, interviews or documents 
(Miles and Huberman 1994: 9) Qualitative research uses 
methods which produce descriptive data, presented in a way 
which reflects the respondents’ own views and experience 






4.2.3 Limitations of qualitative research 
 
 It is in the interpretation of data wherein the first underlying 
limitation of qualitative research lies. Words (data) can be 
framed by the researcher’s implicit concepts (Miles and 
Huberman: 1994: 9). Indeed, it was suggested in the section 
above concerning ethics research that an ‘interpretive frame’ 
should be avoided by researchers at all cost. Christensen 
(2010: 558) highlights Loseke and Cahill’s (1984) argument 
about how researcher’s should avoid the pitfall of ‘framing’ 
where an actors’ perception of reality is socially constructed. It 
is important to let themes emerge naturally from data and not 
from second order conception. The subjectivity and relativism 
of the qualitative approach has been called into question by 
critics (Chadwick, Bahr & Albrecht 1984: 214). The risk of 
collecting meaningless and useless information and the 
excessive amount of time qualitative research takes is also 
considered a weakness. Chadwick et al (1984) note qualitative 
research involves entering the personal space of the 
participants and the consequent ethical issues are a central 
concern.  
 
4.2.4 Strengths of qualitative research 
 
 
Despite these limitations, the qualitative method gives the 
researcher the freedom to research people in their natural 
settings. It also assists the researcher in achieving a deeper 
understanding of the participants’ world, their interpretations of 
reality and the meaning they attach to the subject under 
investigation (Chadwick, Bahr & Albrecht 1984: 214). 





Ethics is a distinctly human characteristic and reducing 
participants to numerical symbols and statistical figures would 
have resulted in a loss of perception of the subjective nature of 
human behaviour (Sarantakos 1998: 46). Qualitative data 
provides descriptive information that is 
 
…vivid, nested in a real context, and ha[s] a ring of 
truth that has strong impact on the reader (Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 10). 
 
Vaismoradi et al (2013: 400) highlights a key feature of 
descriptive qualitative approaches is the simultaneous gathering 
and analyzing of data and this adds to the “depth and quality of 
data analysis.”  
 
4.2.5 The researcher and the qualitative 
methodology 
 
A questionnaire was used as a research tool and open-
ended questions allowed the participants to describe their 
attitudes towards the ethics of tradecraft. Pertinent questions 
were pursued in a follow-up questionnaire to confirm or refute 
the researcher’s initial findings. 
Because the researcher had access to a large sample,
 representativeness, an essential element of qualitative research, 
was, on the balance of probabilities, achieved. The sample 
comprised participants who are directly involved in the activity 
under investigation on a daily basis in an easily identifiable 
population group. The setting under investigation was relatively 





It is important to disclose how the researcher relates to the 
subject matter and participants. The researcher is embedded in 
the research population and is part of the institution from where 
the participant sample was drawn. Researcher tried his best to 
not reflect institutional views or try to explain or expand upon 
participant inputs, but merely present them and let the data 
speak for itself. The danger lies in ‘co-producing’ knowledge with 
the participants and this was guarded against and corrected 
through rereads. The researcher therefore adopted a critical 
approach as best he could with these limitations of institutional 
experience and knowledge in mind.  Consequently, the 
researcher sought to be honest and frank with the reader and 
acknowledges his role as researcher must be separate from his 
role as an intelligence practitioner in his own right to avoid 
normative stances.  
 
4.3 Validity in qualitative research  
 
The aim was to achieve validity in this study There are many 
different types of validity and the means to assess or evaluate 
validity (Bailey 1987: 66). Some of the ways of assessing validity 
are face validation (Selltiz et al. 1976, Phillips 1976; content 
validation (Kerlinger 1964) and logical validation (Goode and 
Hatt 1952). Construct validation is also a major form of validation 
(Bailey 1987: 66). For the purposes of this study, two methods of 
validation were chosen. 
 Communicative validation 
This was achieved through interrogation of the participants’ 
 answers and requests for clarification and explanation. Once 
themes were identified and conclusions drawn, questions were 





 Argumentative validation 
This was established through presentation of the findings in 
a way that conclusions could be followed and tested. The 
analysis is presented with rich participant extracts which the 
researcher hoped would substantiate his arguments and 
findings. 
 
It is also important to note that the researcher sought 
credibility, trustworthiness and authenticity (Sarantakos 1998: 




Some qualitative researchers aim to achieve high reliability 
in their studies, and others strive for auditability and 
confirmability as alternative forms of guaranteeing the quality of 
their research. The assertion is that the stability of the methods 
and findings is the reliability, which in turn is an indicator of 
validity, the “accuracy and truthfulness of the findings” (Altheide 
and Johnson 1994: 485). Bailey (1987: 70) notes that measure 
is deemed reliable if it remains consistent. Drew et al (1996: 
169) propose a number of steps to achieve internal reliability in 
qualitative research. Taking note of these, the researcher 
employed a careful record of data (audit trail) which another 
researcher can follow back from conclusions to raw data and 
used low inference descriptors. With regard to external reliability, 
the researcher stated his own position on intelligence ethics so 
that readers knew what point of view drove the data collection. 
Secondly, the researcher clearly described who the participants 
were (besides anonymizing them to protect their identities) and 





selected. The researcher also defined the analytic constructs 
which guided the study (conceptual frameworks). The data 
collection and analysis procedures were also carefully described 
(Drew et al. 1996: 169). 
  
4.5 Research aim  
 
The primary aim of the researcher was to conduct an 
exploratory survey on a small sample of intelligence practitioners 
within a limited population with a view to determine a possible 
framework for understanding the research question, phrased as:  
What ethical views do a sample of intelligence practitioners hold 




4.6.1 Sampling method. 
 
According to Sarantakos (1998: 139), sampling can be 
defined as “the process of choosing the units of the target 
population which are to be included in the study.” Non-
probability sampling, specifically purposive sampling, was 
employed in this study. Bailey (1987: 94) proposes that in 
purposeful sampling, the researcher chooses respondents 
based on judgement as to whom would “best meet the purposes 
of the study”. The sample units have to fulfil certain criteria and 
be easily identifiable.  
Identification of participants therefore becomes part of the 





approaching a range of State Security Agency (SSA) 
practitioners who are involved in one or more of the areas of 
operation (agent operations, investigations or communication 
interception). In the opinion of the researcher, this sample was in 
the best position to provide data on the subject under 
investigation. There were a finite number of possible participants 
and the sampling was directed towards typical cases within this 
finite number. The sample size was envisaged to comprise no 
less than .02 percent of the total population involved in the 
activity under investigation (10 out of a possible 500)2. 
Simple random sampling was used. The population is 
defined as the total number of intelligence practitioners involved 
in operational work in the Agency (as opposed to administrative, 
managerial or technical personnel). Precise numbers of 
practitioners involved in operational work and who fit these 
criteria is classified information and cannot be made public. A 
sub sample of 20 was chosen through convenience sampling, 
because it represents a practical, workable number. These 
twenty were identified and selected based on the selection 
criteria, outlined below. Selection was done through the internal 
directory to which the researcher had access. From this list of 
potential participants, 12 were randomly selected by allocating 
each person (unit) a number. Twelve numbers were selected 
using a computer program that generates random numbers. The 
selected twelve were contacted. No inducements were used and 
participants participated voluntarily. Participants answered 
questions on a questionnaire relating to ethics and submitted to 
a follow-up questionnaire to clarify answers and provide more 
detail. The sample comprised a selection of members of all race 
and gender groups and in the age group of 25 -55 as per the 20 
chosen through convenience sampling. The participants are all 
                                                          
2
 The figure of 500 SSA members involved in clandestine intelligence collection is an estimate 





serving members of the SSA who may know each other and 
may know the researcher. This is unavoidable as the draw pool 
is relatively small and intelligence practitioners are generally a 
close community of people. There are no factors which may 
have increased the vulnerability of participants or increased their 
susceptibility to harm. The survey was conducted after approval 
from the UCT Ethics Committee.  
4.6.2 Selection criteria 
 
Serving members of the SSA were the population from 
which participants were chosen. A sub group of members who 
practice clandestine collection methods in their daily work was 
selected from the population. No specific culture, gender or 
ethnic group was required. The selection criteria were: 
 
•Participants needed to be members of the SSA for a period of 
not less than five (5) years. 
•Participants needed to be over 18 years of age. 
•Participants needed to be in an operational environment where 
collection/operational activities are personally undertaken. 
•Participants needed to have a firm grasp of the English-
language. 
•Participants were willing to sign informed consent to participate 
in the study. 
 
The participants were required to be members of the SSA 
for a minimum of five years as this was perceived as a 
reasonable amount of time in which to gain experience in a 





have a clear understanding of the nature and culture of the 
intelligence profession. Participants needed to be over 18 years 
of age so that parental permission was not required and so that 
there was a level of maturity. Typically, members inducted into 
the SSA as field officers would be at least 23 years old. The 
participant needed to be in an operational environment where 
there would be exposure to the ethics of clandestine intelligence 
collection. The participants would have a basic knowledge of the 
theories being applied. 
The participants had to have a firm grasp of the English 
language as the qualitative nature of the study demanded 
extraction of meaning from sentences. Translation from other 
languages into English may have corrupted data and analysis. 
Finally, signing an informed consent form was a pre-requisite of 
selection. 
 
4.7 Data collection 
4.7.1 Collection process 
 
As per the policy of the SSA, signed consent was obtained 
from the Director-General SSA to conduct the research on 
participants who are members of the Agency. Individual consent 
was obtained from each member selected. The participants 
were given the choice to seek permission from their supervisors 
to participate in the study but were also made aware that this 
would affect their anonymity. The research was conducted in 
their own time and with their own resources, and they were not 
obliged to seek further permission to participate; the DG 
permission would suffice. 
These participants were initially contacted through internal 





explained the scope of the study. Participation was requested 
(see Appendix B). The letter explained the purpose of the study 
and what would be required of the participant. The confidentiality 
of the study was stressed and it was indicated consent would be 
required to participate. 
Once the participant agreed to participate in the study and 
the relevant consent was signed, the participant received the 
questionnaire through private email and was required to 
complete it within a reasonable period of time (two weeks). The 
confidentiality of the questionnaire was communicated to the 
participants prior to their participation. For this reason, the 
participants did not use internal communication systems (emails) 
to communicate with the researcher and receive the 
questionnaires, but a private email address was used. The 
participants should not have felt that they could be victimized or 
scrutinized by the employer which would cause any undue 
stress and cause them to hold back in their answers. Anonymity 
of participants, in the case of this study, was of ethical concern 
and the researcher made every effort to change any information 
that could be identifiable to a specific person, work area or 
geographical location. If the researcher deemed an answer to a 
question may have led to the identification of a participant, the 
answer was discarded and expunged from the research. If an 
answer contained a word or phrase which was deemed 
sensitive, the relevant word or phrase was redacted. 
Once completed, the questionnaire was returned to the 
researcher for analysis. 
Follow-up questions, for clarification purposes, were 









A semi-structured questionnaire was constructed and sent to 
the supervisor for scrutiny and suggestions. A final draft was 
approved by the supervisor and UCT’s Law Faculty Ethics 
Committee. The researcher was careful to avoid framing 
questions in such a way that they would elicit answers which fit a 
preconceived ‘reality’. Christensen (2010: 558) highlights Loseke 
and Cahill’s (1984) argument about how researchers should 
avoid the pitfall of ‘framing’ where an actors’ perception of reality 
is socially constructed. How a reader interprets an action or 
statement is greatly dependent on the way the situation in which 
it occurs is typified and this creates the context. Loseke and 
Cahill (1984) stress the importance of experts controlling the 
interpretive frame. 
They argue that experts define behavior in a way 
that allows them to create “…an interactional situation 
which will produce evidence confirming the accounts 
they [experts] offer…” (Loseke and Cahill 1984: 302).  
 
This researcher acknowledges the importance of the 
interpretive frame and context and by every means avoided 
‘confirming an account that is offered.’ 
For this reason, the questionnaire was structured as a series 
of three scenarios with a list of open-ended questions on each 
scenario. The aim was to encourage participants to engage the 
topic in a narrative way which would allow for the free 
expression of thoughts and feelings. The scenarios were also 
hypothetical and not specifically related to SSA work, which the 
researcher hoped would encourage participants to be more 
honest in their answers without fear of compromising their 
employer or their loyalty towards the SSA. The questionnaire 





adopted to maximise understanding of the ethical issues raised 
in a format which lends itself to transparency. The aim of 
scenario sketching was also to delink any actual or real 
situations from the participants’ minds and answers, in keeping 
with the SSA’s security prescripts.  
A portion of a scenario with questions is attached below: 
 
 Scenario 3: The Scientist 
Dr Kara Jamal is a biochemist working at a private research 
institute, Cryrotech Industries in Johannesburg. Cryrotech 
specialises in developing cultures in a Bio Level 1 laboratory. 
The cultures are for the production of medication for drug-
resistant infections. Information has reached your desk 
indicating Jamal had a meeting with a diplomat from the North 
Korean embassy, Kim Jong, who is suspected of being an 
undeclared intelligence officer. A decision is made to target 
Jamal because of her contact with Jong. Initial investigations 
indicate Cryrotech products can, with minimum adaptation, be 
used as a biological agent and Jong is known to be sourcing 
material for North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
program. More intrusive investigations indicate that Jamal 
leaves the bio medical lab every week with a briefcase and 
meets Jong at a local coffee shop. 
 
1 Is it ethically correct to target Jamal before there is proof 
of her being involved in illegal or unconstitutional activity? What 
level of intrusive targeting against Jamal would you as the 
investigator be comfortable with? More or less intrusive? 
2 When Jamal is officially targeted, is she dehumanized 
(loses her value as a human being with rights)? Does this make 





  (End)   
 
Constant monitoring and feedback from participants was 
encouraged. Qualitative reporting required data extracts 
(verbatim extracts) being used as evidence in the report and this 
was explained to participants. It was stressed that identifying 
information would be anonymised and participants de-identified 
(specific job title, place names etc) 
Collected data and other information was stored off-site on 
flash discs and not on in-house IT systems. The data was also 
password protected and only the researcher and supervisor had 
the password. Only the researcher and supervisor had access to 
the data which will be stored until completion of the project and 
then deleted. Hard copy data was kept in a lockable cabinet and 
shredded on completion. Identifiers were removed from the data 
at the analysis phase. Names of participants were changed at 
selection phase and known only to the researcher. Pseudonyms 
were used which still identified the participant’s gender and race. 
Participants were encouraged to skip questions which they 
may have found too traumatic to answer. In the unlikely event of 
a question leading to emotional or psychological stress, 
embarrassment, deception, stigma or stereotyping, the details of 
the SSA social services/psychologist/total wellness officer were 
provided on the questionnaire with instructions to reach out for 
counselling if necessary. Participants could withdraw at any time 
without prejudice.  
  
4.8 Data analysis 






An analytic method often used in psychology is thematic 
analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006: 77).  
The advantage of Braun and Clarke’s (2006) model is that 
the phases are general which allowed the researcher to follow a 
method that optimised the current study’s data. 
The disadvantage of this model is that it ignores the wider 
social, political, religious and economic themes implicit in data. 
Furthermore, narrative style and the use of metaphor and 
language are not accounted for. Attride-Stirling (2001) indicates 
that application of analytic models to a research study should be 
clearly explained. Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) argue that,  
 
 …qualitative psychologists need to be clear about 
  what  they are doing and why, and to include the 
  often-omitted ‘how’ they did their analysis in their 
  reports. 
 
Polit and Hungler (2007) are in favour of analysis being 
conducted before the literature review in order to keep analysis 
more data-driven. This was not possible in the current study, as 
ethical clearance (which required a research proposal including 
literature review) needed to be attained by the university before 
data collection and subsequent analysis could be completed. 
While the researcher tried to suspend knowledge from the 
literature review while conducting the data-driven analysis, it 
was not possible to fully suspend preconceived ideas from the 
literature review. In an attempt to keep with a data-driven 
narrative analytic process, the researcher tried to avoid fitting 
data into preconceived categories (as those defined by Zubin 
and Steinhauer, 1981, or Rutter 1997, 2002) and attempted 
rather to let the data ‘speak for itself’. 






…for researchers who wish to employ a relatively 
low level of interpretation, in contrast to grounded 
theory or hermeneutic phenomenology, in which a 
higher level of interpretive complexity is required. 
(Vaismoradi et al 2013: 399)  
 
The low level of interpretation was important to this study. 
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and 
reporting patterns within data (Braun & Clarke 2006: 79). It 
organises and describes the data set and often even interprets 
various aspects of the research topic. According to Vaismoradi 
et al 2013: 401), one of the advantages of thematic analysis is 
that it is 
…able to offer the systematic element 
characteristic of content analysis, and also permits the 
researcher to combine analysis of their meaning within 
their particular context (Loffe & Yardley 2004). 
 
Rubin and Rubin (1995: 226) claim analysis is exciting 
because “you discover themes and concepts embedded 
throughout your interviews.” The aim of using thematic analysis 
is that it searches for certain themes or patterns across an entire 
data set and not within a data item, such as an individual 
interview (Braun and Clarke 2006:80). It allows researchers to 
contextualize data within a framework of analysis (Vaismoradi et 
al 2013: 401). A theme describes an important aspect 
discovered in the data which relates to the research question. 
The aim is to find repeated patterns of meaning. Here, 
Vaismoradi et al (2013: 401) note the importance of context and 
researcher understanding where the aim is to create a world 
where the texts make sense: 
The researcher, who has a broader understanding 
of the context influencing the stories of the study 
participants, may develop a wider understanding of 





she or he may share with those participating in the 
research (Downe-Wamboldt 1992). 
  
In this research, the researcher indeed shares an 
understanding of the topic with the participants and could 
therefore create a ‘world’ in context, where participants could 
answer the questions in a meaningful way. 
The collected data were converted to a form which 
conveyed a central message which attempted to answer the 
research question (Sarantakos 1998: 313). In qualitative 
research, data collection, analysis and evaluation are one and 
the same process (ibid.) Braun and Clarke (2006: 86) concur 
that analysis is a constant back and forth movement between 
the entire data set, the coded extracts of data being analysed 
and the analysis of the data that is being produced. 
After the questionnaires were received from the participants, 
the researcher summarised, coded and categorised the data. 
Data organisation took place in the form of assembling 
information around themes and categorising the information 
(Sarantakos 1998: 316). A theme can be defined as  
… a coherent integration of the disparate pieces of 
data that constitute the findings (Sandelowski & 
Leeman 2012)(Vaismoradi et al (2013: 402). 
 
Vaismoradi et al (2013: 402) express the view that the 
researcher using thematic analysis is “mainly advised to 
consider both latent and manifest content in data analysis.” 
In the interpretation phase, 
the same set of analytical interventions used in 
content analysis is applied in thematic analysis under 
the classifications of generating initial codes, defining 
and naming themes, reviewing themes, and searching 






Braun and Clarke (2006: 87) describe the phases of 
thematic analysis thus: 
 
Phase                   Description of the process 
 1. Familiarising 
yourself with 
your data 
Reading and re-reading data, noting down 
initial ideas. 
 2. Generating 
initial codes. 
Coding interesting features of the data in a 
systematic fashion across the entire data set, 
collating data relevant to each code. 
 3. Searching 
for themes. 
Collating codes into potential themes, 
gathering all data relevant to each potential 
theme. 
 4. Reviewing 
themes. 
Checking if the themes work in relation to the 
coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data 
set (Level 2.) generating a thematic ‘map’ of 
the analysis. 
 5. Defining and 
naming themes. 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of 
each theme, and the overall story the analysis 
tells, generating clear definitions and names 
for each theme. 
 6. Producing 
the report.  
The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of 
vivid, compelling extract examples, final 
analysis of selected extracts, relating back to 
the analysis to the research question and 
literature, producing a scholarly report of the 
analysis. 
 






The researcher used inductive method in locating themes. 
Personal understanding was suspended (as much as possible, 
bearing in mind the researcher is embedded in the same 
population the sample was drawn from) and themes were not 
consciously sought. When themes appeared from the texts 
provided, commentary was provided.  
 
Vaismoradi et al. 2013: 400) are critical of researchers who 
fail to provide detailed descriptions of the methodology used. 
They  
…merely describe the use of qualitative data 
gathering techniques, such as interviews and focus 
groups, and not enough effort is made to qualify 
individual elements of methods other than signaling 
the data analysis process as either content or 
thematic analysis (Sandelowski & Barroso 2003b). 
 
In this study, adequate explanation of the processes 
followed were provided. 
 
 
4.8.2 Limitations to thematic analysis 
 
The benefit of qualitative analytic models is that their lack of 
specificity allows for interpretation and the emergence of themes 
and ideas. However, the lack of clearly demarcated boundaries 
in this type of analysis has received criticism, as described by 
Braun and Clarke (2006: 78)  
…an absence of clear and concise guidelines 
around thematic analysis means that the ‘anything 
goes’ critique of qualitative research may well apply in 






Braun and Clarke recommend utilising the flexibility that 
qualitative models provide, but also recommend that the 
researcher defines exactly how the model was applied and 
adapted. Braun and Clarke (2006: 86) support the use of any 
models as long as “…the finished product contains an account, 
– not necessarily that detailed – of what was done and why.” 
The flexibility inherent in thematic analysis is flexible and allows 
for clarification and adjustment of models to maximise the needs 
of the dataset.  
4.9 Steps in write-up 
 
Following the random sampling process of identifying possible 
participants, twelve prospective participants were identified. One of the 
selected participants had already resigned from the SSA and one was 
not willing to participate. The remaining ten were sent consent forms, 
nine of whom completed and returned them. The tenth potential 
participant had misgivings about participating and did not co-operate, 
despite the researcher’s best efforts to convince her. Nine 
questionnaires were sent to the participants in June 2017. Eight were 
returned by the middle of July. The ninth was returned on 25 July 2017. 
As mentioned above, the details of the participants were anonymised 
and all identifying information was removed. In order to retain 
authenticity the grammar and style of writing by participants, when 
quoting, was left unchanged unless there was an error which made the 
sentence unintelligible. This was important to reflect the meaning 
conveyed behind the words. The following steps were taken in the 
analysis and presentation of the results. Each questionnaire was 
scanned for key words and colour coded.  
 Common threads were identified and described 
 Key themes were lifted 
 A model was compiled on each questionnaire’s key themes 





 Verbatim quotes were used to substantiate the themes of the 
central model 
 
By examining the various colour representations of the key 
themes, the researcher looked for similarities. These similarities 
were grouped together to create overarching themes and 
subthemes. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that a difficulty 
with this part of the analysis is the potential to lose detail by 
reducing raw data: 
By ‘define and refine’, we mean identifying the 
‘essence’ of what each theme is about (as well as the 
themes overall), and determining what aspect of the 
data each theme captures. It is important not to try and 
get a theme to do too much, or to be too diverse and 
complex (Braun & Clarke 2006 : 92). 
 
It is likely some of the neutralizations offered by intelligence 
practitioners prior to their actions and rationalizations afterwards 
could be interpreted in other ways. The aim of this study is to 




4.10 Demographic information 
  
Table 4.2 presents the nine participants of the study and 
their basic demographic information. It is stressed here again 
that the participants’ names have been anonymised and the 








Ashley Govender Female 32 Honours Hindu 10 years Investigations 





Nombeko Khoza Female 31-40 Degree Christian 5-10 years Collection 
Nicky Isaacs Female 31-40 Matric Christian 11-15 years Collection 
Logy Ranjeeth Male 50 Honours Hindu 20+ years Collection 
Esme Coetzee Female 41-50 Honours Christian 20+ years Collection 
Steven de Jager Male 50 Degree Christian 20+ years Collection 
Prince Kekana Male 41-50 Honours Christian 11-15 years Investigations 
Nazim Hoosein Male 25-30 Degree Muslim  5-10 years Collection 
 
Table 4.2 Participant demographic information 
 
Participant A: Ashley Govender 
Govender has been an intelligence investigator for nearly 
ten years. She is a 32 year old Hindu woman with an Honours 
degree. 
Participant B: Willem Jordaan 
Willem Jordaan is a middle-aged investigator with more than 
20 years’ experience. He has a bachelor’s degree and considers 
himself to be a Christian.  
Participant C: Nombeko Khoza 
Nombeko Khoza was 31 years old at the time of the study 
and has been a member of the SSA for a period of eight years. 
She has a Bachelor’s degree and is involved in operations 
where she manages human sources of information. She lists her 
faith as ‘Christian.’ 
Participant D: Nicky Isaacs 
Isaacs is a female collector in her mid-thirties. She is 
currently studying towards her Bachelor’s degree and has been 
in the SSA for over ten years. 
Participant E: Logy Ranjeeth 
Ranjeeth and is an intelligence veteran with over twenty 
years’ service as a collector and investigator. He holds an 





Participant F: Esme Coetzee 
Coetzee is a twenty year veteran and is nearly 40 years old. 
She is a collector and holds strong Christian values. She has an 
Honours degree.  
Participant G: Steven De Jager 
De Jager has more than twenty years’ experience in 
collection and is over 50. He holds Christian values and has a 
degree. 
Participant H: Prince Kekana 
Prince Kekana is an operational member of SSA in his mid-
forties. After completing his Honours degree, he worked in other 
areas of Government before joining the SSA 12 years ago as an 
investigator. He holds Christian values. 
Participant I: Nazim Hoosein 
Hoosein is in his late twenties, has a degree and over five 
years’ experience in the collection field. He is of the Muslim faith. 
These participants are all involved in the subject under 
investigation in this research, which is the collection of 
intelligence by using techniques such as recruiting and handling 
agents and conducting intrusive measure investigations which 
may include the interception of communications. The scenarios 
which were provided in the questionnaire, although hypothetical, 
are consistent with the types of scenarios these participants may 
have been exposed to as intelligence practitioners. As illustrated 
above, the study’s participants varied in age, gender, faith and 








4.11 Analysis of Results 
 
The researcher only re-consulted the literature after the 
analysis of the questionnaires was completed and data was 
extracted. This was done so as not to influence the researcher 
and to keep the analysis data-driven. It was inevitable that the 
literature influenced the researcher’s beliefs and interpretations; 
however the researcher endeavoured to intentionally suspend 
beliefs as much as he could to allow for a data-driven analysis. 
The analysis that follows was derived from the analysis of each 
of the questionnaires and determination of themes relevant to 
each. These themes were then consolidated into a global model 
which incorporates the overriding ideas of all the questionnaires. 
The raw data extracts attempted to substantiate the themes 
identified in the model and were referenced according to the 
questionnaire page number and line number, for example, Esme 
Coetzee’s comments were referenced E2: 3-4 meaning 
Coetzee’s questionnaire,  page 2, lines 3 to 4. Follow-up 
questions were asked in a second questionnaire which is 
referenced with both letters of the participant’s name, followed 
by the pages and line numbers (EC1: 5-6). The first time a 
participant’s name was mentioned, the full name was cited, 
thereafter, only the surname. Sometimes, participant quotes 
were used more than once in different themes to substantiate 
the theme. The linking of the literature to the themes extracted 
from the data was reserved for Chapter 6, Discussion of Results. 
Thereafter, in the concluding discussion of results and 









The qualitative method of data collection combined with the 
thematic analysis of data received was considered the best 
methodology combination given the topic and population 
surveyed. The ‘what’ and ‘how’ of the research process was 
described in this chapter, noting the limitations of both qualitative 
data collection and thematic analysis. By being specific about 
how the qualitative model was applied and by giving a step by 
step break down of the process, some of the limitations of 
qualitative data collection and the thematic analysis process 
were overcome. Both latent and manifest content in data 
analysis was considered and the themes were allowed to 
develop organically. The researcher deemed it important to 
disclose how he relates to the subject matter and participants. 
The researcher is embedded in the research population and is 
part of the institution from where the participant sample was 
drawn. Researcher tried his best to not reflect institutional views 
or try to explain or expand upon participant inputs, but merely 
present them and let the data speak for itself. The danger lay in 
‘co-producing’ knowledge with the participants and this was 
guarded against and corrected through rereads. The researcher 
therefore adopted a critical approach as best he could with these 





















This chapter presents participant information and the 
thematic analysis of the data. Excerpts were extracted from 
participant replies which the researcher hoped would support 
identified themes.  
 
 
5.2 Collating participants’ data 
 
In the researcher’s view, three main themes emerged which 
the researcher has denoted the Personal Ethical Framework, the 
Institutional Framework and the Working Ethical Framework. 
The last theme is operationalized and explained in paragraph 
5.5. An exploration of each theme and subtheme is presented 
below, followed by the researcher’s collation of these themes 










 “I have my own belief system. I was conditioned from a very 
young age, and am firm in my beliefs.” Nicky Isaacs 
 
The researcher noted that the participants appeared to have 
a personal ethical framework from which they assessed their 
moral decisions. The question was asked whether participants 
ever thought about ethics as practicing intelligence practitioners. 
Without exception, all answered in the affirmative. Esme 
Coetzee added the footnote, ‘quite often’ (EC 1: 11). 
Participants seemed to be clear about their personal ethical 
framework in their private lives, but within the context of the 
institutional framework, conflict appeared to take place. The 
personal ethical framework seemed to be defined and 
underpinned by various factors, such as responsibility, choice 
and consequences, family and faith and patriotism and duty. 
 
5.3.1 Personal responsibility 
 
One of the participants’ comments may point to her 
appreciation of being personally responsible in the task of 
conducting intelligence collection. The personal ethical code is 
seen as being distinct from the institutional framework 
(discussed in section 5.4 below). 
I have a very specific individual opinion and am 
guided by this, as I do not believe that the employer 
has a strong ethical / moral compass. This however 
does not excuse me as my opinion and actions are my 
personal responsibility (E2: 5-7). 
 
Coetzee’s comment seems to suggest that she is clear that 






If you in any circumstances doubt that what you 
are doing or about to do does not correspond with your 
ethics or if you are unclear about the motives of the 
activities, refrain from continuing until you have had the 
questions sufficiently answered against your moral 
compass as well as a well-defined legitimate goal (E3: 
3-10). 
 
In her case, she appears to not rely on the institutional 
framework or any other objective framework other than her own, 
which is the only one she trusts. Responsibility cannot be 
abrogated to the organisation, it is hers alone. 
 
5.3.2 Personal choice 
 
Another factor that appears to influence three of the 
participants’ ethical framework is choice. In some cases, the 
moral compass seems to be a core component of a person’s 
make-up and forms the foundation upon which decisions are 
made. Willem Jordaan asserts 
You get older and wiser your opinion is formed 
the whole time. There are external influences. …the 
basic principles of ethics remain. That what you have 
learnt from a young age and what your gut tells you 
remains. Your ethics is part of your core make-up. The 
pillars from which you operate must be sound (W3: 19-
30). 
 
Steven De Jager sees his personal ethical framework and 
the objective institutional framework as mutually necessary to 
intelligence collection. 
My morals will dictate that I be fair and just and will 
follow my jurisdiction and task as described by the 






Nazim Hoosein acknowledged that questionable decisions 
have to be informed by a personal ethical framework: 
 I have to be guided by my individual values and 
principles in making decisions that (would) otherwise 
be questionable (N2: 13-16). 
 
Hoosein asserted that these decisions on ethics cannot be 
influenced by peers or team mates.  
If that were the case then ones individual opinion 
would be non-existent (N2: 27). 
A personal ethical code is the default position Hoosein 
appears to use when there is doubt about the ethical soundness 
of an action.  
This will be determined by your individual moral 
compass and principles. The SSA’s Code of Ethics 
exists but when you are faced with a situation where 
you need to make a call, it will be your own moral code 
that guides your decision (N3: 1-7).  
  
A personal moral/ethical compass makes the choices on the 
extent of deception and covert activities required to perform, 
clearer. 
The focus/objective and reason for the intelligence 
activities must remain clear and specific and all 
activities must be measured against a specific 
outcome. While operational activities are ongoing, the 
intelligence operator has the personal duty to 
continuously make decisions that speaks to his/her 
moral compass. As is in everything we do, actions are 
however guided by personal choices and not 
necessarily by a corporate culture. It remains therefore 
a choice and a decision to conduct moral or immorally 
corrupt intelligence activities (E1: 1-26).  
 
Nicky Isaacs appears to have a personal ethical framework 






I have my own belief system. I was conditioned 
from a very young age, and am firm in my beliefs (I2: 
25-27). 
 
Isaacs mentions how she made the choice of behaviour 
using her son as a sounding board and makes the point that 
lying is always wrong.  
I know an action is unethical, if the action required 
is in contravention of my values. I use the measure of – 
would I be able to face my son and tell him that I was 
proud of my work that was conducted? (I3: 1-6).  
In my opinion, lying is lying and no end result can 





The consequences of an action may also inform the 
personal ethical framework. Nombeka Khoza acknowledges 
there are costs to ethical decision-making which are personal 
and work-related. These, she separated. 
It hasn’t caused any personal conflict because the 
consequences in my personal life are different from the 
consequences at work. However I must add, I have 
become more reserved with what I say and share with 
the general public about myself and personal life (K7: 
19-23). 
  
The separation, in her words, appears to have resolved a 
possible conflict between two ethical frameworks, the personal 
one and the institutional one (further discussed in 5.4 below). In 
the researcher’s view, the consequences of breaching the 
personal ethical code were more serious. 
The end result (goal) appears to be an important 





to a hypothetical scenario posed in the questionnaire where a 
subject was deceived into providing information to prevent a 
possible crime. 
Yes it would be easier if she was already guilty 
because in that way you know that your actions are 




Stay focussed on the specific goal and measure 
the activities whether it is focussed on achieving the 
goal. Always keep the law in mind should the activities 
be uncovered, whether you will be able to justify (even 
within a societal context) that your actions were fair 
and just relating to the goal and everyone involved in 
any way (E2: 16 – E3: 3). 
 
 
5.3.4 Family values and faith 
 
Family values may play a role in the formation of the 
personal ethical framework in two of the participants. Khoza 
notes that her  
…opinion is more influenced by my parents rather 
than my peers and team mates. But also the older one 
gets the more you gain a personal perspective in terms 
of what is ethical and what is not. Therefore at this 
stage I do have an individual thinking, nonetheless 
more likely to go to my parents for influence than my 
peers or team mates (K2: 50-52).  
Her comment does suggest, however, a shift towards a 
subjective understanding of what is ethical and what is not, over 
the passage of time. There is also the suggestion of a separate 
ethical code, the “work code.”  
I don’t see the need to adjust my ethic baseline 





constantly remind me of my ethics. So when I work, I 
see it as work (K7: 24-28). 
  
Here Khoza implies that she is clear about her ethical code, 
into which family and religion have input, which frames her 
existence - outside of work. The personal ethical code is 
described as something distinct from her work. Isaacs concurs 
that family is an important influencing factor in the personal 
ethical framework where she uses her son as a type of role 
model (I3: 1-6). 
The personal ethical framework of two participants is 
reinforced by faith. Coetzee gives the impression that she places 
much influence on her faith and uses it as the final arbiter in 
ethical decision-making. 
By my personal belief/faith; thus, the Word of God. 
Therefore I will only allow peers who have the same 
belief system as I to have an input into my ethical 
opinion but also after testing it against the Word (E2: 
13-15).  
 
When participants were asked what measure they used to 
judge whether an action is unethical or not, Jordaan notes 
I also go back to my gut feel and religion. If there is 
uneasiness, I would mention it to my superiors and find 
possible solutions (W4: 16-19).  
 
Coetzee has a stronger response: 
As a believer, which determines the core of my 
faith and guidance, I am obliged to act as a moral 
agent according to my faith in whichever position I am 
employed and by whomever (E1: 41-46).  
 
Interestingly, this emphatic view needs to be seen in context 
with the other participants who are perhaps not as anchored in 





made to always base her moral decisions on what her faith 
would expect of her. 
  
Previously I would have engaged in covert 
operational activity unrestrictedly. However 10 years 
ago, I made a conscious decision to conduct any 
operational activity according to what I believe is right 
and ethical and to treat all people I engage with in an 
ethical manner, whether they are targets, agents, 
contacts or colleagues. I chose to follow an unmoving 
compass which is my faith, rather than an ever 
changing worldly compass (E8: 15-26).  
 
In the case of Coetzee, her trend appears to be from an 
“unrestricted” work methodology, which may have included 
every means of clandestine collection, to a very ethical 
execution of intelligence work. Eight of the other participants 
appear to have the reverse trend line over a period of time, from 
more ethical, to less ethical means of collection in a type of 
‘slippery slope’. 
 
5.3.5 Patriotism and duty 
 
The personal ethical framework may also be informed and 
guided by patriotism and duty. Three participants suggest that 
there is an expectation that there is a buy-in from the general 
public for the use of intrusive methods of collection which 
reinforced the personal ethical code. Prince Kekana notes “…my 
ethics are informed by patriotism, morals and loyalty to the 







I believe that South Africans are generally patriotic. 
We love our country and want to protect it as much as 
we know how to (K2: 1-3).  
 
Coetzee sees a threat to national security as sufficient 
justification to use deception as an intelligence gathering 
technique. In the questionnaire, a hypothetical scenario was 
provided of an intelligence practitioner having to elicit 
information about a possible crime from a subject using a cover, 
which involves lying and deception. The question was asked 
whether deception was justified against the subject: 
The deception is further justified due to the level of 
the threat experienced, the hidden nature of the 
possible crime, and the mandate to maintain security 
and even uncover activities that could lead to harm to 
other societies (E6: 6-12). 
  
So the protection of society (all citizens) appears to be a 
strong motivator for the personal ethical framework. 
Four of the participants seem to suggest that a sense of duty 
is invoked to protect the country and its citizens. These 
participants appear to indicate that deceit in intelligence 
collection is a duty fulfilled in protection of the State and this was 
justified in a personal ethical framework. 
I believe the deceit (lying and manipulating) is in 
the best interests of the country, therefore it is well 
justified (A3: 12-15). 
We have a right to protect the national interests of 
this country and all legal means should be explored to 
protect those interests (W1: 3-7). 
I would also argue the fact that as long as our 
intrusive collection methods are aimed at maintenance 
of national security, it should not be challenged (P1: 8-
12). 
 I act as a moral agent for SA citizens. The SSA 
efforts contribute to the security of the citizens. So, 





officers acting as moral agents to the employer, the 




5.3.6 Perception of target 
 
The researcher considered it necessary to explore the 
sample of participants’ views of the targets they would be 
required to act against in their course of legally sanctioned work. 
It was considered important to determine whether the 
intelligence practitioners’ perception of the target had any 
bearing on their use of clandestine tradecraft. Would a clearly 
‘evil’ target be easier to conduct intelligence against, resulting in 
less ethical conflict? Would conducting intelligence against a 
dangerous or immoral target negate feelings of guilt more easily 
than a seemingly harmless target? Ashley Govender appeared 
to think it would. “Definitely yes, it makes it much easier if the 
person has a deviant past” (A3: 22-23). A scenario was painted 
which suggested a person with access to a target could be 
blackmailed into co-operation because he had lied about his 
academic qualifications. Kekana conveyed the impression that a 
‘weak’ target was an easy target. 
If your conduct is weak (lying about your 
credentials), you will be blackmail-able. Blackmail is 
justified in this case. Use the weakest link to solve the 
security weakness (P5: 6-11). 
 
Jordaan believes that the intelligence practitioner’s view of 
the target should not have any effect on his targeting, yet he 
conceded it does. 
Should ethical justifications be influenced by your 
view of a target – NO. Are ethical justifications 





a target and should be worked without any external 
influences (W6: 2-9). 
 
Hoosein believes that under certain circumstances, 
blackmail is an acceptable means of recruiting the subject. 
 
The recruitment of this individual is work well done 
and to acquire the information necessary regarding 
Jamal and the truth is necessary. No sacrifice is made 
here as the individual lied about their qualifications (N5: 
4-15).  
 
Hoosein seems comfortable with the fact that because the 
subject lied about his qualifications, this was sufficient 
justification for blackmail.  
Khoza suggests her attitude toward the target is influenced 
by her view of the target, “… however collection methods and 
investigations are conducted fairly, and decisions are based on 
facts” (K4: 32-33). Data seems to support the assertion that guilt 
and conflict is diminished where a person is more deserving of 
targeting by virtue of his or her level of involvement in 
malevolent activity.  
5.3.7 Personal justifications and harm 
 
A question was asked as to whether participants believed 
people may be harmed when they use clandestine methods of 
intelligence collection. 
With the exception of Kekana, the other participants agreed 
that harm was caused to people in the collection of intelligence. 
To test how participants felt about ethical dilemmas generally, 
they were asked if they could personally save five people by 





Kekana, Jordaan, Khoza, Isaacs, Ranjeeth and Hoosein 
said they would, whereas Coetzee and Govender said they 
would not. 
Participants were given scenarios of ethical dilemmas where 
the researcher hoped to test their responses regarding exposing 
targets or subjects to harm. Harm relates to the consequences 
of an action and may not refer to physical harm, but indeed to 
the harming of dignity, the invasion of privacy and treating 
human beings as a means to an end. The data from this sample 
appeared to suggest that these participants seemed to downplay 
the harmful effects of conducting intrusive methods on 
individuals. The participants’ impressions on using deception on 
a possibly innocent victim as a means to elicit intelligence, was 
tested in a hypothetical scenario. Without exception, the 
participants did not believe the victim (Jamal) was harmed 
through deception. 
The deception is most definitely justified and is a 
simple way to obtain information in the beginning 
without resorting to intrusive measures. She would not 
suffer any harm and I would be fine with the deception 
and in the situation would not even see it as deception 
but a routine exercise to solicit information (A4: 12-19). 
To tell a lie to get a photo without compromising 
your task? Is that justified? I would say yes. Nobody 
was hurt, the operation was not compromised and 
nobody has lost anything (W5: 4-10). 
The deception is necessary in order to acquire 
further information about Jamal. Jamal would not suffer 
any harm from the deception as they will be unaware of 
the true reason for the deception. If I were involved in 
malicious activities I must accept that there are those 
that will try to acquire further information about me and 
will use any means possible (N4: 14-27).  
 
Isaacs asserts the subject could not be harmed if she was 
not aware of the intrusion. “She will not be dehumanized as she 





it seemed as if the motive was important to determine whether 
harm was caused or not: 
 
Yes it is justified because again you are not lying to 
collect this information to harm her, also the act will not 
cause any damage if she is indeed innocent (K5: 20-
23). 
  
Jordaan sees deception as a tool of tradecraft (W7: 24). 
Would the subject have suffered harm? “No, what harm is 
involved?” [How would deception make you feel?] “Neutral – no 
feeling of deception at all. I would just be doing my job” (W7: 24-
27). Coetzee suggests that the legal and institutional framework 
would justify the action which may only ‘hurt her trust:’ 
It is not expected that this deception will cause 
permanent mental or physical harm to Jamal other than 
hurting her trust. The legality of the operational 
activities due to the seriousness of the suspected crime 
and the mandate given to the intelligence agency will 
allow the intelligence officer to conduct the deception 
without feeling guilty (E6: 13-23). 
 
The data seem to suggest that intelligence practitioners in 
this sample used a very narrow definition of harm – that which 
related to mental or physical harm. The harm to a person’s 
dignity caused by deception was not considered. In most cases, 
the individual against whom deception is used in order to gather 
information on the target may be seen as collateral damage. 
The sample of intelligence practitioners tested appear to use 
justifications within the personal ethical framework to answer the 
question ‘when are clandestine methods of collection against a 
target justified?’ One of the identified justifications appeared to 





In any action, test the level of activities against the 
required outcome. Stay focussed on the specific goal 
and measure the activities, whether it is focussed on 
achieving the goal (E2: 16-17). 
 
Coetzee appears to stress the point that the outcome was 
essential to consider before engaging in operational work: 
It is critical for an intelligence officer to have a clear 
understanding of the target, the threat posed by the 
target and the expected outcome before he/she 
engages in operational activities (E4: 25-37). 
 
Khoza agrees: 
I’m an intelligence professional working for all SA 
citizens. The reason being I am not here to serve the 
interests of an individual or individuals, but rather the 
interest of my country. The way I approach my work is 
not to please my employer but rather to do what I can 
to improve the lives of all South Africans. (K2: 21-28)  
 
Jordaan sees working toward a singular objective may have 
negative implications. 
Unfortunately it does happen that if you are 
working on i.e. [a target area] and you want to be “part 
of the solution”, you would justify certain actions more 
easily. The question then arises whether you are still 
objective. This can have a serious impact on your 
performance (W6: 10-18). 
 
Khoza suggests the subject in the given scenario would 
understand the ruse of deception and see it in context of a 
greater good: 
No I don’t (think) she would suffer any harm unless 
she personally feels invaded or used; which again is 
not harmful if you were to explain what type of person 
she was working with and the good that has come out 






5.3.8 The end goal is good  
 
The researcher proposes that if the end result (the outcome) 
is sufficiently noble, such as ‘improve the lives of all’, then at 
least three of the intelligence practitioners in this sample can 
arguably justify any means to reach that positive outcome.  
The researcher suggests that the intelligence practitioner’s 
personal ethical framework may justify working towards the goal 
of achieving security and stability in the country. 
In the interest of security it is sometimes necessary 
to conduct activities under the radar and do “acting” in 
order to obtain specific intelligence related results (E1: 
1-5). 
 
A portion of the sample of participants justify the use of 
tradecraft in the maintenance of security. Govender asserts that 
the “purpose of intelligence collection is to prevent instability” 
(A2: 1-2). Coetzee seems to use a mental algorithm to justify an 
action, and uses the criterion of a safer national environment for 
all citizens as a final arbiter. 
Members therefore have to make specific choices 
before entering into intelligence activities whether they 
will be able to bear the consequences once activities 
are uncovered or not; whether ethically they have 
peace with their actions; and whether they truly believe 
that the actions that they are about to become involved 
in are bona fide security related actions; and finally that 
the actions will contribute to a better and safer national 
environment for all the citizens of the country (E3: 33-
49).  
 
The researcher contends that a threat to national security 
should elicit a measured response from the intelligence 
community. Referring to the monitoring of a subject (Jamal) who 






…monitoring is determined by [her] activities and 
[her] involvement in a matter which directly affects 
national security (N4: 14-17).  
 
De Jager appears to be clear about what motivates him to 
practice intelligence tradecraft: 
My goal is to protect my country. If she is my target 
or has access to my target it’s my duty and part of my 
tradecraft to do all I can to achieve success. I am not a 
priest you know (S4: 12-16).  
 
Khoza suggests her intelligence skills should be used to 
protect the country she loves. “We love our country and want to 
protect it as much as we know how to” (K2: 1-3). And “ … these 
methods are used for the benefit of the security and stability of 
South Africa” (K1: 22-24). Isaacs asserts that she acts as a 
moral agent for all SA citizens.  
The SSA efforts contribute to the security of the 
citizens. So, even though it might be perceived as 
intelligence officers acting as moral agents to the 
employer, the end goal – is to protect the interests of 
the citizens (I2: 8-14).  
 
For reasons of security, the sample tested suggests that 
intrusive means of collection were justified: 
For national security it will be 100% justified as it 
will save innocent lives. No, no harm from deception as 
it will stop her from doing a wrong thing. I will feel 
proud as an Intelligence officer for saving innocent 
lives (P4: 8-16).  
 
Hoosein is clear about what the role of intelligence is: 
Intelligence practices should be squarely focused 
on matters of national security and the improvement of 
a nation. Allowing political influences and unjustified 
intrusive methods are what the public will take a 
greater interest in as these actions are not guided by 





trust that their Government is genuinely interested in 
the public’s wellbeing and not any other matters such 
as individual gain or self-enrichment at the expense of 
the nation. If intelligence practices are aimed squarely 
at ensuring national security and improvement then the 
public will likely support any ventures undertaken to 
ensure this (N1: 1-22). 
 
Safeguarding the national interest and providing security 
and stability may serve as strong drivers for intelligence 
practitioners’ personal ethical frameworks. When the goal is 
preserving the nation, practitioners may be able to nullify any 
feelings of guilt quite effectively. 
 
5.3.8 Cost versus benefit 
 
The sample of participants consulted in this exploratory 
study seemed to suggest that intelligence practitioners may 
consider their tradecraft as a necessary means to a positive end. 
The scenarios which were offered to the participants tested how 
their personal ethical framework may justify an ethically 
questionable action to accommodate a vital end goal, such as 
the neutralization of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
threat. The goal was to evaluate where the intelligence 
practitioner would stand in a cost-benefit argument. The data 
seemed to suggest that the sample of participants consulted 
may adopt an ‘end justifying the means’ line of reasoning. 
Kekana observes that “…when there is enough evidence that 
the target poses a security threat, I will do whatever it takes to 
collect against them” (P3: 13-18).  Khoza appears to share this 
view: “Benefit does outweigh the cost because the reasons are 
justifiable” (K7: 1-4). She adds: “You have to do what is 
necessary to deal with those problems” (K1: 14-16). Hoosein 





be appropriated from an individual (Jamal) to confirm or refute 
information regarding a target (the diplomat). 
Stealing is justified as the information acquired will 
be critical in determining the activities of Jamal and the 
diplomat. Efforts must be made to act without Jamal or 
the diplomats’ knowledge (N5: 16-23). 
 
Isaacs takes the idea of end justifying means outside of the 
given scenario. 
Because the activities of an intelligence officer are 
mandated by legislation, it is regarded as acceptable 
because the end product contributes to national 
security (I1: 3-7). 
 
To her, it appears as though the result trumps the methods 
used. 
It really doesn’t matter to me. I can spy on anyone 
who is of interest to me. Collecting information on a 
target is not personal to me at all. If the end justifies the 
means, I go for it (I3: 32-37).  
  
Intelligence practitioners are required to be truth-driven and 
truth should be one of the key elements of their personal ethical 
framework. It is ironic that intelligence practitioners have to be 
prepared to lie and deceive in their quest for truth. Determining 
the truth appeared to emerge as a theme among the participants 
surveyed. Hoosein: 
I will do what is required in order to determine the 
truth and not go into the investigation with a 
preconceived idea on whether Jamal is guilty or not 
(N5: 1-3). 
  
Khoza concurs that intelligence decisions cannot be based 
on emotions, but must be grounded in fact: “…However 





decisions are based on facts” (K4: 32-33). Hoosein sums up this 
important point:  
The actions taken to acquire the truth are 
necessary to determine the nature of the relationship 
between the two individuals. I would feel no guilt either 
way of the outcome as the work of an intelligence 
officer is to determine the truth and to remain objective 
throughout (N5: 26-33). 
 
A follow up question to the participants was “Do you ever 
feel like a ‘bad person’ or feel uncomfortable because of some 
of the (legally) unethical functions you have to perform?” Three 
of the participants answered no (Kekana, Coetzee and 
Govender) and five answered yes (Hoosein, Jordaan, Isaacs, 
Ranjeeth and Khoza). Coetzee’s answer reflected her strong 
faith-based ethical framework: 
 
No, I try to do everything according to what I 
believe and if I make mistakes or do not have control 
over circumstances, I trust the Lord with it. I have made 
peace with the responsibility put on me and believe I 
have much control over the ethical way in which it is 
done. The rest I do not have control over or when I 
make mistakes, I am honest about it and either pray 
about it or refrain from continuing with it altogether (EC 
1: 21) 
 
Kekana provides a justification for performing ‘unethical’ 
functions for which he also ‘felt bad’: 
 
Somebody has to do the right thing (PK 1: 16)  
 
Jordaan notes he felt bad, but also highlights the 
importance of the end result: 
It is for the cause. We work for the State Security 
Agency, and we are not here to win a popularity 





done. You also tell yourself that it is a win-win situation. 
The Agency wins and the person did a good deed for 
his country- so he also wins (WJ 1: 22)  
  
Govender uses the end justifies the means justification for 
explaining why she did not feel ‘bad’ engaging in questionable 
activity:  
The ends must justify the means and if it means 
that certain rights are infringed in the interests of 
national security then I feel justified in executing certain 
actions (AG 1: 17). 
 
Isaacs provides a similar justification: 
 
I think of the bigger picture. My unethical functions 
can contribute to the well-being of the country and its 
citizens (NI1: 16). 
 
Ranjeeth holds the same view: 
 
The impact of my actions are for the greater good 




In the view of the researcher, the personal ethical 
framework of an intelligence practitioner is, at face value, no 
different to the average citizen. The personal ethical framework 
is possibly informed by responsibility, family, faith, choice, 
patriotism, duty and consequences. The data pointed to the 
possibility that the personal ethics of the intelligence 
practitioners sample may have been guided by certain 
justifications such as no harm is done to the victims, the 





the argument for the end justifies the means and the quest to 
determine truth.  
The personal ethical framework may not be the only 
framework which is consulted when decisions are made relating 
to covert intelligence collection. These decisions must also be 
informed by an institutional framework. 
 
 
5.4 Institutional Framework 
 
“Know that the constitution and laws of the country still 
guides our actions, thus be well aware of these and align 




The institutional framework, beginning with the Constitution 
and including laws, organisational prescripts, codes of practice 
and operating procedures appeared to be an important 
consideration amongst all the participants when they made their 
ethical choices. The participants appeared to see their specific 
organisation, the SSA, as the guardian of all citizens’ security, 
which has strict guidelines which direct intelligence work. The 
institutional framework is objective but may play an important 
role in evoking subjective ethical responses. The institutional 
framework, the participants’ data suggested, directs intelligence 
practitioners on what to collect (informed by national security 
needs and targeting and mandated by law) and it determines 
how these practitioners should collect the information (directed 





intelligence culture). If the action is legal and legitimate, the 
effect of a conflicting personal ethical code could be diminished.  
  
 
5.4.2 Institutional Framework Determines What to 
Collect 
 
Intelligence practitioners cannot choose what they want to 
collect intelligence on. Targeting is institutionally driven and the 
institutional ethic is not perceived to be determined within a 
particular political framework. 
Ethics are not determined within a particular 
political framework; again policies and law are the 
same when approaching any situation (K4: 12-20).  
 
There appears to be an acceptance amongst the majority of 
the participants sampled that intelligence work is conducted 
within the ambit of the law.  
We have a right to protect the national 
interests of this country and all legal means should be 
explored to protect those interests (W1: 3-7). 
[Laws] are to protect the interests and rights 
of the citizens of this country (W1: 8-10).  
 
Govender appears to see a synergy between the law 
and defensible circumstances:  
 …action needs to be justified by the 
circumstances as well as the legislation prescribed to 
protect us (A3: 2-4).  
Govender notes that the laws protect the intelligence 





[laws] are to protect the interests and rights 
of the citizens of this country (W1: 8-10).  
 
Khoza gives the impression that the institutional 
framework is represented right down to supervisor level, where 
authorization must be sought. 
 
When working in an environment that 
involves the interests and wellbeing of the general 
public, you need to make sure that by Law how is your 
act perceived. The intelligence environment is lawfully 
protected by its policies to conduct its work, hence you 
always need to make sure that whatever you do 
(surveillance, intrusion etc), your line manager is aware 
so that you are not held responsible if there are any 
queries. So intelligence ethics are not led by religion or 
culture or personal preference, but by our policies and 
our law therefore you need to read and gather as much 
information on tradecraft and work methods (K3: 9-26).  
 
A target’s involvement in illegal activity appears to be 
seen as sufficient grounds for targeting by a participant. In the 
given hypothetical scenario concerning a WMD case where 
deception is required to determine the activities of a North 
Korean official suspected of being involved in the smuggling of 
WMD, Coetzee noted that 
…being involved in illegal activities, the 
purpose of the actions must also be exposure of these 
activities in order to bring her (the target) to justice 
according to the laws of the country as well as to 
expose the Korean officer’s actions and neutralise it. 
Again activities must be guided by rights according to 
the law and mandate (E5: 22-34). 
 
Regarding the same hypothetical example, she 
contends that 
[t]he nature of the threat will determine 





justified to steal the briefcase as it will either lead to 
conclusive evidence allowing neutralisation actions to 
be implemented, or it will assist in possibly exonerating 
Jamal from any wrongdoing (E7: 28-34). 
 
Hoosein appears to imply that subjectivity (guided by a 
personal ethic) should be excluded when making a decision. 
The reasons for the spying on a particular 
target have to be correctly justified. One has to be 
objective or else you may be too influenced by your 
biases (N3: 23-27).  
 
The researcher proposes that intelligence practitioners 
work decisions are directed by laws and policies and these are 
interpreted within their personal ethical frameworks as to how to 
action them. 
 
5.4.3 Institutional Framework Determines How to 
Collect it 
 
The researcher contends that the participants function within 
a regulatory framework which not only prescribes what 
information can be collected, but also how this collection of 
information can take place. The participants seem to confirm 
that clandestine intelligence is legally collected through the 
universally accepted methods of tradecraft (described earlier). 
The data suggested that the methods of collection can only be 
applied once the legal obligations have been met and there is 
sufficient justification. Govender proposes “[The]…action needs 
to be justified by the circumstances as well as the legislation 
prescribed to protect us” (A3: 2-4). Part of the culture of 
intelligence is the generally accepted use of tradecraft, which 
are the tools practitioners have at their disposal to accomplish 






Intelligence officers work vicariously through the 
agency, BUT do so for the protection of all SA citizens. 
The Agency provides the tools and structural 
framework for the execution of the duties (A2: 22-27). 
 
The participants suggest that obtaining intelligence through 
clandestine collection methods is a carefully regulated activity.  
Intelligence activities lend itself to deception and 
the utilisation of human sources in obtaining (again) 
specific goals/objectives. This objective is (again) 
guided by a legal mandate of the agency (E6: 30-35). 
 
Ranjeeth (R2: 24-25) asserts that you know when an action 
is unethical when you operate outside the framework of the law. 
The legal framework is a valuable reminder that although some 
actions may be unethical and morally repulsive, they are still 
legal. Coetzee explains: 
The legality of the operational activities due to the 
seriousness of the suspected crime and the mandate 
given to the intelligence agency will allow the intelligence 
officer to conduct the deception without feeling guilty (E6: 
13-23).  
De Jager maintains “the public should see us as the naughty 
guys with the naughty toys and methods, but all for a good 
cause” (S1: 15-18). The reference to ‘naughty toys and methods’ 
refers to the tools and methods of tradecraft. 
 
There appeared to be a clear understanding amongst 
intelligence practitioners of the scope and limits of the legislative 
framework which governed intelligence collection. Regarding the 
scope of investigating a target in the hypothetical scenario, 
Jordaan concedes 
[y]ou would need to register this investigation at a 
central point and use all available means to prove or 







The ‘available means’ Jordaan refers to, in the given 
scenario, would probably refer to the tradecraft which Jordaan 
would use to prove or refute allegations, after the registration of 
the investigation at a central point (fulfilling the legal 
requirements). Govender seems to concur that an intelligence 
practitioner cannot “be involved [in intrusive measures] until 
legislative requirements [are] fulfilled” (A3: 7-9). Jordaan 
highlights the point that collection activity must stop when the 
objective is reached. It should be “…limited to reaching your 
goal and should not continue ad infinitum” (W1: 45). Coetzee 
reminds the intelligence practitioner of the institutional 
framework to which tradecraft must be aligned: 
Know that the constitution and laws of the country 
still guides our actions, thus be well aware of these and 
align your activities likewise (E3: 19-20).  
 
De Jager notes that at organisational level  
…there is a specific Ops Directive and Standard 
Operating Procedure as well as an Intelligence Manual 
that dictates my actions (S2: 10-12). 
 
 
5.4.4 Intelligence and the public perception 
 
The sample tested appears to acknowledge that intelligence 
activity is conducted in a regulated institutional framework. The 
data suggest that intelligence practitioners represented in the 
sample agree that tradecraft activity conducted in pursuit of 
operational objectives must be lawful and mandated and even 
then, tradecraft activity (intrusive means of collection), is still 
limited by law. Of the sample of participants consulted, seven of 





intelligence institution and intelligence methodologies. Public 
perception may be important. How the public view the work of 
intelligence practitioners may have an effect on their morale and 
may affect how efficiently they employ clandestine collection 
methods. The participants appeared to mostly feel that the 
general public are not in a position to judge intelligence 
practitioners’ working methods or question their ethics. Jordaan 
concedes there may be outside influences which form the 
opinion of intelligence practitioners over time: “There are 
external influences…” (W3: 19).  Khoza offers her opinion on the 
matter: 
The public are not in a position to judge intelligence 
collection methods because of their unfamiliarity with 
the intelligence environment. They are not part of the 
intelligence environment nor do they have any practical 
experience therefore it is difficult to speak on 
something that you are oblivious to (K1: 1-9). 
   
Khoza’s view may be reinforced by De Jager who appears 
to concede that public ignorance of intelligence tradecraft may 
be a universal phenomenon: 
Intelligence methods will seldom be understood by 
outsiders. It involves by nature deceit, manipulation, 
role-playing, lying etc. (S1: 1-6). 
 
Jordaan advances the position that the public expects the 
intelligence community to perform its duty to protect the nation 
and achieve success: 
[The] public want to see perpetrators caught and 
brought to justice. The intelligence services have 
however in the past few years been plagued by mostly 
negative news and the general public is very 
pessimistic in terms of its capabilities and methods. In 
South Africa, we need a few ‘positive cases’ to be 
highlighted and made public, to increase the positive 
role that intelligence is playing. This will also positively 





intelligence collection methods more readily (W2: 7-
20).  
  
Kekana seemingly concedes that the public are only shown 
the negative side of intelligence and therefore will not condone 
intrusive collection methods. 
The general public is too quick to judge intelligence 
communities when something goes wrong. On talk 
radio such as 702, SAFM, Power FM and Radio 2000 I 
always listen to callers who blame the intelligence 
communities, that we are always caught ‘napping’ (P2: 
4-10). 
 
Isaacs asserts that the public’s lack of understanding of the 
intelligence community may even lead to paranoia. 
In the absence of an explanation of how and why 
intrusive intelligence collection is done, the public will 
be paranoid (I2: 1-4).  
 
Ranjeeth appears to hold a similar view: 
The public is not in a position to judge intelligence 
collection methods as they don’t understand the 
importance of intelligence in maintaining security and 
stability in the country (R1: 3-8).  
 
Kekana gives the impression that the general public does 
not value security and stability over the protection of human 
rights.  
Those who understand the role of intelligence, they 
would but there are those who do not understand our 
role and they believe (misconception) that we only 
protect the government or ruling party (P2: 11-12).  
 
 
Khoza appears to be the only participant who holds a more 





…general public would support intelligence 
practitioners working methods, irrespective if they 
seem morally questionable. The public would consider 
the end result a good justification (K1: 35-38).  
 
She also insists that the public would accept the use of 
intrusive means of intelligence collection.  
Absolutely! I believe that South Africans are 
generally patriotic. We love our country and want to 
protect it as much as we know how to (K2: 1-3). 
  
She defends her position further by maintaining that 
…South Africans, as the general public, would 
value security and stability over the protection of 
human rights, especially those who are the innocent 
patriotic general public. Also knowing that these 
security and stability methods are in place to protect 
the very same human rights (K2: 15-18). 
 
Jordaan seems to recognise that the negative view the 
public has of the organisation may have an effect on the morale 
and may contribute towards negativity. He distinguishes 
between the corporate culture of the organisation and the 
corporate image. 
 
Corporate image is the view the general public 
have. So you can have the latest rebranding of your 
organisation (changing the corporate identity), but if the 
general public is bombarded with negative stories 
about you all the time, it is not going to help you at all 
in rebranding yourself (W2: 39-42).  
 
In his view, it is the institution which has to counter the risk 
of having a negative identity:  
Let the general public buy into the idea of the 





– and then it would be easier for the general public to 
value security and stability over the protection of 
human rights (W3: 1-6). 
 
Coetzee asserts that the institution’s ethic may be viewed in 
a broader context by the public.  
Political frameworks will in most cases publicly 
propagate their own ethics which might sadly be 
accepted and adhered to eventually by a society 




Khoza was the only participant who appeared to be positive 
about the public perception of the intelligence profession. Other 
participants surveyed seemed to generally believe the public are 
unaware of the work intelligence practitioners do and therefore 
cannot be judgemental about the methods used to collect 
intelligence. The general negative perception the intelligence 
practitioners feel the public has toward them, is a negative factor 
which possibly contributes to the difficulty of making ethical 
decisions in the work environment. The institutional framework 
would be expected to ensure intelligence practitioners function in 
an environment which is not perceived as being negative or 
harmful. The question of whether there is institutional support for 
intelligence practitioners, who may experience ethical dilemmas 
within a perceived negative environment, was considered 
relevant. 
5.4.5 Institutional ethics sensitivity 
 
It is logical to assume that any intelligence organisation 
would recognize that intelligence practitioners who engage in 





minefield of ethical dilemmas in order to operate efficiently. 
When faced with ethical conflict and conscience issues, and the 
personal ethical framework cannot accommodate them, 
intelligence practitioners may turn to their institution for support 
and motivation. Govender observes “the SSA does provide 
support in the form of supervisors and managers” (A3: 10-11). 
The researcher is of the opinion that supervisors and managers 
are not equipped to deal with moral and ethical issues. This may 
explain why conflicted intelligence practitioners may not turn to 
the institution itself for support. 
I do believe help is available for those who seek it, 
whether it is internally or externally. I have not heard of 
anyone who has requested such support (W4: 25-28). 
 
Hoosein concedes that direction is given as to what is 
required, but the “how” is left up to the individual practitioner:  
Guidance is provided up to a point. Generally your 
superiors are responding to requests made by their 
superiors and so forth. Therefore, the net result of 
acquiring the information is generally what is considered 
the most important. How you acquire the information is 
your business (N3: 8-16). 
 
Kekana feels there is “no institutional guidance” (P3: 4). 
Coetzee pronounces that 
…currently the SSA does not engage in these 
issues enough. There is no clear consensus on basic 
ideas re relevant or ideal operational means, and 
members sometimes use their own sense of ‘ethics’ to 
guide their actions. Support is mostly only implemented 
once a member experiences a physical or mental issue 
relating to activities and even then the support is 
limited and often insufficient (E3: 21-33). 
  
Coetzee feels the support is often too little too late.  Khoza 





The SSA does not necessarily provide guidance for 
day to day activities that need you to lie, deceive etc. 
When on the ground, you are on your own. You need 
to know how to get out of a sticky situation and not put 
yourself in too much of a risk that you cannot get 





The researcher contends that the intelligence practitioners 
represented by the sample of participants carry out their 
functions within a regulatory framework which not only directs 
the ‘what’ of their activity, directed by the Constitution, laws 
and Acts, but also the ‘how,’ informed by policies and 
procedures which direct tradecraft. The participants appeared 
to align their activity to the regulatory framework where this 
conformed to their personal ethical framework. It became 
evident that one of the factors which may affect ethical decision 
making in the work environment, is a negative public 
perception. This appeared to have a negative effect on many of 
the participants who felt their work activity did not receive 
public approval. There was no consensus amongst the sample 
of participants as to whether there is institutional support to 
assist intelligence practitioners in making ethical decisions. The 
views of the participants appeared to indicate conflict between 
the personal ethical framework and the expectation of the 
employer for them to engage in functional activity which went 








5.5 Towards a New Ethical Framework 
 
“Are we so engulfed in deception and lies after all these 
years that it has become the norm and that the goalposts of 
normal have shifted?” Willem Jordaan 
“There is a moral unwritten spy bible that grows with 
you, dictated by the rules, your environment, your 
upbringing, your own moral compass and an intelligence 
tradition and culture with its own written and unwritten 
rules”. Steven De Jager 
5.5.1 Introduction  
 
The researcher would like to suggest that in the sample of 
participants surveyed, a case may be made that intelligence 
practitioners may suspend their personal ethical framework 
when conducting clandestine intelligence collection and operate 
within a new ethical framework. The possibility exists that 
conflict in the personal ethical framework is caused as a result of 
trying to fulfil the requirements of the institutional framework, 
which may be at variance with an individual’s morals. To clarify 
whether this conflict was latent or manifest, the participants were 
asked in a follow-up question whether it is possible they have 
two separate moral codes: a personal one and one which they 
use for work purposes. Six out of seven of the participants who 
were re-questioned, acknowledged they had two separate moral 
codes. Coetzee was the exception, stating she had one moral 
code. Govender indicated she ‘definitely’ has two moral codes. 
Interestingly, Jordaan’s answer was ambiguous: 
 
Yes. But it cannot just be answered with a simple 
“yes” or “no”. That is why you need to have a 





life”. Separate the two. It does sometimes get mixed 
up, but you can manage it (WJ2:  5-7). 
 
Participants were then asked if there is a separate ‘work 
moral code’, whether this code accommodates all the morally 
difficult functions they have to perform – lie, steal, cheat?  
Some of the participants who answered in the affirmative 
provided justifications, even though these were deliberately not 
asked for. 
 
Govender provided a justification in her short answer: 
 
I would think that it does, although not so much as 
a lie but a manipulation of the truth (AG 1: 20). 
 
Kekana agreed it does and provided a justification: 
Yes. As long as it will save innocent lives and 
protect my country from any form of harm, I shall 
always spy (PK 1: 21) 
 
Jordaan indicated that the work ethical code would not give 
carte blanche to his actions: 
There are certain things I will just not do (WJ 2: 
10). 
 
Hoosein’s answer also indicated that although he 
acknowledged he functioned in a separate ‘work code’ when 
necessary, this framework itself had ethical boundaries: 
 
It does not accommodate all those actions that are 





think on how to avoid unethical actions and try and live 
with what you have done (NH1: 24) 
 
The separate ethical framework used while working did not 
exempt him from accountability.  
Seven out of eight of the participants who responded to the 
second questionnaire, admitted they use two sets of ethical 
codes, the personal ethical framework, and another distinct code 
which is called upon when work requirements and the personal 
ethical framework are at odds. This possible disjuncture 
between the personal ethical framework and the institutional 
framework in which the intelligence practitioner is required to 
work is highlighted by many of the participants in this exploratory 
study. Govender explains  
[a]s an individual, I have my own moral compass 
and beliefs which might not be shared by the agency or 
reflect the values of the agency at times. Work is 
executed in line with the employer’s viewpoint (A2: 30-
37).  
 
Govender implies that her moral compass and the 
employer’s viewpoint are not always aligned but that she uses 
the employer’s values when she is at work. Khoza referred to 
the elimination of personal thinking in the intelligence 
environment and the adoption of ‘groupthink’: 
In the intelligence environment we are governed by 
policies and laws in order to eliminate any personal 
thinking or agendas, in that light I see how ‘groupthink’ 
may exist in the intelligence agency when it comes to 
ethics (K2: 44-46).  
 
The researcher noted various indicators emerge from the 
data which suggest participants may encounter risk to their 





adapt to their conflicted state. The indicators,  point to an 
altered personal ethical framework, or a new and separate one. 
The indicators may be seen as 
 adaptation of moral compass 
 conflict and 





 The indicators were identified by the participant’s use of 
words which suggested a change in the personal ethical 
framework. Meaning was extracted from words and phrases 
which pointed to redefinitions, contradictions and emotional 
language. Statements or questions which pointed to a 
disturbance of the personal ethical framework were used as 
cues to identify these ideas.  
 
 
5.5.2.1 Adaptation of Moral Compass 
 
The data may indicate that time played a role in the 
intelligence practitioners’ adaptation to intelligence work. De 
Jager spoke of the moral unwritten spy bible that grows with you 
(S2: 18-19) (emphasis added). De Jager is an intelligence 
veteran with more than 20 years’ experience and he appeared to 
concede that experience over time leads to a new 
conceptualization of intelligence collection. The researcher notes 
that De Jager asserted that this ‘spy bible’ is unwritten. It does 
not appear to be a formal code or set of rules, but rather one 





Jordaan, seems to imply that only the basic ethical principles 
which form a practitioner’s core-make up are not adapted over 
time.  
You get older and wiser… your opinion is formed 
the whole time. There are external influences …the 
basic principles of ethics remains. That what you have 
learnt from a young age and what your gut tells you 
remains. Your ethics is part of your core make-up. The 
pillars from which you operate must be sound (W3: 19-
30).  
 
Jordaan later concedes: 
Are we so engulfed in deception and lies 
after all these years that it has become the norm and 
that the goalposts of normal have shifted? Or is it just 
the case that we justify the smaller lies and deception 
as being part of the work (W4: 29-37)?  
  
Khoza’s moral compass appears to have shifted over time. 
At first I used to justify each action but with 
time you don’t even see some things as unethical (K7: 
5-14) (emphasis added).  
 
Govender gives the impression of having had a similar 
experience: 
I have seen a change and over the years 
have shifted the moral compass where I need to (A6: 
5-7).  
 
When asked if she questioned the adjustment, she 
replied “In the past, I used to” (A6: 10) (emphasis added). 
Govender has ten years’ experience so this adjustment does not 
appear to necessarily take place over decades. Coetzee made a 
conscious decision ten years ago not to conform to the 






Previously I would have engaged in covert 
operational activity unrestrictedly. However 10 years 
ago I made a conscious decision to conduct any 
operational activity according to what I believe is right 
and ethical and to treat all people I engage with in an 
ethical manner, whether they are targets, agents, 
contacts or colleagues. I chose to follow an unmoving 
compass which is my faith, rather than an ever 
changing worldly compass (E8: 15-26).  
 
In her case, it is possible that a strong personal 
ethical framework directs her action. Her moral compass, 
conceivably, is unshakable. In one of the scenarios presented to 
her where moral dilemmas were explored, she intimated that 
deception could still be used and she would not feel guilty if 
certain conditions were met. 
Moral justification combined with legality of 
actions and a legal mandate will definitely lessen any 
possible moral burden resulting from deception. 
However it must always be taken into consideration 
that people get attached to each other in some way or 
another during contact of any kind and even though 
there is moral justification for deception, this 
attachment (or not) could eventually contribute to a 
sense of guilt. The action of deception in the case of 
determining and achieving this specific goal is however 
unlikely to cause guilt and can be morally and ethically 
justified (E6: 23-29).  
 
In a follow up question, Coetzee was asked whether 
her single ethical code allowed for the use of unethical methods 
of collection. 
Although my personal ethical code does not 
allow me to lie, steal, deceive for my personal or 
unethical benefit, these activities are sometimes 
conducted in professional work related circumstances 
where the end goal is clearly defined and in line with 
my ethical code. Biblically there is a clear mandate to 
protect what is right and true and has been assigned to 
your responsibility, including the protection of human 
life. As we live in an impure world, unfortunately 





threats posed by this world. We therefore cannot 
excuse ourselves from also taking responsibility for 
protection and regulation in all spheres of our society 
and leave it for other people to do (EC 2: 5-12).  
 
The researcher contends that deception may 
therefore be applied ethically if there is sufficient justification, 
even using Coetzee’s strict criterion. It appears as though 
Coetzee has redefined her ethical code to accommodate her 
faith and values, so that it still allows her to be an effective 
intelligence practitioner.  
The competing forces of personal ethics and duty to 
protect may ultimately lead to conflict and sustaining a strong set 





Participants appear to concede that internal conflict 
materialised when their personal ethical framework and the 
institutional imperatives of duty and results were in conflict. 
When Govender was asked if she had to adjust her personal 
morals to accommodate work, she indicated “I have at times and 
it can cause personal conflict” (A6: 8-9). Khoza is more 
emphatic: 
The deception would make me feel like I’m such a 
liar! But the reasons why, would quickly eliminate those 
feelings. I still would feel the same way because it’s not 
about the other person but it’s about me feeling and 
hearing me being liar (K6: 8-16).  
 
While Govender and Khoza appear to concede to being 





other ways. Coetzee, whom it appears has a strong, faith-based 
ethical framework, seems to be willing to give up some of these 
principles for the sake of expediency and duty. 
 
As long as the goal remains specific according to 
the mandate and my personal belief of role and 
purpose which is not to harm others but to neutralise 
an existential / potential threat, I will not consider it a 
suspension to my moral or ethical values (E8: 7-11). 
 
In a follow up question for clarity, Coetzee was asked 
whether she ever felt like a ‘bad person’ or felt uncomfortable 
because of some of the (legally) unethical functions she had to 
perform. She answered: 
No, I try to do everything according to what I 
believe and if I make mistakes or do not have control 
over circumstances, I trust the Lord with it. I have made 
peace with the responsibility put on me and believe I 
have much control over the ethical way in which it is 
done. The rest I do not have control over or when I 
make mistakes, I am honest about it and either pray 
about it or refrain from continuing with it altogether (EC 
1: 18). 
 
Not all the participants admitted to personal conflict because 
it is the researcher’s argument that this conflict may have been 
resolved in a new ethical framework apart from the personal 
ethical framework (refer to section below).  
   
 
5.5.2.3 Denial of conscience 
  
Actions which are morally difficult to execute may still be 
legal, however the law alone may not be sufficient to negate 





human conscience may not be tricked into believing that legality 
is equal to moral correctness. Khoza appears to highlight the 
importance of denying her conscience. 
Some do prefer to look at situations as black and 
white meaning they don’t involve their emotions and 
ethical feelings, that way they are more productive in 
their work; and some are guided by their ethics and 
morals. However I do think it is better to park your 
conscience because that way you don’t become biased 
or practice favouritism (K4: 22-29). 
 
The normalisation of actions which are arguably unethical, 
may point to the denial of conscience. In the case of Jordaan: 
Are we so engulfed in deception and lies after all 
these years that it has become the norm and that the 
goalposts of normal have shifted? Or is it just the case 
that we justify the smaller lies and deception as being 
part of the work? (W4: 29-37). 
 
Khoza admits she can suspend her conscience at will, when 
necessary: 
 In some cases I do suspend moral and ethical 
beliefs because I understand that I’m an intelligence 
officer and my line of work means collecting 
information using certain methods, and my work 
policies to some extend justify my actions. At first I 
used to justify each action but with time you don’t even 
see some things as unethical (K7: 5-14).  
 
Govender also sees the suspension of conscience as being 
necessary in order for the intelligence practitioner to be effective. 
I think that the conscience is always there, but in 
certain instances it is better to make peace with it and 
suspend that conscience to yield the best results (A3: 
21-25).  
 
The term ‘make peace’ may infer that there is conflict within 





recognise his conscience as getting in the way of his work. 
When asked if he suspended his conscience, he replied “Yes I 
do, based on the fact that if I consider ethics, I will compromise 
myself” (P6: 1-3). Ranjeeth suggested the conscience of an 
intelligence practitioner is an obstacle to work efficiency. “It is 
better to suspend [your] conscience because it interferes with 
judgement” (R3: 16-18). Judgement, in his opinion, may be 
clouded by a personal ethical framework which may not be able 
to accommodate ethically questionable actions. Coetzee 
conceded that suspension of conscience is not necessary to 
undertake a legally mandated and justified task. In the scenario 
of the stealing of a briefcase to evaluate information contained 
inside which may point to a target’s involvement in serious 
crime:  
The theft of a briefcase in this critical and possible 
existential threatening circumstance is not considered 
suspension of ethical beliefs (E7: 44-47).  
 
In the researcher’s view, this appears to indicate that 
Coetzee can steal the briefcase without compromising her 
strong personal ethics. Kekana hinted at having the ability to 
dismiss his conscience when the end result justifies it.  
In dire situations one does not need conscience. 
For example when the lives of innocent people are in 
danger and information needs to be collected urgently 
to neutralise the threat (P3: 7-13). 
 
Kekana suggests that urgency or necessity may be sufficient 
justification for him not to consider the ethical consequences of 
an action. He argues that necessary actions may be carried out 
spontaneously and instinctively, without recourse to a 
conscience, almost in ‘self-defence.’ Govender possibly 





unease in the interests of reaching the objective of the 
investigation:  
Your personal and ethical beliefs need to be 
suspended at times and this is one of those instances. 
I would morally be perturbed about the physical 
acquisition of the briefcase, but I would justify it in my 
head as working within the boundaries of the 
investigation (A5: 12-19).  
 
The justifications which undermine an action may neutralize 
any feelings of guilt.  “Deception is needed in order to execute 
the task. This is part of the job and is not wrong” (I4: 11-15). 
Here Isaacs accepts that deception is not wrong if it is the 
context of work. The ‘work’ therefore gives ethically unpleasant 
task legitimacy. There is the suggestion that there may be 
careful deliberation before morally challenging actions are 
undertaken. Hoosein hinted that he does 
…not suspend moral beliefs but I look at what is 
required and what is expected in order to acquire the 
necessary information before the operation 
commences. If there is a matter that I do not agree with 
beforehand, I will not engage in it. If I am forced to 
make a rash decision while in the field, I will go with my 
gut (N6: 1-9).  
 
Coetzee stated emphatically that she personally does not 
suspend her ethical beliefs but conceded some intelligence 
practitioners do. 
All intelligence officers have a conscience. 
However many intelligence officers often suspend their 
conscience while working as the nature of the work 
tends to give an idea of being “untouchable”, superior 
and even being above the law (E4: 9-13). 
 
Does she suspend hers? “No I do not suspend my moral or 
ethical beliefs when I engage in a covert operational activity” 





either, but goes on to explain how she can still be effective by 
‘altering her values’.  
However, I am able to alter my values in order to 
meet my objectives, but only to a certain point (I3: 22). 
 
 She regards her ‘values’ as a fluid entity which can be 
changed at will. Emotion may be suppressed, and this possibly 
negates feelings of guilt. 
Performing a function that requires deception will 
not make me feel guilty. When it comes to handling a 
source of information or investigating a target, 
emotions cannot come into play (I4: 17-18). 
  
To De Jager, tradecraft (with all its morally questionable 
methods), may be part of his belief system. In this case, 
suspension of conscience may not be necessary because a new 
definition of right and wrong may have been formulated. When 
asked if he suspends moral and ethical beliefs when engaging in 
covert operational activity, he replied “No its part of my belief 
and morals to use tradecraft” (S5: 4-6). Hoosein, a relatively new 
intelligence practitioner with under ten years’ experience, gave 
the impression he has not adjusted his moral beliefs. “I have not 
adjusted my moral beliefs and there is no conflict” (N6: 12-13). 
He has “one set that I live by in all aspects of life” (N6: 14-15). 
His motivation to comply with his strict personal moral code 
appeared to be underpinned by the belief that the institution will 
offer him no protection ‘if he is caught’.  
I have not been granted such licence as if I am 
caught, I understand that it is likely that the SSA will 
not assist me and indicate that they had prior 
knowledge of such events. Therefore, I have to 
maintain my moral beliefs (N6: 16-21). 
Hoosein is under the impression that his personal ethical 





activity. He believes he has one set of moral beliefs and must 




5.5.3 Working Ethical Framework  
 
 
The sample is small and this is just an exploratory study, 
however, a case may be made for the existence of an ethical 
framework which is distinct from the personal ethical code and 
which is able to give utility and expression to the institutional 
framework. The new ethical framework does not appear to be a 
formal set of rules as in a code of ethics. It may best be 
described and explained by what De Jager called an “unwritten 
spy bible.” 
 
5.5.3.1 Neutralisation methods 
 
In the literature study, the neutralization model highlighted 
certain rationalizations which individuals use to justify deviant 
behaviour. In the intelligence ethics context, these could be 
adapted to apply to the intelligence practitioner, as described 
below: 
Intelligence training may help the members of the 
‘intelligence’ society to socialize into the intelligence culture and 
accept the rules and beliefs of the ‘spy world.’ 
  





The intelligence practitioner may argue he or she accepts no 
responsibility for the unethical or immoral act done as it 
becomes the product of a series of acts which begins as a lawful 
instruction and is directed and controlled through policies and 
processes. The participants appear to not take personal 
responsibility for their institutional actions. 
I didn’t really hurt anybody. 
The researcher suggests that the target may be seen as 
being impersonal and may even be objectified, given a number 
or a code name. It is easy to see how an intelligence practitioner 
may be able to deceive, pry and spy on a target without feeling 
he or she is harming a real human being. In a sense, it may be 
easy to justify hurting an object or a number rather than a real 
person. The participants’ interpretation of the concept ‘harm’ 
points to their denial of any harm being visited on their targets. 
Everyone’s picking on me. 
When questions were asked about the intelligence 
community and how it behaves, the researcher proposes 
intelligence practitioners may feel they are being unfairly treated 
or judged. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s), the media 
and lobby groups are critical of intelligence agencies and their 
perceived intrusive methods of information collection which 
impede the privacy of citizens. The participants’ answers show 
that intelligence practitioners are quick to defend themselves 
and also feel the motives of the accusers (as outsiders) are 
suspicious. It may be natural for intelligence practitioners to see 
ordinary citizens as hostile to the cause of intelligence as they 
do not understand how the intelligence community functions.  
I didn’t do it for myself. 
Another justification of intelligence practitioners may be an 





that some rules of society are abrogated for the good of other 
individuals or groups and there is no personal gain or 
satisfaction in deceiving others or invading the privacy of others. 
The intelligence practitioner is a functionary in a bigger machine 
with a higher goal that transcends any personal agenda. The 
researcher submits this rationalization may free the intelligence 
practitioner of any personal guilt. The data show that 
participants’ were clear about the call of duty and the 
maintenance of national security. 
 
5.5.3.2 Intelligence practitioners work in a 
separate mode 
 
 The researcher suggests that a new framework develops, 
one which includes both the institutional framework 
(incorporating the Constitution, laws and Acts which informs the 
action) and the personal ethical framework which may give the 
action context and meaning. This is learned behaviour. The 
researcher argues it may also be understood as the “mode” 
which intelligence practitioners switch over to when they are 
faced with an ethical dilemma and their personal ethical 
framework fails and the institutional framework has no answer. 
Ranjeeth submits “people are not what they seem to be in the 
world of spying” (R5: 23-24). He suggests it is a world separate 
from the ‘normal’ one. This ‘intelligence world’, with its unwritten 
spy bible, may have its own ethical code. The new framework is 
adapted to the needs of the institutional goals and its key 
objective of providing national security. The participants never 
specifically mentioned a separate ethical code, in fact most 
appear to be clear about having a single ethical framework. The 
data suggest, however, that a separate ethical code emerges 





unshakable ethical frameworks (Coetzee and Hoosein), still 
appear be able to operate by switching to a new ethical 
framework, the working ethical code. Coetzee insists she has 
only one ethical code: “I have remained true to what I know is 
right and consider my work ethics part and parcel of my personal 
ethics” (E9: 1-4). Her single ethical framework was confirmed in 
a follow up question where the question was “Is it possible that 
you have two separate moral codes – a personal one and one 
which you use for work?” to which she answered “No, just one” 
(EC 1: 28). Ranjeeth admitted to having two ethical codes, a 
personal one and a work one and replied yes to a direct 
question on this matter. When asked if the separate working 
ethical code accommodates the lies, deception and other moral 
issues encountered while at work, he replied: 
No, not really because your personal beliefs and 
your personal moral code always guide the actions you 
perform at work. It is the sane voice that speaks to you 
(LR1: 21) 
 
This implies that Ranjeeth believes that his personal ethical 
framework is sufficiently strong to guide his work activities in 
ways which are acceptable, even though there is a separate 
working ethical code.  
Adaptation and justifications appeared to be common 
threads in responses. It also appears that contradiction is a 
recurring issue as the participants sometimes deny having more 
than one ethical code but proceed to describe one which is 
completely separate to their personal code. Jordaan was a good 
example of this denial-concession: 
It sounds like talking a child: “Do what I say” and 
not “Do what I do”. I would not say two sets of morals, 
but I separate my work and my private life. It doesn’t 
mean that I have two sets of morals and ethics. It just 





do it. I have done it for so long, that it is in my DNA 
(W10: 5-13). 
  
It is important to note that he considers the ethical 
framework he operates in as being part of his DNA, which may 
indicate a very deep seated, almost physiological response, 
consistent with Kekana’s response earlier which implied his 
actions can be instinctive. Jordaan also concedes that it is a 
process that has developed over time. In the follow up question 
which asked whether he has two separate ethical codes, he 
replied ‘yes’ but then explained there is a “separation between 
work and private life” (WJ 2: 5). Ranjeeth submitted he has a set 
of work morals and a separate set of personal ethics. 
Important to differentiate between personal life and 
work. At home, you are a family man trying to instil 
moral values in your kids and the rest of the family. 
Personally, I hate lying and I reward honesty at home 
(R6: 3-8).  
 
Ranjeeth conceded he hates dishonesty in his personal 
ethical framework but may justify and tolerate lying in the 
working ethical framework.  
Govender too admitted she has two sets of morals and 
ethics – a work set, and a home set. 
Most definitely yes. If not working as an intelligence 
officer, then my personal set of moral obligations apply 
(A6: 11-14).  
Her understanding of the new ethical code is that a set of 
ethics may automatically be ascribed to her when she works as 
an intelligence practitioner, and then is discarded when at home. 
Isaacs provided an indication of what contributed to the 
redefinition: 
My opinion will always be expressed as my own 
and I cannot be influenced by group thinking. However, 





agency as individuals easily conform to groups. I’ve 
experienced that in this environment, it can be 
somewhat easier to alter ones viewpoint to fit the 
opinion of the employer (I2: 15-24). 
  
Isaacs suggests that conforming to the work-ethic is hard 
to resist, even if it goes against the grain of the personal ethical 
framework. There appears to be an acknowledgement that the 
work persona is not expected to be a moral one. De Jager 
opined 
 
[m]y goal is to protect my country. If she is my 
target or has access to my target it’s my duty and part 
of my tradecraft to do all I can to achieve success. I am 
not a priest you know (S4: 12-16) (emphasis added). 
 
This natural intelligence tradition may inform the 
intelligence practitioners’ work ethic. Jordaan referred to 
two hats, implying the intelligence practitioner may have to 
constantly juggle various issues in order to reach the goal. 
 
One must always be wearing your two hats. You 
must ask yourself if this is lawful, is it the right thing to 
do, are there easier ways to reach your goal, is it 
necessary to use intrusive measures (W3: 7-13)? 
 
Generally speaking, data showed that there may be a 
certain acceptance of intelligence methods within the ethical 
framework, provided there is institutional authorisation and 
according to the rules and conventions of intelligence. 
  
I’m an intelligence officer and my line of work 
means collecting information using certain methods, 
and my work policies to some extend justify my 





time you don’t even see some things as unethical (K7: 
5 -14). 
  
Khoza referred to the assimilation of the new ethical code 
into her life over time. Isaacs suggested the same where 
ethically questionable activity may have become ‘second 
nature’: 
Profiling people in my personal life has become a 
second nature and if I need to solicit information to 
confirm a suspicion in my mind, I will do it (I6: 23-27). 
 
 
5.5.3.3  Defining a new framework 
 
At this point, it seems necessary to offer a definition of a 
possible working ethical framework.  
It is proposed that the Working Ethical Framework may be 
defined as 
 
An alternative ethical framework adapted for use by 
intelligence practitioners which may mitigate conflict between 
their personal ethical framework and the desire to reach the 
objective of securing the nation in relation to the goal of the 
institutional framework.  
 
The researcher’s view is that the small sample of 
participants’ data point to the possibility of the working ethical 
framework, but further studies on a larger scale would have to 
confirm its existence. The preliminary definition is based on the 
exploratory sample and may have to be revised after further 
studies. The operationalization of the concept at this stage is just 





After the intelligence practitioner has redefined his or her 
ethical framework and functions within a new mode, the Working 
Ethical Framework (WEF), certain actions may need redefining. 
Jordaan proposes,  
…to be a good operator, you have to decide what 
is ‘allowed’ – sometimes it may be cunning, but not 
unethical (W5: 39-47). 
  
In this case, Jordaan perhaps infers that some collection 
methods may assume a new label, ‘cunning’, which may make 
the actions appear less devious. When intelligence practitioners 
switch their ethical framework to a working one, they may 
assume an ‘Agency persona’ as a type of ‘working mode’ where 
‘acting out’ the role of an intelligence practitioner is played and 
the redefinition of ethically uncomfortable words such as lying, 
stealing and deception is possible. When asked if deception is 
justified, all nine participants agreed it was. “Yes. It forms part of 
tradecraft” (W7: 24). Jordaan says using deception as part of 
tradecraft would make him feel “Neutral – no feeling of deception 
at all. I would just be doing my job” (W7: 24-27). Kekana says 
plainly that the work subsumes the intelligence practitioner. 
“Sometimes you become the nature of work, you lie to 
manipulate people” (P6: 15-17). Earlier it was noted that 
Coetzee used the word ‘acting’ when describing intelligence 
methods. 
In the interest of security it is sometimes necessary 
to conduct activities under the radar and do “acting” in 
order to obtain specific intelligence related results (E1: 
1-5).  
 
Isaacs also describes how she uses the tactic of charm to 
elicit information from a male. 
Extracting information from a male may require 
some level of charm. This is a dangerous tactic but I 






Isaacs describes herself engaging into work mode, putting 
on a persona, and using this persona to extract information as a 
tradecraft ‘tactic’. This is probably not something she would do 
outside of work, when in ‘private’ mode. 
Personal life is kept separate from work. When I go 
home, I am my true self whereas when I am at work, I 
am an actor (I6: 15-18). 
 
It may also be pertinent to note that she depersonifies her 
target, calling him ‘a male’, a distinctly impersonal term where 
an individual is reduced to species level. In the same vein, 
definitions may also change in this new framework and 
euphemisms may be present. The WEF may accommodate 
lying and deception, where a personal ethical code would not.  
Lying is not an ethical fundamental but this is the 
basis of my work when sourcing information. I don’t 
feel the need to justify my action to a personal set of 
beliefs (I6: 1-5).  
Isaacs goes on to explain how the personal (home) ethical 
code and the WEF are separate, and how the work persona is 
not the real her.  
 My work doesn’t define me as a person. When I 
engage for purposes of work, I act as an employer of 
SSA and not in my personal capacity. I keep these two 
lives separately. It has become less difficult to lie in my 
personal life though, but it’s a personal choice not to 
choose this option just because it is easy (I6: 6-14).  
 
In the researcher’s view, her use of words reveals a 
complete separation of two lives, and possibly by extension, two 
ethical frameworks. Isaacs holds herself to a high set of 
personal ethics, to the point of using her son for an 
accountability check. It can be interpreted that her work persona 





standard. Deception appears to be justified if the intelligence 
practitioner adopts the Agency persona and can use the 
euphemistic language which is part of the intelligence culture. 
The data suggest that the participants take on a role when at 
work which is different to that which they are at home, as 
mentioned above. There may be evidence to suggest that in a 
switching over to work mode and adopting the Agency persona, 
the intelligence practitioner may become like an actor who acts 
out a role as a certain character. The character portrayed and 
whatever she acts out, may be someone apart from the 
individual, it is not the individual defined by her personal ethical 
framework. The researcher argues that acting requires practice. 
Isaacs asserts “When I do my planning to engage - I do 
rehearse a certain profile I want people to see” (I6: 19-21). 
Coetzee would also use this strategy to obtain information 
deceitfully. 
In the interest of security it is sometimes necessary 
to conduct activities under the radar and do “acting” in 
order to obtain specific intelligence related results (E1: 
1-5).  
Even when the intelligence practitioners adopt an “Agency 
persona” and acts out a role in pursuit of the intelligence 
objectives, they may still be plagued by ethical dilemmas. 
Redefinition of concepts appears to be a technique used by 
intelligence practitioners to rationalize their behaviour.  
 
5.5.3.4 Acceptable and unacceptable behaviour 
 
The contention is that the WEF may have its own rules, 
most of which might not be tolerated in a personal ethical code, 
or in the institutional framework. “The 11th Commandment for 





be caught’ implies engaging in activity which would be 
considered deviant in normal society where punishment would 
be a reasonable expectation. Lying is possibly acceptable in the 
WEF even if it considered unacceptable in the personal ethical 
framework. Interestingly, the data show the participants make a 
statement, and then try to justify it within the new framework. 
“Yes, I have to lie about who I work for. Lying is not in my 
nature” (P6: 4-5). When Kekana says he has to lie and then 
provides the explanation that lying is not in his nature, he may 
be saying it is the intelligence practitioner, operating in the WEF 
with a specific goal in mind, who is lying. The WEF is evident in 
Isaacs’ statement where she has previously asserted that she 
would lie and deceive to elicit information, and yet: “In my 
opinion, lying is lying and no end result can justify it” (I1: 1-2). 
The researcher notes that this question was asked at the 
beginning of the questionnaire and at that stage Isaacs perhaps 
still believed in her personal (home) ethical code. It can possibly 
be deduced from her later answers that she has switched to 
another ethics code other than her personal one. In the following 
quote, she appears to say that in the beginning, lying is a learnt 
ability and then over time, it comes naturally. 
The need for sufficient cover has always been part 
of the training I’ve received, from the onset. Over 
years, lying to fit a certain profile comes naturally (I3: 7-
11).  
 
The researcher sees Isaacs as believing lying may be a guilt 
free intelligence tactic that can be developed over time to be 
incorporated into the WEF. Lying would not come naturally to 
Isaacs in her personal ethical code, only in the new framework. 
Kekana seems to suggest two ethical frameworks, one where 
lying is permissible, and the other where it is not. “In my line of 
work I have to lie whereas in my normal life I am against lies” 





(ethical code) is distinct from his ‘normal’ one. It can also be 
interpreted as saying that his work life may be seen as an 
anomaly.  
The sampled participants were presented with a scenario 
where a briefcase had to be stolen from a target to verify its 
contents. The questions in the questionnaire related to whether 
stealing was justified. The results showed that all of the sampled 
participants justified stealing in one way or another. “Stealing 
evidence is accepted as intelligence collection tradecraft” (P5: 
16-18). Jordaan, in the given scenario, justifies the theft despite 
stating emphatically that stealing is wrong. “Stealing is always 
wrong - don’t get me wrong on that” (W9: 26-27). “It can never 
be justified” (W9: 31). In this example, Jordaan must have a 
mechanism for justifying stealing because if stealing is wrong, 
he would never be able to steal, even if it was a necessary 
action in an intelligence operation. De Jager appeared to offer a 
convenient answer to this dilemma: “If I steal as part of my job, it 
is collection. If I steal to enrich myself, it is theft” (S5: 1-3). This 
could be interpreted as seeing motive as a key determinant, but 
it is more likely he attributed the definition to the WEF where 
stealing is acceptable. In the personal ethical framework it would 
be theft. He seemed to confirm this where he mentions the act 
as being ‘part of his job.’ The WEF appears to satisfy the 
requirements of the intelligence practitioner to still operate and 
be effective without letting personal ethics get in the way. The 
participants’ data point out that there are still limits to what the 
WEF will permit. It does not appear to grant carte blanche 
approval of any intelligence action. In one scenario presented to 
the participants, the possibility of blackmailing a person into co-
operation is suggested. This appeared to create a dilemma 
which even the WEF could not always accommodate or tolerate. 





possibilities fail, but it appears evident from his response the 
action disturbs him. 
Blackmail should be your last resort. Isn’t there any 
other way to recruit this source? The source can then 
never be trusted, because he hates you and you will 
never know if he is telling the truth. If you do not have 
any other source who can assist you and you have to 
get the results, you would then probably recruit this 
person. Is it justified – no (W8: 8-17).  
 
Jordaan noted it would not be justified even if the 
recruitment led to a guaranteed success (W8: 20). In the same 
hypothetical scenario where blackmail is offered as a 
recruitment tactic, Khoza also appears to struggle to 
accommodate it within the WEF:  
I don’t believe that blackmail if justifiable because 
the lie used could actually get the colleague fired or in 
trouble if caught. I do indeed see it as sacrifice to my 
moral principles because I’m using someone at the risk 
of their own work. Other methods would need to be 
exhausted; or rather the recruitment method would 
have to be different. I would still feel the same even if 
this sacrifice leads to a success. He deserves the 
respect as a human being! (K6: 17-29) 
 
Kekana notes other unacceptable collection methods, such 
as the use of sex to elicit information: “An action is unethical 
when for example you apply “honey pot” measures”3 (P3: 1-3). 
Isaacs seems to acknowledge there are limits to questionable 
tactics:  
I however, am able to alter my values in order to 
meet my objectives but only to a certain point. I know 
where to draw the line and what will not be acceptable 
to me as a human (I3: 22-31). (Emphasis added.) 
                                                          
3
 The honey pot was a tradecraft tactic used by the Russians where sex was used as a 
blackmail tool against Westerners. The practice involved the recruitment of women 
prostitutes (known as ‘swallows’) to trap foreigners into co-operating with the intelligence 






Coetzee’s WEF appears to be the least defined. 
Although tempted often in the beginning of my 
career to adjust my morals to my intelligence work and 
in addition struggling with aligning my personal ethics 
with the work; I became more stable and conscious of 
my own responsibility the longer I did covert 
operational work. Rather than adjusting my personal 
morals to the work, I have (as previously mentioned) 
adjusted my work to my personal morals which made 
decision making much easier and less complicated 
(E8: 30-40).  
 
Coetzee was conflicted (‘struggling’) until she found the 
solution which resolved the conflict. The solution was possibly a 
realignment of her WEF to her personal ethical framework. She 
goes on:  
Yes, at a stage I questioned it continuously until I 
found an answer. I was re-established in my core and 
made a conscious decision to adjust the work activity 
to my ethical base (E8: 41-45).  
 
Coetzee would possibly have to lean on a separate work 
ethic to perform some vital intelligence tasks that would be 
impossible under her personal code, to remain an effective 
practitioner. The tolerance of her WEF is possibly set at a higher 
level compared to the other participants. The tolerance of her 
WEF is influenced by her personal ethics code to a greater 
extent. 
5.5.3.5 Agreed outcomes 
 
The data seemed to suggest that the desired outcome of all 
the intelligence practitioners consulted appeared the same. They 
all agreed that the end objective had to be the countering of 
threats against the citizens of South Africa, stability and 





collection is to prevent instability” (A2: 1-2). Although the 
interpretation of ‘threat’ or ‘national interest’ was not a focus of 
this study, the intelligence practitioners mostly agreed that the 
Constitution and human rights were guiding principles toward 
the desired outcome. 
I would also argue the fact that as long as our 
intrusive collection methods are aimed at maintenance 
of national security, it should not be challenged (P1: 8-
12) (emphasis added). 
 
Govender appears to concur: “Intelligence officers work 
vicariously through the agency, BUT do so for the protection of 
all SA citizens” (A2: 22-27) (emphasis added). “For national 
security it will be 100% justified as it will save innocent lives” 
(P4: 8-14) (emphasis added). Ranjeeth infers it would be easier 
to function ethically in a stable environment as opposed to a 
high-risk scenario. 
We all work from the premise all is well in the 
country and that there is no serious threat to national 
security. At that stage we all, including the Agency, 
want to function as ethically as possible. But when the 
threat is on our doorstep, it is difficult to think and 
function ethically (R2: 13-20) (emphasis added). 
 
This rationale seems to suggest that intelligence 
practitioners have the option of applying the WEF when the 
threat against national security sufficiently justifies it. When the 
threat level is low and intrusive intelligence is not as necessary, 
perhaps the personal ethical framework will suffice. In both 
cases, the work must be conducted within the legal framework. 
 






The researcher proposes that the data from this exploratory 
sample support the idea that intelligence practitioners who have 
to conduct clandestine intelligence collection methods have 
difficulty operating within a personal ethical framework. The 
researcher argues that the types of activities required of 
intelligence practitioners to perform and to be effective in the 
field, such as lying and deceiving, can conceivably not be 
accommodated in an individual’s personal ethical framework 
which is characterized by integrity and honesty. Trying to 
operate effectively within the personal framework, even if the 
activity is legal and legitimate appears to create contradictions 
and personal conflict which perhaps even the individuals 
themselves do not recognize or acknowledge. The answer to 
this dilemma is the possible rationalisation of action through the 
creation of a Working Ethical Framework (WEF), which is 
utilized for work purposes and is functional for the purpose of 
collecting intelligence. The WEF could possibly accommodate 
‘tradecraft’ action, where people can be targeted, deceived, lied 
to and used in any other manner. In reaching the end goal, an 
Agency persona seems to be assumed which allows the 
practitioner to perform optimally. In this framework, new 
definitions of ethically questionable misdeeds may make them 
more palatable and the personal ethical code may not be 
tarnished. If these actions were conducted for the wrong 
reasons, for example in private life, then the practitioner would 
be morally compromised or even criminally liable. The sample of 
participants in this exploratory study appeared to stress, 
however, that there are even limits of operation within this 
framework. The operation must be legally sanctioned and action 
must be conducted within the rules and conventions of the 
Agency. There are possibly still certain actions which even the 
working ethical code will mostly not tolerate. According to the 
participants of this study, blackmailing a person to co-operate 





outcome justifies it. The data seem to suggest that they balance 
the action (means) with a specific outcome (end), which is the 
protection of citizens, security of the state and stability.  
 
 
5.6.1 Intelligence Practitioner’s Ethical Triad 
 
It is proposed that the analysed data may be interpreted as 
an intelligence practitioner’s ethical triad (Figure 5.1). In the 
triad, it is argued that the personal ethical framework (PEF) 
forms one side of the triad and converges with the institutional 
framework (IF) and WEF. The IF forms another side of the triad 
and converges with the PEF and WEF at two points. The IF’s 
goals may cause conflict in the PEF which leads to adaptation 
towards the WEF, the third side of the triad which converges 
with the PEF and IF. This new framework may be necessary for 
the IF to function efficiently towards its goal of security and 
stability. It is proposed, based on the findings of this exploratory 
sample, that intelligence practitioners with strong personal 
ethical frameworks (and they are recruited into the profession 
because of these) will not be able to function efficiently without 
operating within the WEF. In a sense, the three sides of the triad 
are equally important and mutually dependable. The efficiency of 
intelligence production is based on the robust relationship of the 
three sides of the triad. Having a strong institutional framework 
(Constitution, laws, policies) without practitioners having a good 
sense of personal ethics, will lead to failure. A weak institutional 
framework, no matter how strong the personal ethics of the 
practitioners are, will lead to failure. The lack of a working ethical 
framework to function, will lead to failure. If one side collapses, 





practiced efficiently. The whole is reliant on the strength and 
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The aim of this exploratory study was to try to understand 
how the intelligence practitioner deals with ethical issues when using 
clandestine collection methods. When these themes appeared to 
emerge from the data, the researcher was concerned about ‘framing’ 
the concept of a WEF and confirming a self-derived finding. For this 
reason, the participants were asked the direct question as to whether 
they believed they operated in a separate working framework, to which 
eight of the nine participants responded in the affirmative. This 
appeared to confirm the notion that a separate working ethical 
framework exists. Further studies will need to be conducted to confirm 
and describe the findings of this exploratory study. 
 The participants answered frankly and honestly and 
engaged well with the hypothetical scenarios. The choice of using the 
qualitative approach was confirmed to be the best, as the data 
provided rich insight into the thinking of the subjects on this topic. It is 
acknowledged that a small sample may give a skewed result, but this 
research has opened up the possibility for further academic discourse 
around the issue of intelligence ethics, not from an outsider’s 
perspective, but from those who are directly involved in ethical 















Building on and referring to the literature review, the 
researcher took and combined the research findings into a 
logical argument which addresses the research problem. The 
overriding theme which appeared to emerge from the data was 
participants’ efforts to justify ethically questionable actions within 
a framework outside of their personal ethical code. One of the 
questions which the researcher hoped to answer was whether 
intelligence practitioners’ views on ethics could be interpreted 
within a specific ethical, criminological or psychological model.  
 
6.2 Theoretical Ethical Frameworks 
 
There are definite responses to ethical dilemmas in the daily 
work of intelligence practitioners. The participants have a basic 
understanding of the various theories which were applied to their 
answers. The researcher considered it useful in locating the 
responses of the participants within specific theoretical 
frameworks by citing a sample of data, but the traditional ethical 





practitioners’ deal with the ethical dilemmas they face on a daily 
basis. The usual test used to locate responses within a 
utilitarianist or deontological framework is the trolley test (Foot 
1967) and so this test was used on participants of this study. 
Kekana, Jordaan and Hoosein said they would flip a switch 
which would let the trolley kill one person and save five others, 
whereas Coetzee and Govender said they would not flip the 
switch and would allow the one person to live, but five would die. 
The former response suggests a utilitarian approach whereas 
the latter a deontological judgement (Conway & Gawronski 
2013: 216). 
Many of the participants appeared to measure the outcome 
of their actions in a cost-versus benefit calculation, to determine 
its utilitarian goal (the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people). In this exploratory study, the participants appeared to 
agree that the right course of action is the one which produces 
the most good (Erskine 2010: 127) and appeared to subscribe to 
Michael Herman’s position (in Erskine 2010: 127) which 
highlights the integration of intelligence methods and knowledge 
into an ‘ethical balance sheet’ where the credits are the 
information (or knowledge) gained and the (less acceptable) 
methods used in collection are the debits. Several participants 
described outcome as a decisive factor in justifying clandestine 
activity, and this supports literature which describes a utilitarian 
and specifically a consequentialist approach. The extracts from 
one participant (Coetzee), indicated a more deontological view 
which supported studies which stress the importance of duty 
over consequence and focuses more on how people are treated. 
The deontological approach to ethics guides an individual in 
standing by his or her pre-determined categorical imperatives – 
such as, “I shall not lie.” Coetzee’s personal ethical framework 
can be seen as deontological. Several participants saw a 





the citizens are safe. They indicated that their obligation was to 
protect the citizens, and uphold the Constitution. Actions that 
contribute to the good of the political community are considered 
justified in a realist framework (Jones 2010: 24) and realists 
believe that acting in the national interest is a worthy moral 
principle. The participants’ extracts appeared to support the 
notion that using clandestine intelligence methods to gather 
information to this end, is ethically acceptable and even ethically 
necessary (Jones 2010: 24).  
The moral justification of the means of collection is balanced 
by the positive impact of the knowledge acquired. Data support 
Erskine’s position where two of the participants justified 
deception if the goal was positive. 
The participants consulted may adopt an ‘end justifying the 
means’ line of reasoning. Kekana and Khoza reasoned that they 
would do whatever it takes to neutralise a security threat.  
Bolton’s (2010: 194) survey of intelligence practitioners in 
the US Army showed 67 percent of participants indicated it is 
ethical to hurt one person to help many, although they 
acknowledged context was important – the situation has to 
dictate the severity of the action. Asked to perform a duty that 
upon hindsight, they would consider unethical – 8 percent said 
yes and 89 percent said no (Bolton 2010: 199). This is 
consistent with the views of the participants who viewed the 
‘harming’ of people necessary where the end purpose was to the 
benefit of many (the nation’s security). 
Participants seemed to refer to a set of ethical imperatives 
separate from their personal ethical frameworks. Some 
participants (notably Coetzee, Isaacs and Ranjeeth) appeared to 
have clearly demarcated personal ethical frameworks where 
deontological imperatives applied yet were still willing to break 





Their answers to questions relating to using tradecraft methods 
involving lying and deception, appeared to indicate that they 
hold strict deontological imperatives in their personal ethical 
framework, for example where Jordaan states: “Stealing is 
always wrong - don’t get me wrong on that” (W9: 26-27). “It can 
never be justified” (W9: 31). Yet, most of the participants also 
accept lying and stealing may be part of their working ethical 
framework and still need to accommodate it. These extracts 
highlight the conflict or dissonance which is aroused where there 
is a clash between how these individuals view themselves and 
the ‘immoral’ activity they have to perform which changes how 
they feel about themselves. Several participants described how 
the disjuncture between their personal morals and working role 
caused conflict.  
In deontological thought, intentions are important, possibly 
more so than the act itself. If an intelligence practitioner follows a 
predetermined set of rules with a pure motive (not self-interest), 
then actions could be morally justified, even if the consequences 
are bad. This is why De Jager could claim that it is the intention 
behind the act of appropriating an object that makes it 
‘collection’ not ‘stealing’. To Khoza, it seemed as if the motive 
was important to determine whether harm was caused or not. 
Kant argues that we can only treat humanity as an end and 
never as a means only, a view which some of the participants in 
the exploratory study held, particularly when it came to the issue 
of blackmail. Khoza indicated that a target ‘deserves respect as 
a human being.’ Kekana agreed there are limits to collection 
methods, such as the use of sex to elicit information. In a 
deontological sense, the coercion often employed to procure a 
human agent could never be justified, as coercion is morally 
unacceptable because it can never become universal law and 
the human agent has no value as an end to self (but is merely a 





factored in before an action is taken, can be justified. De Jager 
and Jordaan both concede that intelligence work presupposes 
harm will be done to a target and factor it in.  
Kant’s duty ethics believed that obligation was everything 
and a moral act could never be the consequence of selfishness. 
An intelligence practitioner would be acting immorally if he or 
she did not collect intelligence, because it is their sworn duty to 
do so.  
 
 
6.3 Personal Ethical Framework 
 
In the literature, a fundamental objective of intelligence 
ethics studies is the determination of the participants’ personal 
moral codes (Bolton 2010; Rolfe 2015; Bailey 2015; Pekel 1998 
et al). Contemplated actions are evaluated by intelligence 
practitioners against personal moral preferences (Charters 2006: 
366). Practitioners would not always have a clear understanding 
of the ethical principles which would guide them into knowing 
what is right and wrong. The average person has little 
knowledge of ethical reasoning and the various ethical 
frameworks as outlined above. The literature on ethics describes 
how an ethical framework aims to identify the basic principles, 
criteria or standards which we should use to determine what is 
right or wrong and how we are to act morally in a given situation 
(Frankena 1973: 61). Some of the participants in this study also 
seemed to experience a change in their moral compass over 
time which may have led to conflict.  These views appear to 
support what Welsh et al (2015: 3) calls the slippery slope of 
unethical behaviour, where deviant behaviour is likely to take 





where they themselves would not have originally considered 
permissible. This is consistent with the data which point to some 
of the participants’ behavioural change over time. The 
intelligence practitioner functions within an institutional 
framework which legalizes activity but does not necessarily 
legitimize it. The participants in the exploratory survey appeared 
to focus more on the legality of an action, than its legitimacy. 
The literature highlights a difference between legal and 
legitimate (Rolfe 2015: 2). A legal activity is legitimate if it is 
conducted ethically. An illegal activity cannot be legitimate or 
ethical. A legal activity can, however, also be conducted 
unethically. Rolfe observes that ethical behaviour leads to trust, 
which forms the basis of the relationship between a government 
and its citizens. Participants in this study appeared to respect 
the precepts and limitations of the law and functioned within its 
framework. Bailey (2012: 55) noted that an action may be legally 
permissible, but considered morally unacceptable by many. A 
practice may also be morally appropriate, but not legally 
acceptable. In the study, participants appear to acknowledge the 
importance of applying the law in an ethical manner. According 
to Rolfe (2015), the test for ethics and legitimacy is found in 
whether the action can be defended publicly. Accountability is 
the overall test of the ethics of human intelligence activities, 
according to former Director of CIA, Stansfield Turner (quoted by 
Rolfe 2015: 2). Coetzee’s views were robust on accountability, 
but all the participants appeared to accept that operating within 
the legal framework made them accountable to the Constitution, 
laws and the institutional policies. One of the participants in this 
study believed that she needed to be accountable to her own 
child for the activities she was involved in. Bailey (2012: 56) 
suggests that intelligence practitioners are bound to face 
conflicting moral and legal duties which leads to challenging 
questions about shared values and appropriate ways of 





highlighted the dilemma of needing to justify an action which 
was unjustifiable in his comment on the recruitment of a source 
using blackmail. 
  
Rolfe (2015: 4) asks whether collection activities are always 
for the public good, or if collection isn’t just conducted because 
we can and not because we must. He notes that ethically, 
individual rights should always trump institutional convenience. 
Some of the participants in the exploratory study appeared to 
disagree and saw the need to be goal focused in order to 
maintain stability and security. 
Phythian (2012: 13) refers to Kent Pekel’s research based 
on structured interviews with fifty CIA professionals where the 
serving officers saw intelligence as being ethically neutral. The 
participants in this exploratory study appeared to share the view 
that the profession of intelligence, like journalism and the 
military, allows a person to act in ways which would be wrong, 
were it not for the role (Pekel 1998: 3). In this study, participants 
saw the deception as part of their work function and considered 
it morally neutral and as ‘just doing their job.’ Statutory 
intelligence services exist to collect information, convert it into 
intelligence products and provide it to clients (Bruneau & Boraz 
2007: 7). Ideally, the client uses the intelligence products to 
make decisions in the national interest. The participants strongly 
asserted their views on protecting the national interest and 









Rationalizations allow intelligence practitioners to stay in 
their chosen profession for decades without feeling the burden 
of ethical compromise. They have to adapt to the world of 
intelligence and embrace the ‘unwritten spy bible’. Olson shares 
a CIA joke: “What do you call a case officer who cannot recruit? 
A former case officer” (Olson 2006: 236). Without being able to 
find a way around the ethical dilemmas of tradecraft, an 
intelligence practitioner cannot be effective and may have to 
leave the profession. The morally correct thing may be to not lie, 
but the intelligence practitioner would be unable to work 
efficiently if she didn’t lie and therefore be conflicted and lead a 
miserable life. Bailey asserts that intelligence practitioners 
should resolve conflicts through asking themselves if there are 
less morally questionable actions available which are equally 
effective (Bailey 2012: 62). This rationalization is consistent with 
what participants appear to experience. The survey showed 
participants weighed up the intrusiveness of the operation 
against the need of the intelligence available.  
 
6.5 Adapted framework 
 
The data presented in this study suggest a drift in the moral 
compass where attitudes towards ethical issues change over 
time and adaptation to a new ethical code takes place. Based on 
this argument, intelligence practitioners may be influenced within 
their work environment (social group) to accept certain unethical 
activity as a norm and this may cause a drift in their moral 
compass. This phenomenon, which Welsh et al (2015: 3) calls 
the slippery slope of unethical behaviour, is likely to take place 
gradually, where the 
… temptation to commit small indiscretions (Mazar, 





people to commit acts that are considerably less ethical 
than they may have originally considered permissible. 
 
Dissonance is experienced when an individual views herself 
as immoral or unethical and which jeopardizes her positive self-
concept (Harmon-Jones & Mills 1999: 14). This is why Khoza 
probably declared that the deceptions she was involved in made 
her feel like a liar. Cooper (2007: 92) draws on research 
conducted by Claude Steele to suggest that when an individual’s 
self-system is threatened, they need to affirm its integrity. These 
threats may occur when individuals see themselves as being 
unworthy or dishonest. Participants in this research appeared to 
resolve the threat deviant activity may have posed to their self-
system (personal ethical framework) by re-inventing a 
framework where self-worth is restored.  
 Individuals who do not receive affirmation from their 
identity group (peers) from whom they draw strength, can lose 
their sense of self-worth. The degradation felt by the individual is 
the end result. Cooper (2007: 11) proposes that consonance can 
be restored through a change of opinion about the element 
causing the dissonance. The discrepancy between a decision 
made and the consequence can be minimized by justifications. 
De Jager’s quote is a fine example: 
If I steal as part of my job, it is collection. If I steal to enrich 
myself, it is theft (S5: 1-3). 
 
By changing his opinion on the function he has to perform 
(stealing), he effectively reduces the dissonance it may cause. It 
may also be important to note that because intelligence 
practitioners are functionaries of the State, their activities are 
given legitimacy and, in their minds, justified. If a behaviour 
which leads to a negative consequence is forced by someone 





justified their actions as being ‘legal’, Constitutional and in line 
with the objectives of the institution. Although tradecraft is not 
‘forced on’ the practitioners, they are in effect not responsible for 
the action. The participants were expected to function in a legal 
framework and conduct activity which allowed them to fulfil this 
obligation. Clandestine activity possibly resulted in conflict at two 
levels: firstly, the personal ethical framework suffered 
dissonance because some of the activity conflicted with what the 
participant considered good and normal behaviour, and 
secondly, the participants perceived the public as being non-
supportive of clandestine intelligence work. Rolfe notes: 
It is always a temptation to assume that our 
collection activities are for the public good, to keep the 
country and its citizens secure. But is that always so? 
Are collection activities ever, for example, for 
institutional convenience or carried out because we 
can rather than because we must? Certainly, on ethical 
grounds, individual rights should always trump 
institutional convenience (Rolfe 2015: 4) 
 
The participants’ extracts seem to be consistent with studies 
which highlight the phenomenon of ‘reframing’ as a type of moral 
hypocrisy. Research by Ayal et al describe how an individual 
can believe one thing, whilst acting contrary to it (Ayal and Gino 
2011, Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson 1997; 
Monin & Merritt). Several participants cited their aversion to 
deception and lying, but freely admitted practicing these actions. 
Barkan and Ayal (2015: 7) describe moral hypocrisy as a 
“cynical post-violation justification [which] allows people to hold 
two distinct belief systems”. In so doing, individuals distort their 
understanding of their actions (Moore and Gino 2012: 23) and 
reframe immoral actions as defensible (Barkan and Ayal 2015: 
9). Based on themes drawn from their questionnaires, 
participants may be perceived as functioning in two distinct 





when they need to function as an intelligence practitioner. The 
studies by Gino and Moore (2013) are helpful in understanding 
how participants can ‘sanitize’ unethical practices by using 
euphemistic labels, and then freely participate in them. This 
renaming and reframing of unpleasant or uncomfortable 
concepts as highlighted in Gino and Moore’s (2013) study, 
appears to be a ‘dissonance reducing’ tactic used by intelligence 
practitioners. Participants’ extracts support this view. De Jager 
renames ‘stealing’ as ‘collection’ and Kekana says stealing is 
accepted intelligence tradecraft. 
Language is an important facilitator of how a decision should 
be understood and allows an individual to choose appropriately. 
The intelligence profession has its own euphemistic language 
(‘dead drop’, ‘honeypot’, ‘false flag operation’, ‘plausible 
deniability’) and this language can socialize practitioners into the 
belief that these activities are morally acceptable and part of 
intelligence culture. The participants’ acceptance of unethical 
action as a norm is confirmed by a study conducted by Bersoff 
(1999: 30) with 120 participants who were overpaid to participate 
in a study, aimed to test the hypothesis that 
 
… unethical behavior is promoted when people 
are able to develop and maintain a biased characterization 
of an unethical action as being morally acceptable was 
tested. 
 
Several participants described how certain activities, such 
as lying and deception, when carried out for purposes of work, 
were morally acceptable. Research findings propose that 
dissonance can be reduced when individual’s thoughts or 
behaviour are adapted to avoid inconsistencies between 
cognitions (refer to Martinie et al 2013: 7). In the case of 
participants, they reconcile their ‘immoral’ behaviour with the 





reduces inconsistencies.  They also invoke the thought that 
these unethical actions benefit the majority of people, and so the 
altruistic motivation is drawn upon.  
When Isaacs says ‘emotions cannot come into play’, she 
may be neutralising the moral and cultural obstacles which 
would have caused her to feel guilt. This allows her to later 
state:  
I can spy on anyone who is of interest to me. 
Collecting information on a target is not personal to me 
at all. If the end justifies the means, I go for it (I3: 32-
37).  
 
Participants views support research that show neutralization 
techniques are employed to justify deviant action. Obedience to 
authority was identified as a key neutralization technique used 
by participants. The appeal to institutional legitimacy, the law, 
protection of citizens and national security were all cited as 
justifiers for their activity. A study by Milgram (1974) concludes 
that individuals who are in institutional positions of authority, 
cannot resist obedience to that authority. The extracts which 
appeal to the legal mandate of the SSA  indicate that several 
participants are motivated by obedience to authority and this 
serves as a dissonance-reducing mechanism. The real or 
perceived legal obligation of the participants also support 
research relating to organizational behaviour as posited by Shu, 
Ferrel Gresham, & Fraedrich 1989; Treviño, 1986 where “job 
context, incentive structures, and organizational culture” play a 
role in negative ethical conduct. The role of an intelligence 
practitioner involved in clandestine collection methods would be 
sanctioned (and possibly encouraged) by the organization which 
would benefit from their conduct. There is no suggestion that 
intelligence practitioners overstep the mark of what is legally 





SSA is deliberately encouraging negative ethical conduct. 
Repugnant tasks are par for the course for intelligence 
practitioners and the intelligence organisation itself may be what 
Pekel (1998) describes as being ethically neutral.  
With regard to how intelligence practitioners have to deal 
with the possible internal conflicts, the data suggest participants 
in the study may separate the clandestine activity (involving lies 
and deceit) from their personal ethical framework and create a 
working ethical framework where the actions become morally 
less questionable and where they can still function effectively. 
The extracts relating to separation of personal and work ethical 
frameworks and the ‘switching’ from one to the other when 
necessary, is pertinent here. Participants clearly separated their 
personal life from their work life. At work, their colleagues looked 
and acted just like them. This is consistent with studies by 
Swann, Pelham, & Krull (1989) which concluded that individuals 
associate with others who see them as they see themselves, as 
this confirms their self-concept. Participants self-verification of 
their own morality results in them viewing themselves as moral, 
regardless of the actual ethical content of their actions (Moore 
and Gino 2013: 27). They concede that this 
  
… tendency can lead individuals to create and 
maintain cultures that may perpetuate morally 
questionable behaviours, as individuals will seek to 
remain in the company of those who confirm their 
positive self-regard, regardless of their actions. 
 
Bersoff (1999: 28) cites various studies which substantiate 
the idea that defensive processes must necessarily be brought 
to bear in order to rationalize unethical behaviour. Themes 
drawn from participants of this study suggest various 









6.6. Neutralization theory 
 
Research into the neutralization theory, originally proposed 
by Sykes and Matza (1957), leads to the suggestion that several 
participants may indeed employ some of the techniques Sykes 
and Matza posit. Four of the techniques of neutralisation were 
studied (Williams & McShane: 1999: 193) and applied to data. 
 
 
6.6.1 Denial of Responsibility  
 
Acts are the product of forces beyond the control of the 
individual. The individual has no control over the situations he or 
she finds him or herself in. “I didn’t mean it”. The participants 
appeared to believe that the acts they committed in pursuit of 
their operational objectives were outside of their control and part 
of their legal mandate. Extracts consistently justified the work 
activity of participants as being ‘in the line of duty’ and in pursuit 
of their legal mandate. They did not appear to experience 
feelings of personal responsibility for their actions.   
 
 
6.6.2 Denial of injury.  
 
No harm is caused. “I didn’t really hurt anybody.” In the 





denying any harm was caused to the victim (target). Multiple 
extracts confirmed that the participants did not consider harming 
a target or source as a deterrence to their operational work. Yet 
Gray & Schein (2012: 413) assert that harm should be an 
important measure of whether an action is moral or not. If harm 
is a consequence of an action, they suggest that it is then an 
immoral action. A follow up question to participants confirmed 
that most believed their actions caused harm, yet most also did 
not consider this harm to be immoral. Harm may be difficult to 
define and quantify from an intelligence collection point of view, 
and this possibly makes it easier to rationalize away. 
  
 
6.6.3 Condemnation of the Condemners  
 
Those who disapprove of the act have wrong motives or 
ulterior agendas. “Everyone’s picking on me.” 
In Arrigo’s (2006) study, the proposal was made that 
intelligence practitioners differentiated between how ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’ viewed intelligence work. The participants’ 
extracts suggest that participants in the study also drew a 
distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, those who were 
within the intelligence community, and private citizens. Citizens, 
and possibly the media, tended to condemn the practice of 
clandestine intelligence practices and saw it as an infringement 
of privacy and of human dignity. Participants shared the view 
that the public was not in a position to judge their intelligence 
activity. The participants’ proposed that somebody not in the 
intelligence community does not understand its workings, and, 







6.6.4 Appeal to Higher Loyalties 
 
Sykes and Matza’s (Williams & McShane: 1999: 193) 
Neutralization Theory suggests some rules of society are 
abrogated for the good of other individuals or groups. “I didn’t do 
it for myself.” 
The participants of the study may subscribe to this way of 
thinking. Intelligence practitioners are undertaking these 
functions, not for personal gain or satisfaction, but for a greater 
good, be it national security, the good of all citizens or the best 
interest of the country. This view came through strongly in the 
data. Chi-Mei (2008: 252) notes two other neutralization 
methods which may be employed by those seeking to commit a 
deviant act. 
Minor (1981) found some support for the use of 
neutralization in a sample of college students. He 
identified the two additional neutralization techniques: 
(a) "the defense of necessity" (if an act is perceived as 
necessary, then one needs not feel guilt about its 
commission) and (b) "the metaphor of the ledger" (one 
with a sufficient supply of good credit can indulge in 
some evil without feeling guilt (p. 298). 
 
The participant responses suggest intelligence 
practitioners may use the defence of necessity as a 
neutralization technique. Intelligence practitioners see their 
profession as necessary to safeguard the nation and this came 
out strongly in participant responses. 
 Equally, the metaphor of the ledger may be applied to the 
intelligence profession. The researcher argues practitioners 
may believe the good that accrues from their successful 
operations allows them sufficient credit to ‘indulge in some 
evil.’ This is consistent with the cost-benefit calculation that 









Outliers are participants whose views are not aligned with 
the other participants and whose contribution is not an easy fit 
into identified themes and patterns. Coetzee was clearly an 
outlier in that her responses were often inconsistent with the 
other participants. She appears to have a strong faith-based 
ethic that directs her daily activity. Miles and Huberman (1994: 
269) indicate that outliers, which are seen as exceptions in a 
finding, should not be ignored. Outliers protect the researcher 
against “self-selecting biases” and may even strengthen the 
basic finding. Coetzee’s data showed that intelligence 
practitioners with strong faith codes can overcome the 
temptation to operate in an alternative ethical framework. At 
least in this study, Coetzee’s strong, uncompromising religious 
convictions served as an explanation as to why her working 
ethical framework was not well defined.  
 
 
6.8 Own View on Intelligence Ethics 
 
To reinforce the principle of external reliability, the 
researcher articulates his own view on the topic of intelligence 
ethics so that readers have insight into what drove the data 
collection. The researcher is of the view that above all else, 
intelligence practitioners are pragmatic and rational human 
beings who have chosen a career path which is unique, 
challenging and beset with contradictions. It cannot be that 
those who sign up as intelligence practitioners and are assigned 





they are expected to undertake. The researcher’s view is that 
there is a plethora of literature (both fiction and non-fiction) 
which describes what intelligence work entails. No prospective 
intelligence practitioner can be oblivious to the fact that he or 
she will enter a world of deception and lies. In the same way, a 
person would not become a defence attorney and then be 
surprised when he or she has to tell untruths to defend his or her 
client. When a person voluntarily enters the world of intelligence, 
he must reasonably expect to participate in the accepted 
customs and traditions of the profession which are well 
documented, even at folk-lore level. Before embarking on the 
research, the researcher’s expectation was that individuals 
would react in different ways to engage in morally questionable 
activity. The researcher predicted that the majority of 
participants would steel themselves against the more 
objectionable activities in the beginning and perhaps push back 
morally for a period, only to be conditioned by time and their 
peers into acceptance that this is the norm and it is necessary. 
The researcher believed a minority would have either deep 
conflict about the type of work expected of them, or 
wholeheartedly embrace the tradecraft. The expectation of the 
researcher was that the outliers would not make any less of a 
contribution to the production of intelligence than the normalized 
participants. Any person who is deeply conflicted by intelligence 
work will simply exit the profession. Contrary to what might be 
portrayed in the popular media, the intelligence service is not an 
institution from where there is no escape. Practitioners can exit 
the profession if there is discomfort at the moral or ethical 
aspects of the work, or they can request a transfer to non-








6.9 Conclusion  
 
The researcher suggests intelligence practitioners may 
experience the same feelings of guilt as other perpetrators of 
deviance and may use the same neutralization techniques in 
order to function. The use of criminological theories to explain 
and describe clandestine intelligence collection is a field which 
will need more exploration and discussion. In the same way, the 
cognitive dissonance and ethical dissonance models are useful 
in understanding how intelligence practitioners rationalize their 
behaviour either within their own personal ethical framework, or 
within a separate working ethical framework. The institution 
provides a legal framework and guidelines to the practitioners 
and allows them to function within this framework in order to 
reach the objectives of the institution, in this case, security of the 
State.  
Ultimately, each intelligence practitioner needs to make his 
or own decisions on which methods to use to be effective (Bailey 
2012: 62). Most intelligence agencies (or companies) don’t 
provide a strong ethical culture which offers practitioners 
guidance on what to do in ethically ambiguous situations 
(Trevino & Weaver 2006: 358). They are left on their own to try 
and navigate these murky waters relying on their upbringing, 
education and professional background for guidance. Literature 
shows that intelligence practice does not pretend to be ethical 
and some of the participants in the study concur: 
I am not a priest you know (S4: 12-16) (emphasis 
added). 
 
This chapter sought to position the data within specific 
philosophical, criminological and psychological models. Further 
studies will be necessary to confirm and expand upon the 










SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
  
7.1 Overview of interpretation and analysis 
 
      This research set out to answer the following question: 
 
 What ethical views do a sample of intelligence practitioners 
hold in the collection of clandestine intelligence? 
 
This question was answered by participants who outlined 
that making informed ethical decisions in their intelligence work 
was by no means simple or exact. A combination of factors 
played into how they made ethical decisions and how they 
justified (or did not) these decisions. A combination of 
institutional frameworks (deontologically derived rules 
predetermined by the institution) and personal ethical 
frameworks (derived by each individual participant’s family, 
religion etc) were key in creating a working ethical framework 
(intertwining the former and the latter) which allowed/justified 
them in making ethical decisions.  The analogy of a cord may be 
used where each strand plays an essential role in the utility of 
the whole. The first strand is the personal ethical framework 





strand which intertwines the personal ethical framework strand is 
the institutional framework strand which gives the cord 
legitimacy and provides statutory direction. These two strands 
on their own would not provide a link between the need of the 
State to provide security to its citizens and the end goal of a 
secure State. The third cord which intertwines the other two is 
the working ethical framework which provides the justifications 
for the work and allows the practitioners to function without their 
moral self-sense being blemished. Each strand of the cord is 
essential to the other in a type of synergetic relationship. This 
study argues that without the third strand (the working ethical 
framework), the personal ethical strand and the institutional 
strand will be weakened to the point where the cord would have 
no utility. The Intelligence Practitioners’ Ethical Triad as 
displayed in Figure 5.1 above aptly describes the importance of 
the three sides of the triad, making it a structure which is 
dependent all sides being present to give it strength and utility. 
 
7.1.1  Central Idea 
 
The views of the participants may be distilled into one 
central idea which highlights the complexity of intelligence 
ethics. Intelligence practitioners are normal human beings who 
have chosen an extraordinary profession. The profession gives 
these individuals the ability to function as legal ‘deviants’, whilst 
maintaining their personal and professional integrity. They view 
their assignments as a necessary requirement in fulfilling the 
legal obligations of their profession, that is, the maintenance of 
the security of the nation–state. The findings support the notion 
that intelligence practitioners have personal ethical frameworks 
which can be considered consistent with those of any other 
reasonable human being. The institution of intelligence demands 





as deviant from a criminological perspective, but are seen by the 
participants as merely part of the job requirements. Some 
participants experience conflict in that their sense of self is 
harmed through engaging in tradecraft activity, but all seem 
adept at rationalizing this behaviour through various learned 
techniques. These rationalizations were explained within the 
context of a Working Ethical Framework, underpinned by 
criminological theories which describe and explain the 
rationalization of deviance and a psychological model which 
explains dissonance reduction. The researcher proposes the 
Working Ethical Framework is a separate framework which 
practitioners may use to justify their clandestine collection 
methods as their personal ethical frameworks will not 
accommodate their ‘deviant’ activity. One participant, with a 
strong faith to draw on, justified her actions on the basis of her 
faith.  
Coldea (2017:109) notes that intelligence codes of ethics 
are there to provide the intelligence practitioners with tools which 
are able to outline the moral norms of the profession so that 
behaviours can be defined which society expects from the 
practitioners. This study proposes that the intelligence institution 
is unable to design a code of ethics which will accommodate the 
working functions of operational intelligence practitioners. 
Instead, these practitioners rely on their own ‘Spy Bible’ which 
directs their behaviour within the institutional context. The Spy 
Bible draws on a combination of ethical models to find solutions 
on how to be efficient in the intelligence domain. Utilitarian 
precepts were invoked where actions by the state are evaluated 
according to the state’s capacity to produce the best aggregate 
consequences for its particular circumstances. The act 
utilitarianism approach on its own appears to be unable to 
provide clear ethical guidance when it is applied to qualitative 





invoke Rule utilitarianism, which requires the analysis of the 
likely effect of compliance with existing rules and how these 
rules produce the best overall consequences in a particular 
circumstance (Cooper & Murphy 1997: 9). Participants in this 
study were clear in that they complied with general rules (the 
obligations of the Acts governing their work) and this gave their 
ethically challenging tasks legitimacy. From a deontological point 
of view, practitioners who were sampled believed they had a 
duty to serve and protect in the interests of national security, but 
the model could not account for actions which were blatantly 
wrong, such as coercion where harm is a certain consequence. 
The Spy Bible, unwritten as one participant describes it, 
encapsulates the dilemmas practitioners encounter and provides 
the solution. It is a unwritten code of ethics which optimizes the 
performance of intelligence practitioners to ensure the primacy 
of the beneficiaries interests. This informal rule-book is not 
institutionalized, but forms the basis of directing the ethical 
behaviour of practitioners in their creation of a working ethical 
environment and includes the types of rationalizing ideas found 
in utilitarianism and specific criminological models such as the 
rational choice theory. The ultimate goal of rationalizing 
uncomfortable behaviour is to legitimize it on a personal basis so 
that the practitioner’s self-concept is not harmed, which would 
result in conflict and work paralysis. 
 
7.2 Contribution of the study 
 
It is hoped that this exploratory study prompts other 
researchers to seek novel and innovative ways of understanding 
intelligence ethics in the future. This study attempted to obtain a 
snapshot of how intelligence practitioners in South Africa cope 





activities to fulfil their legal obligations to maintain a safe and 
secure State. The study hopefully contributes to the existing 
literature on the subject and offered a novel way of interpreting 
how intelligence practitioners rationalize their behaviour using 
criminological and psychological models. The researcher 
suggests that preconceived models of understanding 
intelligence ethics may need to be reconsidered and new 
approaches to understanding this complex subject sought. No 
previous studies have identified and described a new fit for 




7.3 Recommendation for Further Studies 
 
 The Awareness, Motivation and Pathway (AMP) typology was 
developed by Honig et al (2014) to create a theoretical 
framework to enable conditions for change. The model presents 
three elements necessary to bring about changed behaviour - 
Awareness, Motivation and Pathway (Honig 2014: 19). The 
variables used to describe these elements can be adapted to 
define other phenomena where behaviour change is key (Honig 
2014). This exploratory study on intelligence ethics suggested 
practitioners lack awareness of how to deal with ethical issues in 
the course of their operational activity. The study also 
highlighted the lack of enablers which would promote better 
understanding of ethics. Adaptation and change were identified 
as key elements which determine the practitioner’s effectiveness 
in the field. Training could be the pathway to creating awareness 
and thus a motivation to changed behaviour.  The training will 
present possible courses of action that enable practitioners to 





collection practices. The subjecting of the AMP assessment tool 
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Participants’ Consent Form 
 
 INFORMATION SHEET & CONSENT FORM – [Intelligence 
Practitioners] 
 
Title: An Honest Thief:  A Qualitative Study Exploring the Ethics of 
Clandestine Intelligence Collection In a Statutory Environment.’ 
 
Good day. I am currently working on my Master’s thesis entitled: ‘An Honest 
Thief:  A Qualitative Study Exploring the Ethics of Clandestine Intelligence 
Collection In a Statutory Environment.’ My supervisor is Prof Julie Berg, head 
of the UCT Centre for Criminology. 
My research calls for a sample of intelligence practitioners to provide data on 
their experiences relating to the ethics of clandestine intelligence collection. 
The aim of the research is to better understand how ethical considerations 
impact on the activity of intelligence collection and to determine which 
theoretical framework intelligence practitioners’ thinking subscribes to. I would 
therefore like to gather data through a questionnaire with a possible follow up 
interview. I would like to gather this data through a representative sample of 
intelligence practitioners.  
Please note your participation is voluntary. The choice to participate is yours 
alone. If you choose not to participate, there will be no negative consequence. 
If you choose to participate, but wish to withdraw at any time, you will be free 
to do so without negative consequence. However, I would be grateful if you 
would assist me by allowing me to interview you. Ten respondents like 
yourself will be selected for the project. Permission has been obtained from 
the DG SSA for the conducting of the study. 
 
The project will require the following of you: 
 
1) To complete a questionnaire at the beginning of the research. Would 
you be willing to complete the questionnaire and return it to me within 
a reasonable period of time? Please indicate by checking the relevant 
box below:  
 
                            





2) To submit to an interview (personal, telephonic or by email) to 
clarify/expand on/explain your answers in the questionnaire. Would 
you be willing to submit to an interview? Please indicate by checking 
the relevant box below: 
 
                
                 Yes                   No 
The entire process will take approximately two hours for the questionnaire 
and an hour for the interview. The interview will not be recorded, but notes will 
be taken of the information provided.  
There is no direct benefit to you as the participant. An indirect benefit may 
relate to a review of the Code of Ethics in the SSA or more focused ethics 
training. 
You may skip questions which you may find too uncomfortable to answer. In 
the unlikely event of a question leading to emotional or psychological stress, 
embarrassment, deception, stigma or stereotyping, please contact the SSA 
social services/psychologist/total wellness officer at the following number 012-
4274000 for assistance. 
 
 The research paper may also be published, but all personal identifiers will be 
removed or changed at the data collection stage.  
Qualitative reporting may require data extracts (verbatim extracts) being used 
as evidence in the report. Identifying information will be anonymised and de-
identified (specific job title, work section, geographical location, etc) 
There is no obligation for you to meet with me or anyone else involved in the 
project, everything can be conducted through email to make you feel more 
comfortable with the process.  
 
Data will be safely stored on password protected retrieval ware until the 
conclusion of the thesis. 
Feedback will be given to participants in the form of an electronic copy of the 
finished thesis. 
 














‘If you have concerns about the research, its risks and benefits or about 
your rights as a research participant in this study, you may contact the 
Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Mrs Lamize Viljoen, 
at 021 650 3080 or at lamize.viljoen@uct.ac.za.  Alternatively, you may 
write to the Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, 
Room 6.28 Kramer Law Building, Law Faculty, UCT, Private Bag, 
Rondebosch 7701.’  
 
I have read and understand the contents of this informed consent and by signing 
acknowledge the risks, benefits and my rights as a participant in this study. 
 
 
___________________________________                           
________________________ 









Sample Questionnaire  
1.1 Scenario 1: The Coffee Room 
debate 
 
At the coffee station, you walk into 
an interesting debate going on 
between colleagues. The debate 
revolves around whether the 
general public would support 
intelligence practitioners working 
methods, especially those which 
are morally questionable. Some 
colleagues are arguing that they 
can justify their involvement in 
ethically questionable activity such 
as deception, manipulation and 
prying because it is legally 
protected and the end result is in 
the interest of national security. 
Others argue that they would 
struggle to justify this activity 
because lying is lying and 
deception is deception, and can 
never be justified. Some argue that 
the public would consider the end 
result (the objective of security and 
stability in the country) a good 
justification of the methods used 
to achieve it. Still others make the 
point that the public is not in a 
position to judge intelligence 
collection methods as they don’t 
understand the importance of 
intelligence in maintaining security 
and stability in the country. 
 
What would you argue? 
 
In my opinion, lying is lying and 
no end result can justify it.  
However, because the activities 
of an intelligence officer are 
mandated by legislation, it is 
regarded as acceptable 
because the end product 
contributes to national 
security.   The public, on the 
other hand, because of their 
lack of understanding of the 
intelligence world, will not 
understand this.  The public 
might question the motives of 
intelligence officers and this 
might contribute to the 
undermining of the 
government of the day.  
 
1.2 In your opinion, would the general 
public accept intrusive intelligence 
No.  In the absence of an 








 2. Scenario 2: Conflicts and   
collection methods more readily if 
there was instability in the 
country? 
intrusive intelligence collection 
is done, the public will be 
paranoid.  Intrusive collection 
might contribute to the 
instability of the country.  
1.3 In your opinion, would the general 
public value security and stability 
over the protection of human 
rights? 
No. In light of this country’s 
history, the general public 
would choose the protection of 
their human rights above 
security and stability.   
 
1.4 Are you as an intelligence 
professional, acting as a moral 
agent for your employer, or for all 
SA citizens? Explain your answer. 
I act as a moral agent for SA 
citizens.  The SSA efforts 
contribute to the security of 
the citizens.  So, even though it 
might be perceived as 
intelligence officers acting as 
moral agents to the employer, 
the end goal – is to protect the 
interests of the citizens.  
 
1.5 Does ‘groupthink’ – an institutional 
mind-set, exist in the intelligence 
agency when it comes to ethics? 
Do you have an individual opinion 
or is it affected by what you think 
would be right in terms of the 
employer’s viewpoint? 
My opinion will always be 
expressed as my own and I 
cannot be influenced by 
groupthinking.  However, this 
institutional mind-set exists in 
the intelligence agency as 
individuals easily conform to 
groups.  I’ve experienced that 
in this environment, it can be 
somewhat easier to alter ones 
viewpoint to fit the opinion of 
the employer.   
 
1.6 Is your opinion on ethics 
influenced by your peers or team 
mates? 
No.  I have my own belief 
system. I was conditioned from 
a very young age, and is firm in 
my beliefs  
 







You are asked to present a paper 
on the conflicts intelligence 
practitioners face to an ethics class 
of new cadets. You speak about 
whether you think there is 
consensus amongst intelligence 
professionals on the ethics of 
collecting information in deceptive 
ways. You mention that your 
employer expects you to be honest 
and have integrity as an employee, 
but also expects you to lie, cheat, 
deceive and spy to gather 
information. You introduce the 
topic of how culture and religion 
effect your ethical choices. You 
pose the question whether 
intelligence practitioners are clear 
about how and where they can 
cross moral and ethical boundaries 
without breaking the SSA’s Code of 
Ethics. After your presentation, the 
class ask you the following 
questions, which you have to 
answer: 
2.1 How do you know when an action 
is unethical? What measure do you 
use? The gut feel? A religious 
plumbline?  The disclosure test (if 
my action was made public, would 
I be able to defend it?) 
  
I know an action is unethical, If 
the action required is in 
contravention of my values.  I 
use the measure of – would I be 
able to face my son and tell him 
that I was proud of my work 
that was conducted?  
 
2.2 Does the SSA provide guidance and 
support for members who have to 
engage in unethical actions 
(deceiving, lying, manipulating) in 
the course of their work? 
The need for sufficient cover 
has always been part of the 
training I’ve received, from the 
onset.  Over years, lying to fit a 
certain profile comes naturally.  
 
2.3 Is ethics determined within a 
particular political framework? If a 
The constitution of the country, 






government was unjust (eg Nazi 
Germany, Apartheid regime, One 
Party state etc) would the ethics 
justification be different to 
protecting such a status quo? 
human rights of its citizens and 
the explicit need to transform 
this country.  If this government 
was still in apartheid regime, 
the white supremacy would be 
at an advantage and the ethics 
justification would be different. 
Ethics would by based on 
serving one part , and not all.  
2.4 Is it true that if a Government 
abides by the Rule of Law and 
upholds common held beliefs and 
ethics, protection is legitimate and 
the use of covert means of 
collection to protect it are 
justified? 
  
2.5 Do intelligence officers have a 
conscience? Or do they suspend 
their conscience when doing 
intelligence work? Is it better for 
an intelligence officer to suspend 
his or her conscience to be more 
effective? 
I do not suspend my 
conscience. I however, am able 
to alter my values in order to 
meet my objectives but only to 
a certain point.  I know where 
to draw the line and what will 
not be acceptable to me as a 
human. Eg extracting 
information from a male may 
require some level of charm.  
This is a dangerous tact but I 
am weary where to pull on the 
brakes.  
 
2.6 Are ethical justifications influenced 
by your view of the target? Is it 
easier to ‘spy’ on a target that you 
personally believe is ‘bad’ (a 
gangster or violent criminal) as 
opposed to a target who is softer 
(for example a foreign intelligence 
service officer)? 
It really doesn’t matter to me.  I 
can spy on anyone who is of 
interest to me. Collecting 
information on a target is not 
personal to me at all.  If the 
ends justifies the means, I go 
for it.  
 
 







Dr  Kara Jamal is a biochemist 
working at a private research 
institute, Cryrotech Industries in 
Johannesburg. Cryrotech 
specialises in developing cultures in 
a Bio Level 1 laboratory. The 
cultures are for the production of 
medication for drug-resistant 
infections. Information has reached 
your desk indicating Jamal had a 
meeting with a diplomat from the 
North Korean embassy, Kim Jong, 
who is suspected of being an 
undeclared intelligence officer. A 
decision is made to target Jamal 
because of her contact with Jong. 
Initial investigations indicate 
Cryrotech products can, with 
minimum adaptation, be used as a 
biological agent and Jong is known 
to be sourcing material for North 
Korea’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) program. More 
intrusive investigations indicate 
that Jamal leaves the bio medical 
lab every week with a briefcase and 
meets Jong at a local coffee shop. 
 
3.1 Is it ethically correct to target Jamal 
before there is proof of her being 
involved in illegal or 
unconstitutional activity? What 
level of intrusive targeting against 
Jamal would you as the investigator 
be comfortable with? More or less 
intrusive? 
 
Yes.  I can target Jamal in order 
to proof or refute my 
suspicions.  The level of 
intrusive measures will be 
based on the type of 
information I obtain from my 
sources. if it warrants more 
extensive measures, I would 
motivate and execute post 
haste.  
 
3.2 When Jamal is officially targeted, is 
she dehumanized (loses her value 
as a human being with rights)? 
Does this make monitoring her 
She will not be dehumanized as 
she wouldn’t know that she is 







3.3 You devise a plan to unwittingly 
solicit information from Jamal. This 
involves posing as a vetting officer 
conducting a reference check on a 
colleague for a security clearance. 
This involves lying and deception. Is 
this deception justified? Would the 
deception be justified if you had 
already confirmed her guilt? Do you 
think Jamal would suffer harm from 
the deception? How would the 
deception make you feel? 
Deception is needed in order to 
execute the task.  This is part of 
the job and is not wrong.  Very 
important that agent or 
operation is not compromised 
and Jamal will not suffer any 
loss.  
 
3.4 Would moral justifications lessen 
any possible moral burden that 
may result from a deception? 
Would you feel guilty? Would you 
feel the same way if at the 
conclusion of the investigation, it 
was proven that Jamal was involved 
in criminal activity (selling material 
to Jong?) 
Performing a function that 
requires deception will not be 
me feel guilty.  When it comes 
to handling a source of 
information or investigating a 
target, emotions cannot come 
into play.    
 
3.5 A colleague of Jamal is identified 
who lied about his qualifications to 
the laboratory. You recruit the 
colleague of Jamal on the basis that 
if the lab finds out about his deceit 
he will lose his job. You will use the 
colleague to report on Jamal’s 
activities. The approach is 
manipulative and morally wrong, 
but it will give you key insider 
information to determine whether 
Jamal is involved or not. Is 
blackmail justified in this case? If 
this recruitment would lead to a 
guaranteed success, would it be 
justified then? Do you see this as a 
sacrifice to your moral principles? 
At what point, or never? If this 
sacrifice ultimately leads to a 
success or saves lives, would you 
feel the same? What are your 
Its justified.  Once again, the 
agent will handle the 
investigation as best see fit to 
achieve the objective.  If an 
opportunity like this comes 
along, it should be fully 






thoughts on handling this agent? Is 
the agent treated as a means to an 
end (gathering information) or 
worthy of respect as a human 
being? 
3.6 Jamal meets Jong for lunch at a 
coffee shop. You have an 
opportunity to take her briefcase 
when they refill their coffee at the 
coffee station. The briefcase 
contents may reveal her guilt or 
prove her innocence. Is stealing, in 
this case, justified? Is too much 
‘harm’ being inflicted on the target 
in relation to the ‘benefit’ of 
acquiring the information? Would 
you justify this act of stealing 
against a personal set of ethical 
fundamentals? Do you suspend 
moral and ethical beliefs in cases 
like this? Is stealing always wrong, 
or can it be tolerated if the 
consequence is a greater good? 
Opportunity arises and stealing 
the case is justified.  
 
3.7 If the briefcase is taken and Jamal is 
proven innocent (she is 
romantically involved with Jong and 
not providing him with material), 
would you then question the 
morality of your action? If the 
briefcase reveals Jamal has passed 
biological material to Jong, would 
you then feel justified in lying, 
blackmailing and stealing? Does the 
benefit (neutralizing the target) 
then outweigh the cost (lying, 
blackmailing, stealing)? 
No, whether the outcome goes 
either way, stealing the case 




4.1 Do you suspend moral and ethical 
beliefs when engaging in covert 
operational activity? Do you 
Yes. Lying is not an ethical 
fundamental but this is the 






consciously justify each action or 
activity against a personal set of 
ethical fundamentals? 
 
information.  I don’t feel the 
need to justify my action to a 
personal set of beliefs.   
4.2 Have you seen a change in your 
moral and ethical beliefs in the 
period you’ve been employed at 
SSA? 
Not at all.  My work doesn’t 
define me as a person. When I 
engage for purposes of work, I 
act as an employer of SSA and 
not in my personal capacity.  I 
keep these two lives separately.  
It has become less difficult to lie 
in my personal life though, but 
it’s a personal choice not to 
choose this option just because 
it is easy.   
 
4.3 Have you adjusted your personal 
morals to accommodate the work 
of intelligence? Has this caused any 
personal conflict? 
Personal life is keep separate 
from work.  When I go home, I 
am my true self whereas when I 
am work, I am an actor.  
 
4.4 Have you ever questioned how 
your ethic baseline can be adjusted 
to accommodate a work activity? 
Not actually. When I do my 
planning to engage -  I do 
rehearse a certain profile I want 
people to see.  
 
4.5 Do you have two sets of morals and 
ethics – that which you apply in the 
work place, and that which you use 
outside of the workplace? 
In some ways yes.    
4.6 Has being granted legal licence to 
steal, manipulate, pry and spy 
impacted on your private life where 
these activities are illegal or 
immoral? Or is there a clear 
separation in your mind as to what 
is permitted in the workplace and 
not permitted everywhere else? 
Clear separation.  However, 
profiling people in my personal 
life has become a second 
nature and if I need to solicit 
information to confirm a 
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None, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Other 
(specify) ___________________) 
Christian   
Years’ 
service 
5-10 11-15 16-21 21+ 11-15  
Work area Collection       Investigations
 Surveillance 
Collection   
 











My study into intelligence ethics is now reaching 250 pages. Thank you again 
for your kind participation. The final product should be finalized in the first quarter 
of next year. The findings have been fascinating. 
In keeping with the research design, I have a few follow up questions. May I ask 
you to spend a few minutes and answer them as honestly as possible? Think about 
your answer carefully. Feel free to answer on the sheet below: 
Follow up Questions: 
1. Have you ever thought about the ethics of intelligence?    Yes  
2. Do you believe people may be harmed through your work (not physically, but 
rights or dignity impaired, etc?)  Yes  
3. If you could personally save five people by allowing one to die, would you?  No  
4. Do you ever feel like a ‘bad person’ or feel uncomfortable because of some of the 
(legally) unethical functions you have to perform? No  
5. How do you make yourself feel better again afterwards? What justifications do 
you use? 
Answer: The ends must justify the means and if it means that certain rights are 
infringed in the interests of national security then I feel justified in executing certain 
actions.  
6. Is it possible that you have two separate moral codes – a personal one and one 
which you use for work?  Definitely YES 
7.  If Yes, does the separate ‘work’ moral code accommodate all the morally difficult 
functions you have to perform – lie, steal, cheat? 
Answer: I would think that it does, although not so much as a lie but a manipulation 
of the truth.  
8. If No, does your personal ethical code allow you to lie, steal, deceive, if it is in 
work context? 
Answer:   
247 
 
 
 
 
